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ABSTRACT
AARON HUGH RATCLIFFE: Operating on Quality, Access, and Cost -
Managing Better Health Systems
(Under the direction of Dr. Ann Marucheck and Dr. Wendell Gilland)
Current spending in the US health system has reached 17.9% of GDP and the need for
improved decision-making to help lower costs and improve quality is widely recognized. This
dissertation, Operating on Quality, Access, and Cost: Managing Better Health Systems takes
a hierarchical approach to eﬀective healthcare decision-making by examining three broad areas
for healthcare improvement: health systems design, health systems maintenance, and clinical
operations. We examine how eﬀective operational strategies for improving health service deliv-
ery take into account interrelationships between quality, access, and cost of care. At the design
level, we employ competitive queueing models to study the impact of inter-provider competition
on quality, wait-time and social welfare. At the maintenance level, we use queueing network
analysis to study the relationship between screening guidelines and capacity planning for col-
orectal cancer. At the operations level, we employ stochastic modeling to analyze appointment
allocation policies to improve outpatient clinics' responsiveness to patients' needs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Symptoms show that the US Health System is a body in need of repair. Along three key di-
mensions of system performance the system functions poorly: costs are high and rising, quality
is sub-par and inconsistent, and access to care is limited and highly variable. US health expen-
ditures are higher than any other country on a per-capita basis, reaching $8,361 per-capita in
2010, and exceed any other developed country in terms of percent of GDP, reaching 17.9% in
2010. (WHO 2012). While costs of care are high in the US, many standard outcome measures
of the quality of care, such as life expectancy and mortality, have fallen behind other countries
- see Table 1.1. Nearly 15 years after the well-publicized Institute of Medicine report, To Err
Is Human: Building a Safer Health System claimed that 44,000-98,000 Americans die annually
due to medical errors (Linda T. Kohn and Molla S. Donaldson 2000), the eﬀectiveness of ef-
forts to improve patient safety remains unclear. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
more recently estimated that 100,000 Americans die from healthcare associated infections (CDC
2002). The Oﬃce of the Inspector General estimates that 180,000 Medicare patients experience
an adverse event which contributes to their death (Levinson 2010). Landrigan et al. (2010) ﬁnd
that 18.1% of hospital admissions experience at least one medically induced harm with 63%
of all harms identiﬁed as preventable. In terms of access, patients experience long delays for
outpatient appointments and crowding in the emergency room. A 2009 survey by Merritt and
Hawkins shows that the average time until a routine physical with a family practice provider is
20.3 days nationwide, ranging from 8 to 63 days across 15 selected metropolitan areas. Bour-
Table 1.1: International Comparison of Health Expenditures and Outcomes
Country Health
Expenditure as
% of GDP
(2011)
Population
Life
Expectancy at
Birth (2009)
Infant Deaths
per 1,000
(2009)
Deaths by Age
5 per 1,000
(2009)
USA 17.85 79 7 8
Netherlands 11.96 81 4 5
France 11.63 81 3 4
Canada 11.18 81 5 6
Denmark 11.15 79 3 4
Germany 11.06 80 3 4
Switzerland 10.86 82 4 4
Austria 10.64 80 4 5
Belgium 10.60 80 4 5
Portugal 10.36 79 4 4
Italy 9.50 82 3 4
Sweden 9.36 81 2 3
United Kingdom 9.32 80 5 5
Japan 9.27 83 2 3
Norway 9.07 81 3 4
*Source: WHO 2013: http://apps.who.int/nha/database/DataExplorerRegime.aspx
geois et al. (2008) estimate that 1.79% of all emergency department visits left without being
seen from 2000-2006. Hsia et al. (2011) ﬁnd that this percentage ranged from 0% to 20.3%
with a median percentage of 2.6% across 262 hospitals in California in 2007. These persistent
challenges, marked by medical errors, long delays for health service, and healthcare resource
shortages, are prevalent throughout other developed countries as well, but the high comparative
costs and low comparative outcomes in the US raise the question of whether the US is spending
more to get less and why (McLaughlin and McLaughlin 2008).
Numerous explanations have been oﬀered for these symptoms of poor system performance
and for most, no single explanation is evident or suﬃcient. The Institute of Medicine 2001 report
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century cites several reasons
for the gap between actual and potential performance of the health system: growing complexity
of science and technology, increase in chronic conditions, poorly organized delivery system, and
constraints on information technology adoption. Newhouse (2002) expands on these explor-
ing 5 possible causes of poor performance: consumer ignorance, rate of technological change,
2
administered prices, diﬃculty of measuring provider performance, and the role of the public
sector. Porter and Teisberg (2006) argue that competition on the wrong levels has failed the
US health system as evidenced by rising costs, high variation in quality across geographic areas,
and slow technological innovation. The authors contend that the current zero-sum competition,
where system participants work to gain bargaining power and shift costs to one another, leads
to competition which rewards breadth of services as opposed to treatment of speciﬁc medical
conditions, discrete interventions as opposed to the full cycle of care, and local bias as opposed
to performance accountability. Bohmer (2009) proposes three main problems: 1) we don't know
what to do, i.e. shortage of evidenced-based practice of medicine; 2) we don't do what we
know, i.e. proper care is under or over-supplied; 3) when we do what we know, we don't do it
right, i.e. medical errors and patient safety remain critical concerns. Green (2012) cites several
causes of the medical dilemma including: misaligned payment systems, high levels of uninsured
or under-insured patients, overloaded physicians, proﬁt seeking insurers, ineﬃcient and highly
fragmented health systems, and lack of communication and coordination.
In order to evaluate potential interventions and decide on the best treatments for improving
the system, it is important to better understand three key dimensions of health system perfor-
mance, quality, access, and cost, and the interrelationships between them. In the healthcare
services context, we can deﬁne quality as the degree to which health services increase the likeli-
hood of the desired outcome. In health services it is important to distinguish functional quality,
experiential elements of service such as amenities and reputation, from technical quality, i.e.
clinical outcomes, especially due to information asymmetry and principal-agent relationships
between patients and providers, (Gronroos 1993). Healthcare service consumption can be seen
as a credence purchase in that patients often use functional quality as a signal for technical
quality. Access can be deﬁned as the degree to which services can be obtained. Access may refer
to insurance coverage in the population, disparities in care due to socio-economic status, or the
distance patients must travel to obtain a particular service. Throughout this dissertation, we
will measure access primarily by how long patients must wait for a health service. In terms of
cost, diﬀerent stakeholders have diﬀerent perspectives on the cost as providers are concerned
with internal and external costs of supply, insurers are concerned with reimbursement prices,
3
Figure 1.1: Iron Triangle: Tradeoﬀs of Quality, Access, and Cost of Care
and patients focus on the cost of the insurance premium or out-of-pocket price of service.
The Iron Triangle of quality, access, and cost refers to a common paradigm for explaining
how improving performance along any one of these three key dimensions may compromise per-
formance on one or both of the other dimensions (Kissick 1994). For example, increasing access
to care in a system may require investing in additional resources (higher costs) or faster service
speed which could lead to lower quality. Such tradeoﬀs are not always required, for example
changes to payment structures, technological innovation, or lean improvement eﬀorts to reduce
waste could provide higher value (higher quality at lower cost) (DOJ and FTC 2004). However,
at some point tradeoﬀs between quality, access, and cost become fundamental to decisions made
by stakeholders at the design, maintenance, and operational levels of health systems.
Decisions regarding how to balance quality, access, and cost are made across multiple stake-
holders at multiple levels, each with its own priorities. Patients are the primary stakeholders
in that it is their individual health which is in question, but patients diﬀer in preferences, val-
ues, and needs. For example, some consumers may prefer nothing but the best while other
consumers may be willing to exchange lower quality service for lower prices or wait longer for
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higher quality service (DOJ and FTC 2004). As stakeholders, patients balance quality, cost, and
access through questions such as: Should I seek care with a lower ranked specialist who is more
convenient or aﬀordable? Should I follow guidelines for preventive cancer screening? Should I
schedule an appointment well in advance or wait until I know better my availability? Patients
often have little individual inﬂuence within the system, leaving much of the decision-making
power to larger stakeholders.
Providers are also stakeholders and face issues such as: How much should we invest in
quality and process improvement eﬀorts? How much capacity do we need to meet demand?
What mix of services should we oﬀer? Should we merge with another competing provider? How
do we schedule patient encounters and resources? State and federal governments are also a key
stakeholders and faces issues such as: Should hospitals be allowed to operate as monopolists or
is provider competition better for society? Which services, e.g. preventive cancer screenings,
should be covered by Medicare and Medicaid? Where should funds be invested in disease
prevention, and healthy behaviors? Payers oﬀer insurance and ﬁnancing options for patients
and employers who rely on healthy, productive employees. Within the supply chain, stakeholders
such as pharmaceutical companies and medical equipment suppliers inﬂuence the cost of care,
the rate of new product development, and the diﬀusion of technological innovation. With so
many stakeholders, movements such as patient-centered care attempt to unite stakeholders and
actively involve, educate, and engage patients in decisions which respect their preferences.
Recent major health policy reform in the US, via the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable
Care Act (ACA) of 2010 has drawn even greater public attention to the concerns surrounding
our health care delivery system, and the reform promises to bring with it signiﬁcant changes to
the system (Assistant Secretary of Public Aﬀairs 2010). One signiﬁcant, and commonly cited
change is the provision for increased health insurance coverage which requires all citizens to
carry health insurance or pay a federal tax penalty. The increase in health insurance coverage is
expected by many to lead to an increase in demand for health services as previously uninsured or
under-insured individuals will now be required to have coverage. Combined with the increased
demand for health services due to aging of the baby boomer generation, health providers must
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plan accordingly for increased patient volume. The impact of an increased demand is a recurring
question across diﬀerent types of health services and levels of analysis.
A second signiﬁcant change is the set of provisions within the ACA which emphasize pre-
ventive services. In particular, a new health insurance plan or insurance policy beginning on or
after September 23, 2010, must cover 15 preventive services for adults, 22 for women, and 26 for
children without the patient having to pay a co-payment or co-insurance or meet a deductible
when the services are delivered by a network provider ( U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services 2013). The increase in demand for preventive health services could therefore be even
greater. Colonoscopy screening for patients over 50 is an example of such a preventive service
which has seen a dramatic increase in volume in the past 10 years (Rosenthal 2013).
A third signiﬁcant development connected to the ACA is the emphasis on accountable care
organizations (ACO) and the idea of a patient-centered medical home. In an ACO, a provider's
reimbursement is linked to quality of care metrics for managing the overall health for a given
population (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2013). The ACA authorizes the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to create shared savings programs to contract with
providers. The beneﬁts of ACOs are that they alter provider incentives so that there is a
greater emphasis on value for the patient (higher quality at lower costs), and they support
increased eﬃciency and coordination across diﬀerent levels of care (e.g. primary, specialty,
etc.). ACOs are not without challenges. There are a lack of clear guidelines for implementation
and issues concerning provider consolidation and competition. While the federal government
indirectly encourages providers to form ACOs via consolidation under the ACA, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) still encourages market competition and providers who form ACOs
run the risk of anti-trust infringement due to consolidation. Better understanding of the impact
of provider consolidation on quality, cost, and access to service is warranted in order to eﬀectively
balance these two opposing pressures relating to implementation of ACOs.
A fourth important change related to the ACA is information transparency and the creation
of health information exchanges in order to provide patients with better information to make
health service consumption decisions. In order for patients to accurately balance the tradeoﬀs
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Figure 1.2: Multiple Stakeholders inﬂuence health system design and delivery
between quality, cost and access described in the Iron Triangle, the patients must have access
to accurate information about each of the dimensions across competing providers. It is unclear
how patients will actually utilize public reporting of provider quality, cost, and service delivery
metrics, but the general agreement is that improved consumer access to such information places
greater pressure on providers to deliver higher quality service, with better access at lower cost.
In this dissertation we use operations management theory and analysis to investigate three
critical research problems which correspond to a three-level hierarchy of health systems anal-
ysis: health system design, health system maintenance, and health system operations. At the
design level, we employ competitive queueing models to further investigate the role of compet-
itive structures in health care. By examining the role of competition, we study one important
proposed explanation for poor system performance. We provide insights regarding whether pol-
icy makers should use programs such as Certiﬁcate of Need to regulate competition for health
services. We also investigate how provider strategy, and the balance of quality, cost, and access,
changes from a monopoly to a duopoly environment. At the maintenance level, we use queueing
network analysis to study the relationship between screening guidelines and capacity planning
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for colorectal cancer. Lack of emphasis on prevention is another critical explanation for poor
system. By examining a research problem related to colorectal cancer, we provide insight and
contribute to research on planning supply and demand for preventive services. At the operations
level, we employ stochastic modeling to analyze appointment allocation policies to improve out-
patient clinics' responsiveness to patients' needs. These three research problems by no means
represent the exhaustive resume of how operations research has been applied in healthcare, but
they are a selection of problems which are united by 1) their focus on health service delivery and
managing the associated operations as opposed to problems which emphasize medical decision
making; and 2) their emphasis of the tradeoﬀs between quality, access, and cost and how to
extend the boundaries of the Iron Triangle.
In Chapter 2, we take a design-level perspective to conduct a theoretical analysis of how
competitive structures impact system performance, in terms of quality, access, cost and social
welfare with ﬁxed prices. We use generalized service models to analyze the setting within the
health services industry. During the 1970s and 1980s, when price competition in health services
delivery was fairly weak, analysts argued that provider competition was based on non-price
elements of the service (Gaynor 2006). Anecdotes and scholarly claimed that this led to an es-
calation of technology and capacity investments termed the Medical Arms Race. Prior economic
and health policy research, both theoretical and empirical, has demonstrated that competition
increases quality when prices are ﬁxed but has largely overlooked the impact on access to care,
in particular wait-time dynamics (Gaynor 2006). We analyze a competitive queueing model, an
increasingly common approach in general service provider equilibrium models in the literature,
to compare equilibrium proﬁt, social welfare, quality eﬀort and capacity decisions between a
monopoly and duopoly setting. We model health providers as single-server queues that max-
imize expected proﬁts by optimizing a quality eﬀort and capacity decision. Consumers select
a provider to maximize utility, which is a function of provider quality eﬀort, co-payment, and
expected wait time. In our base model, we ﬁnd that competition leads to a duplication of qual-
ity eﬀort and capacity buﬀers and a corresponding loss of social welfare when providers choose
both quality eﬀort and capacity. However, by modeling diﬀerent cost functions, wait functions,
and types of service quality, we show that competition may lead to a reduction or escalation of
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quality eﬀort. When providers only choose quality eﬀort (capacity is ﬁxed), competition may
lead to lower quality and lower wait-time, and an increase in social welfare. The models which
show a reduction of quality eﬀort are signiﬁcant in that they counter previous economic theory
and the Medical Arms Race argument that price-regulated competition always leads to higher
quality.
In Chapter 3, at the health maintenance level, we examine screening policy and capacity
allocation decisions for Colorectal Cancer (CRC) prevention. CRC is a signiﬁcant health concern
both in the US and worldwide. The National Cancer Institute estimates 146,970 new cases in
2009 with 106,100 of those being colon cancer (National Cancer Institute 2013b). CRC is also
the second leading cause of cancer death in the United States (National Cancer Institute 2013b).
We examine two research questions: 1) How should screening providers or policy makers design
their screening capacity to minimize the sum of capacity and detection delay costs? 2) What
are the tradeoﬀs between the optimal guidelines for time between screening and the optimal
capacity? We use a queueing network model to capture patient return behavior for cancer
screenings. A social planner selects a capacity to optimize expected total cost per unit time
which is the sum of expected detection delay costs (for all patients in the population) and the
cost of capacity. We calculate the optimal capacity assuming the average time until the next
screening request is exogenous. In order to better understand the tradeoﬀs between screening
guidelines and screening capacity, we analyze a model where the provider optimizes the average
time until the next screening request for ﬁxed capacity, and also investigate a joint model where
the provider optimizes both the average time until the next screening request and the capacity.
Given the ACA emphasizes colonoscopy as a preventive service which new insurance policies
must cover at no expense to the patient, understanding capacity planning for colonoscopy is a
relevant and noteworthy problem.
In Chapter 4, at the operational level, we study how clinics should allocate appointment
capacity to improve outpatient appointment access and reduce the wasteful impact of no-shows.
Poor appointment access is a growing trend. In 2001, 33% of patients reported an inability
to obtain a timely appointment as opposed to 23% in 1997 (Strunk and Cunningham 2002).
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Simultaneously, clinics experience alarmingly high no-show rates, and research supports that
no-show rates are higher when patients schedule further in advance (Gallucci et al. 2005, Green
and Savin 2008, Liu et al. 2010). Clinics must balance scheduling advance requests at high
no-show rates and holding appointments open for potential immediate requests at low no-show
rates. Open Access is a popular paradigm for clinics to do today's work today by oﬀering
same-day appointments and encouraging short booking windows. As encountered by clinics
in the UNC Health Care System Patient Access and Eﬃciency Initiative, Open Access does
not eliminate the underlying challenges of managing clinic capacity since some patients request
advance appointments, due to preferences, medical condition, travel arrangements, or ease of
scheduling follow-up visits. We analyze how a clinic should control bookings from two sequential
patient classes with diﬀerent no-show rates in order to maximize expected proﬁt. We employ
stochastic comparisons to establish structural properties and develop approximations for the
optimal appointment allocation policy. Our numerical study compares our approximations with
the optimal policy and policies used in practice and previous literature. On average, we ﬁnd
that the optimal policy increases proﬁts 17.8% over FCFS. A simple policy we develop performs
0.3% below optimal. Pure Open Access can achieve optimality in some situations but performs
23.0% below optimal on average. We provide methods for eﬀectively implementing joint capacity
control and overbooking for outpatient appointments.
There is great opportunity to improve decision-making within the health services system
using analytical tools and operations management theory. The impetus for doing so is expanding
for several reasons: practitioners are becoming increasingly aware of the beneﬁts of analytical
methods; the demand for health services is growing due to an aging population and the ACA;
policy makers are trying to cut healthcare costs due to sluggish economy and large government
deﬁcits; and competitive pressures and regulations require improved quality performance (Green
2012). This dissertation oﬀers insight and tools for improved decision making for both health
service system managers and policy makers with respect to three important health service
delivery research problems where quality, access, and cost must be balanced.
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Chapter 2
Competition Between Health Providers:
Impact on Quality, Access, Cost, and Social
Welfare
2.1 Introduction
US health expenditures are higher than any other country on a per-capita basis, reaching $8,361
per-capita in 2010, and exceed any other developed country in terms of percent of GDP, reaching
17.9% in 2010. (WHO 2012). While costs of care are high in the US, many standard outcome
measures of the quality of care, such as life expectancy and mortality, have fallen behind other
countries (WHO 2010). These numbers raise the question of whether the US is spending more
to get less and why. In the US, competition plays an important role in how providers balance
priorities of quality, access, and cost and which strategies they adopt in order to try and improve
performance on multiple dimensions. Features of the market for health services make it distinct
from other markets and can limit the beneﬁts of competition (Porter and Teisberg 2006). The
question remains whether competition within the US health care system is a problem or a
solution or both. We develop an analytical model of health provider competition to study
provider operations strategy and the impact of competition on quality, cost and access to care.
The iron triangle of quality, access, and cost refers to a common paradigm in health
policy analysis where improving performance along any of the three dimensions may compromise
one or both of the other dimensions (Kissick 1994). Some strategies and innovations break
the boundaries of these tradeoﬀs by improving performance in multiple dimensions, e.g. lean
improvement aims at providing higher quality at lower cost by eliminating waste in the provider's
delivery system; but ultimately, these tradeoﬀs are necessary to the design of the health system.
Additionally, these tradeoﬀs must be weighed across multiple levels and stakeholders; e.g. some
consumers may prefer nothing but the best while other consumers may be willing to exchange
lower quality service for lower prices or wait longer for higher quality service (DOJ and FTC
2004). To understand how competition impacts system performance as measured by these
dimensions, it is fundamentally important to incorporate such tradeoﬀs into our model of the
health service delivery market.
Healthy competition for health services is limited by unique features of the market includ-
ing: a highly regulated marketplace; distorted incentives due to third-party payment (health
insurance); information problems such as asymmetry, reliability, and lack of transparency; soci-
etal attitudes regarding medical care; and agency relationships (DOJ and FTC 2004). Addition-
ally health service consumption can be deﬁned as a credence purchase in that consumers often
use perceptions and functional quality, experiential elements of service such as amenities and
reputation, as signals for technical quality, i.e. clinical outcomes (Gronroos 1993). Porter and
Teisberg (2006) contend that in a normal market competition drives relentless improvements
in quality and cost, whereas competition on the wrong levels has failed the US health care
system as evidenced by rising costs, high variation in quality across geographic areas, and slow
technological innovation. By competition on the wrong levels, the authors refer to zero-sum
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competition where system participants work to gain bargaining power and shift costs to one
another. This leads to competition which rewards breadth of services as opposed to treatment
of speciﬁc medical conditions, discrete interventions as opposed to full cycle of care, and local
bias as opposed to performance accountability standards set by competing providers in more
distant geographic regions. The authors argue, however, that while competition on the wrong
levels is the core problem, competition on services which create value for patients is the core
solution. As a result of the barriers to price competition in the health services market, health
economists and health policy researchers have argued for the existence of a Medical Arms Race
(MAR) which is characterized by an escalation of high-cost technology and capacity investments
due to provider competition on non-price elements of service such as advertising, amenities, and
reputation which may not lead directly to better medical outcomes (Joskow 1980, Robinson and
Luft 1985, 1987, Dranove et al. 1992).
The Medical Arms Race (MAR) argument was ﬁrst proposed in the 1970s and 1980s, when
prices were largely regulated by the government. Since that time several signiﬁcant changes
have occurred in the health care landscape. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant change is that the onset of
managed care in the mid-1990's gave more pricing power to payers to contract with health
service providers. As a result, consolidation amongst US health providers has surged since the
mid-1990's due to greater ﬁnancial pressure to cut costs and increase quality with the onset
of managed care. In theory, as payers developed more negotiating power, they could act as
agents for the consumers and leverage greater price competition between providers. . Many
urban areas are now dominated by 2-3 health systems. Levin Associates estimates 900 hospital
mergers and acquisitions from 1991 to 2000, and though the number dropped to 589 from 2001
to 2010, the estimated value of these mergers still exceeds $80 billion (Gaynor 2006, Irving
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Levin Associates, Inc. 2011). The debate continues regarding what happens to price, quality,
and access to care due to increased consolidation. Will consolidation lead to increased prices
and reduced access to care as providers exert monopoly power or will it create eﬃciency gains
and reduce unnecessary duplication of services leading to lower costs and greater aﬀordability?
By controlling the medical arms race through consolidation, will the overall quality of health
care improve and at what cost?
A second important change is that interventions have been enacted to limit competition
in healthcare markets, and debate continues regarding their usefulness. At ﬁrst on the federal
and then on the state level, Certiﬁcate of Need (C.O.N.) and other similar programs were
developed to coordinate planning of new capacity and technology adoption, and to control high-
cost expenditures deemed medically unnecessary. While C.O.N. was repealed on the federal
level in 1987, due to its ineﬀectiveness in controlling costs, C.O.N. programs administered at
the state level may require health providers to obtain government authorization before oﬀering
high-cost services (e.g. bone marrow transplant), investing in high-cost technologies (e.g. proton
beam therapy, gamma knife or Magnetic Resonance Imaging), or changing bed capacity.
A third change relates to the evolution of consumer access to information. The information
technology boom now makes it possible for consumers to access more information before selecting
a healthcare provider. Using websites such as The Department of Health and Human Service's
Compare Hospital tool, consumers may compare hospitals with respect to a variety of diﬀerent
performance measures of process, outcomes, patient satisfaction, and Medicare reimbursement
(HHS.gov). Additionally, many health providers now provide real-time wait time information,
in particular for Emergency Departments, via billboards, text messages, and internet sites in
an attempt to emphasize wait-time access as a strategic priority and lure customers away from
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competitors (Fleisher 2011). The Aﬀordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) emphasizes information
transparency as an important part of health policy reform with the creation of health infor-
mation exchanges in order to provide patients with better information to make health service
consumption decisions. Questions remain to be answered as to how health care consumers truly
use this information and how it aﬀects their choices of providers.
In light of the changing landscape, some researchers have argued for the existence of a
new medical arms race. Devers et al. (2003) observe a shift in provider's strategic emphasis
between 1996-1997 and 2000-2001. They ﬁnd that in the mid-1990s hospitals primarily competed
on price by providing services attractive to managed care plans, but by 20002001, non-price
competition was becoming increasingly important and hospitals were reviving strategies which
provide services attractive to individual physicians and the patients they serve. They point out
some important diﬀerences between the new medical arms race and that of the 1970s and 1980s:
the hospital market is more concentrated and price competition remains relatively important.
Numerous national and local news reports continue to provide anecdotal evidence of hospital
rivalry and non-price competition (Whelan and Langreth 2009, Warner 2011, Emanuel and
Pearson 2012, Wall 2012, Locke and Frank 2012).
In this work we analyze a competitive queuing model to examine how competition between
health providers impacts quality, wait-time access, and cost under ﬁxed prices. We compare
consumer surplus, industry proﬁt, and social welfare between a monopoly and duopoly setting.
Previous economic theory consistently supports that quality will increase under ﬁxed-price com-
petition and lead to cost escalation. We seek to understand if the escalation is mitigated or
exacerbated in a model which incorporates consumer equilibrium waiting behavior. We also
perform comparative statics to study how current trends in the US market for health services,
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such as an increasingly informed consumer population and growing demand, aﬀect the role of
competition. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a
review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, we describe the model and provide results for the
base assumptions. In Section 4, we analyze variations of the model where ﬁxed-price competi-
tion leads to lower quality eﬀort and lower wait time, a counter-argument to the Medical Arms
Race. In Section 5, we analyze variations of the model where ﬁxed-price competition leads to
higher quality eﬀort and higher wait time, supporting the Medical Arms Race argument. In
Section 6, we consider a model where quality and service rate are linked by a single decision and
compare the results with the base model. In Section 7, we summarize the results of the various
models. In Section 8, we oﬀer conclusions and insights from our work and discuss opportunities
for future research.
2.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to theoretical and empirical research from economics and health policy as
well as competitive queueing models from operations management literature.
Gaynor (2006) reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of competition
on quality. Under ﬁxed prices, he ﬁnds consistent support for higher quality and higher consumer
welfare but ambiguous eﬀects on social welfare. White (1972) and Douglas and Miller (1974)
both develop models motivated by the regulated airline industry to show that when prices are
regulated, ﬁrms compete away proﬁts by oﬀering higher quality. Held and Pauly (1983) present
a simple model, motivated by study of the Medicare program for persons with end stage renal
(kidney) failure, to show a competitive amenity bias - i.e. the level of amenity can be aﬀected
by the level of reimbursement and the level of competition. Pope (1989) examines hospital
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non-price competition in Medicare's Prospective Payment System and ﬁnds that hospitals raise
their quality to compete for Medicare patients. The higher quality expenditures lead to increased
costs, but simultaneously reduce slack. Allen and Gertler (1991) analyze a theoretical model
where consumers are heterogeneous and a ﬁrm can endogenously discriminate based on quality
under two pricing scenarios: 1) the consumer is the payer, 2) the payer is not the consumer.
The authors ﬁnd that ﬁxed-price regulation leads to distributional welfare loss and show that it
cannot induce providers to supply all consumer types with ﬁrst-best quality under either pricing
scenario. Calem and Rizzo (1995) develop a variant of the Hotelling location model where
reimbursement prices are exogenously determined by third-party payers to examine hospitals
which compete with respect to specialty mix and quality of service. They ﬁnd competing
hospitals diﬀerentiate specialties too much or too little compared to the socially optimal service
mix chosen by the monopolist, thereby suggesting that hospital mergers lead to eﬃciency gains
since the consolidated hospitals do not have to maintain excess capacity. They also ﬁnd that
higher reimbursement levels lead to intensiﬁed quality competition, and therefore higher costs,
but also to increased service diﬀerentiation as hospitals try to relax quality rivalry. Brekke
et al. (2010) use a diﬀerential-game approach to show this eﬀect can be exaggerated in static
models. Our work contributes to this stream of economic theory by considering quality and
capacity competition in a ﬁxed-price market where consumers are sensitive to wait-time. We
study whether the wait-time dynamics mitigate or exacerbate the impacts of competition on
quality and social welfare. Many of the previous papers from this stream consider the impact of
competition on quality, but do not explicitly model access which we capture through queueing
elements of our model.
From the empirical literature, numerous studies consider Medicare patients, to study a ﬁxed-
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price population, and show that competition, measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), improves quality, measured by decreased mortality (Gaynor 2006). Kessler and McClel-
lan (2000) ﬁnd that before 1991, hospital competition led to higher costs and, in some cases,
lower rates of adverse outcomes for elderly Medicare patients with heart disease; whereas after
1991, hospital competition led both to substantially lower costs and signiﬁcantly lower rates of
adverse outcomes. Shen (2003) studies how the number of hospitals interacting with Medicare
aﬀects AMI mortality and ﬁnds no eﬀect from 1985-90, but an increase in quality (decrease in
mortality) from 1990-94. Tay (2003) studies the impact of demand elasticity on mortality for
Medicare heart attack patients and ﬁnds an increase in quality (decrease in mortality). The
authors argue that this evidence supports the claim that hospital competition improved social
welfare. Kessler and Geppert (2005) ﬁnd that increased competition leads to lower readmission
rates for Medicare patients. Many such studies emphasize outcome-based metrics for quality
and make few conclusions regarding functional elements of quality. One exception is (Held and
Pauly 1983). While outcome measures of quality may be increased due to competition, it is still
unclear how value is aﬀected, i.e. whether the higher quality comes at substantially higher cost.
When prices are set by ﬁrms, the eﬀect of competition on quality and welfare is unclear.
Theoretical results suggest that competition may not necessarily lead to optimal quality eﬀort.
Kamien and Vincent (1991) and Ma and Burgess (1993) show that unregulated competition
leads to suboptimal quality under exogenous product variety. Spence (1975) shows that the
monopolist supplies a socially optimal level of quality only when the marginal consumer is the
average consumer. Allard et al. (2009) derive conditions where physicians supply optimal eﬀort
in a repeated game, but sub-optimal eﬀort in a static game. The empirical literature also
shows conﬂicting results on the eﬀect of competition on quality, even when varying measures
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of quality and competition are used. Propper et al. (2004) and Propper et al. (2008) show
increased competition, as measured by the number of competitors, leads to decreased quality as
measured by mortality. Ho and Hamilton (2000) show that decreased competition, as measured
by the number of hospital mergers, can lead to lower quality, as measured by the number of
readmissions for heart attack and stroke. Thus, the eﬀect of competition on quality in health
care is an open question, particularly when prices are not ﬁxed.
Our work is also related to equilibrium queueing models from service operations. Hassin and
Haviv (2003) oﬀer a comprehensive review of the literature on equilibrium behavior of customers
and servers in queueing systems. These models largely derive from seminal work by Naor (1969)
who ﬁnds that a levying toll can induce strategic customers in a queue to behave in a socially
optimal manner. More recent work expands upon that model by examining the tradeoﬀ between
service rate and service quality, which has been modeled both in terms of service value and in
terms of service outcomes. Kostami and Rajagopalan (2009) develop a model where a ﬁrm
may speed up a process to meet more demand with less congestion, but this may result in
decreased quality. They highlight the signiﬁcance of this tradeoﬀ in the healthcare sector. They
also characterize and compare the equilibrium outcomes for a single provider in a single period
and dynamic, multi-period setting. Anand et al. (2011) describe services where the quality-
speed tradeoﬀ is critical and demonstrate that the customer-intensity of the service is a critical
driver of equilibrium price, service speed, demand, congestion in queues and service provider
revenues. Pac and Veeraraghavan (2010) analyze expert service providers' pricing and diagnosis
strategies when there is information asymmetry between the expert and the consumer. The
expert prices two treatments, receives asymmetric information from a diagnosis, and then refers
the consumer for treatment. The authors ﬁnd that congestion concerns mitigate expert cheating
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and that experts charge high prices to signal honest diagnoses. Dai et al. (2012) model test-
ordering behavior for a single physician and a pool of insured patients in an outpatient setting
using an equilibrium queueing model. They model service quality as diagnostic certainty which
decreases in service rate (i.e. more diagnostic testing leads to diagnostic accuracy) and increases
patient utility. Under the baseline model, physician over-testing always occurs due to insurance
coverage and the authors also consider the eﬀects of ﬁve diﬀerent service environments. We
consider similar quality-speed tradeoﬀs but our model takes a higher-level perspective in order
to gain insights into health operations strategy; therefore, service providers represent health
systems or competing clinics, either independent or from across competing health systems.
Other research from competitive queuing models examines competition between the service
providers. Chen and Wan (2005) study how market size aﬀects market structure when service
providers choose price and capacity with homogeneous customers. They characterize the Nash
equilibrium and show that when it is proﬁtable for both providers to enter, there exists a con-
tinuum of equilibria where providers split the full market and adjust their respective capacity
decisions accordingly. They also show that a monopoly is socially optimal and that a duopoly
results in a loss of social welfare due to the dominance of economies of scale. Allon and Fed-
ergruen (2008) compare three models of competition based on the timing of price and delay
decisions (delay ﬁrst, price ﬁrst, simultaneous) and ﬁnd that choosing delay ﬁrst leads to high-
est wait time and lowest prices. Afanasyev and Mendelson (2010) compare a generalized delay
cost structure with a traditional additive delay cost structure in a model with heterogeneous
customers where two competing service providers choose arrival rates and capacities. They show
that when customer service valuations are additive (i.e. independent of disutility from waiting),
both providers may oﬀer diﬀerentiated services, in terms of price and delay, but customers are
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always indiﬀerent between the providers, i.e. there is no market segmentation. Under the gen-
eralized delay cost structure, where service valuations and delay costs are interdependent, they
ﬁnd value-based segmentation in the market when the service providers have diﬀerent costs,
i.e. one provider gives fast service to high-value consumers and the other gives lower price and
slower service to low-value consumers. Many of the previous papers from this stream examine
models with provider pricing. Our work is a contribution to previous papers on service provider
competition, as it considers a ﬁxed price model where consumers are insured, and in our model,
the provider chooses its quality eﬀort and service rate with possible inter-dependencies between
the two decisions.
2.3 Model Formulation
We formulate a two-stage competitive queueing model with 2 service providers and a population
(enrollment) of N potential consumers of a medical service. Here providers represent competing
health systems or competing clinics, either independent or across health systems. In the ﬁrst
stage, Provider i = 1, 2 maximizes its long-run expected proﬁt per unit time, pii, by selecting
its quality eﬀort, xi, and capacity, µi. Each provider incurs variable costs Ci (xi, µi) which are
jointly convex in quality eﬀort and service capacity, respectively. Each provider earns a reim-
bursement price ri per consumer served. The quality eﬀort decision represents per-period eﬀorts
made by the provider over a base quality level which may increase consumer service valuation
(e.g. higher functional/experiential quality, or fewer side-eﬀects associated with treatment) or
the probability of a successful service outcome (e.g. higher technical/clinical quality), or both.
However, quality eﬀort comes with a cost. This cost can be either the ﬁnancial cost associated
with quality improvement projects, operating additional amenities, or the time cost, as we will
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see below, associated with safety inspections or spending more face-time with the patient. The
service rate represents the aggregate capacity of the provider (clinic/facility), not necessarily
the service rate of an individual resource. Therefore, in this model, the queue does not describe
a short-term imbalance for a given resource, but an approximation for access to the service in
terms of aggregate provider utilization. The variation in arrivals and service described by the
queueing model then refers to an aggregate for the provider (e.g. patients per day, per week,
etc.). The provider can increase its capacity through means such as process improvement, hiring
additional staﬀ, or leasing or amortizing payments on additional equipment, all of which are
aggregated under an cost of service capacity in each period.
In a given time period, consumers from the ﬁxed enrollment require (seek) medical service
independently with probability s and generate a Poisson arrival process with arrival rate Λ = Ns.
We assume that consumers are able to observe whether or not they need medical service and the
probability of seeking service, s, is independent of any decision made by the provider, i.e. the
provider cannot induce demand from patients who are not ill (enough to seek care). Arriving
consumers observe the quality eﬀort, the expected wait-time, and the out-of-pocket payment
at each provider a priori. For our analysis, we assume all consumers are homogenous but
specify a general model where consumer valuation for service may vary within the population.
The expected utility that consumer n receives from service at Provider i = 1, 2 is denoted by
Uin = Vin (xi) − hWi (µi, λi, xi) − pi where Vin (xi) is the service valuation of consumer n at
Provider i = 1, 2, Wi (µi, λi, xi) is the expected throughput time at Provider i = 1, 2, and h
is the disutility per unit time spent in the system. For simplicity we assume the out-of-pocket
payment paid by the consumer at Provider i = 1, 2 is the same for all consumers and this price
is also exogenously given. We assume that Vin (xi) is a random variable which is independent
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and identically distributed across the population, stochastically increasing in the quality eﬀort
decision, xi, and follows a known distribution with c.d.f. Fxi (v). We assume that consumers
know their own service valuation as well as the service value distribution of other consumers.
Given this information, consumers maximize their expected utility by deciding to join a queue
(e.g. take the ﬁrst available appointment) or take an outside option which has exogenous utility
b. While the provider valuations may be heterogeneous across patients, we assume the value of
the outside option is constant across all patients. In the healthcare context, the outside option
might refer to emergency care for those who cannot access primary care services, destination
providers such as Mayo Clinic for those who cannot access local specialty services, or home
remedies for non-acute services. We are modeling healthcare settings, such as outpatient care
or scheduled surgeries, where a patient's condition is not so emergent that there is no time to
choose between providers or the outside option. The consumer joining decisions lead to the
eﬀective arrival rates at each provider denoted by λi for i = 1, 2.
Using the above assumptions and notation we write the objective function for Provider
i = 1, 2 as:
maxpii = riλi − Ci (xi, µi) (2.1)
The consumer choice model is given by:
Un = max {V1n (x1)− hW1 (µ1, λ1, x1)− p1, V2n (x2)− hW2 (µ2, λ2, x2)− p2, b} (2.2)
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Before proceeding to the model analysis, we introduce some simplifying base case assump-
tions and discuss limitations of our model. First we assume that costs are linear, i.e. Ci (xi, µi) =
qixi + ciµi + k where qi ≥ 0 denotes the linear cost of quality eﬀort per period, ci ≥ 0 denotes
the linear cost of capacity per period, and k ≥ 0 denotes a ﬁxed operating cost per period.
This assumption is primarily made for convenience as either economies of scale or dependen-
cies between the costs of quality eﬀort and capacity may exist in reality which could mean the
variable costs could be non-linear or the capacity operating cost be quality-eﬀort dependent.
We assume that both quality eﬀort and capacity are unbounded continuous decision variables.
Though it has limitations, discussed below, the linear cost function assumption is common in
previous literature on service provider competition. (Chen and Wan 2005).
Second, we assume that service times are exponential so that each provider may be modeled
as an M/M/1 queue. We assume that the eﬀective mean service rate, τi, is linear in the provider's
chosen service rate and quality eﬀort, i.e. τi = µi−δxi, where δ denotes the correlation between
quality eﬀort and eﬀective service rate. When δ = 0, the service rate is independent of the
quality eﬀort decision. If δ > 0, then higher quality eﬀort may require the provider to slow
its eﬀective service rate, e.g. by spending more time serving the consumer, which may be
true of amenities like noise abatement and educational programs. If δ < 0, then increasing
the quality eﬀort further increases the provider's service rate, e.g. the provider expands its
quality eﬀort by operating clinic management technology, such as Electronic Medical Records
and computer based ordering which increase service rate and consumer service valuation. Given
this assumption, we write Wi (µi, λi, x1) =
1
µi−δxi−λi . The exponential service assumption is
made for mathematical tractability, however, since we are using the queueing model to represent
aggregate variation in arrivals and service, the exponential assumption may over-estimate true
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variation in capacity. As discussed by Green and Savin (2008), there likely is some variation in
provider capacity. This variation is not only variation due to time spent with individual resources
(e.g. check-in, nurse, physician etc.), but also variation in supply due to wasted appointments
(no-shows, late cancellations and reschedules) and variation in number of appointment slots
requested. We can generalize the results to M/G/1 queues and approximately to G/G/1 queues
using the PollaczekKhinchine and Kingman's formulas, respectively.
There are several limitations of the model which should be discussed before proceeding. First,
we assume that the out-of-pocket payment at a given provider is the same for all consumers.
In reality, consumers may pay diﬀerent prices because they are on diﬀerent plans (even with
same insurer) or have diﬀerent amounts of deductible remaining. A second limitation is that
our model does not incorporate into patient preferences any disutility from switching providers
which may exist when patients seek service for multiple episodes of care from the same facility.
Also, our modeling of the endogeneity of demand for health service is limited. In reality, the
quality of service a patient receives today may aﬀect their future health state and demand for
health services tomorrow. Consumers who receive high quality care may be more likely to return
to a given provider due to a positive experience, but may not return for service for a longer period
of time if the care received keeps them well longer. A third limitation is that consumers may be
heterogeneous on multiple components of their utility, for instance some classes of patients may
have higher sensitivity to waiting or higher expected service times. Additionally, there may exist
correlations between the components of the utility function, e.g. consumers who value service
more may be more sensitive to waiting. Lurking variables such as a consumer's underlying
health state might also impact multiple components of the utility function. A ﬁnal limitation
of the model is that the queueing service discipline does not accurately reﬂect appointment
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scheduling systems used by many outpatient providers in practice. Appointment systems help
providers balance variation of in-clinic waiting time, reserve capacity for urgent requests, and
match supply with patient preferences. We assume a FCFS service discipline though in reality
consumers may not always prefer the ﬁrst available appointment. Since we are concerned with
overall expected wait-time, we do not model the appointment schedule exactly, but acknowledge
it as an important component in many healthcare contexts. See Green and Savin (2008) for
further discussion of using FCFS queueing model for appointment delay in the outpatient setting.
Several of these limitations will be revisited by relaxing model assumptions in later sections or
extensions. While relaxing assumptions to consider various extensions provides for interesting
problems, the base case assumptions allow for a simple model to address our core research
question regarding the impact of competition.
2.3.1 Base Model Analysis: Duplication of Quality Eﬀort
We assume that consumers are homogenous with linear quality sensitivity. This assumption
implies that the consumer service valuation at provider i = 1, 2 is identical for all consumers
and takes the form Vin = ai + βxi ∀n. The base service valuation at provider i = 1, 2 when
quality investment is zero is given by ai ≥ 0, and the linear coeﬃcient β > 0 represents the
consumers' sensitivity to quality eﬀort and is constant across all consumers. The expected
consumer utility, Uin = ai+βxi−hWi (λi, µi, xi)−pi, does not depend on n, i.e. the individual
consumer. Given the arrival rate, all consumers receive the same expected utility from service.
For convenience, we let zi = (pi + b− ai) denote the base eﬀective out-of-pocket cost for
service to the consumer (when accounting for the base service value and the value of the outside
option).
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Common results from competitive queueing models provide the following market clearing
condition as an equilibrium solution to the consumer choice model when consumers are homo-
geneous. Consumers play a mixed strategy such that in equilibrium all consumers are indiﬀerent
between joining a local queue or taking the outside option (Chen and Wan 2005, Afanasyev and
Mendelson 2010).
Incorporating our base assumption of consumer homogeneity, we rewrite this consumer choice
equilibrium condition as
a+ βx− hWi (λi, µi)− pi = b (2.3)
Proceeding by backward induction and writing zi = (pi + b− ai) , we can rewrite the
provider's optimization problem as follows:
max
xi≥0,µi≥0
pii = riλi − qixi − ciµi − k (2.4)
βxi − h
µi − δxi − λi − zi = 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.5)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (2.6)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.7)
λi < µi − δxi ∀i = 1, 2 (2.8)
In the above problem statement, Equation (2.5) represents the consumer equilibrium con-
straint (or market clearing constraint); Equation (2.6) is a demand constraint which states that
the sum of the arrival rates at each provider must be less than or equal to the total market po-
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tential; Equation (2.7) is a straightforward non-negativity constraint on the arrival rate at each
provider, and Equation (2.8) is the stationarity constraint required for stability of the queuing
model.
We make some assumptions on the parameters to eliminate trivial cases for our model. First,
we assume ri > ci such that an entering provider will choose a non-zero service rate. We also
assume qi + ciδ ≥ 0 to eliminate the case where the cost tradeoﬀ for the quality eﬀort is trivial
and the provider pushes its quality eﬀort to inﬁnity.
To examine the impacts of competition we will compare the duopoly equilibrium with the
monopoly equilibrium. These comparisons of monopolistic and oligopolistic environments seem
reasonable for a health care market which, as we mentioned in the Introduction, is largely con-
solidated with many urban areas dominated by a few major health systems. For the monopoly
case we drop the subscripts and optimize with respect to the service capacity, µ, and the quality
eﬀort, x, to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Assuming q + cδ ≥ 0, if it is proﬁtable for the monopolist to enter, the
optimal quality and capacity for the monopolist are given by x∗ =
√
ch
β(q+cδ) +
z
β , µ
∗ = Λ + δzβ +
(2cδ + q)
√
h
βc(cδ+q) , λ
∗ = Λ
Proof. All proofs in the appendix.
The above result shows that if the monopolist can enter the market proﬁtably, it will choose
to serve the full market potential (average arrival rate of those requiring medical service from
the population). The monopolist chooses a quality eﬀort and service rate such that the eﬀective
service rate, τ = µ− δx, is equal to the arrival rate, λ = Λ, plus a non-negative capacity buﬀer.
The capacity buﬀer is given as 1W , where W denotes the optimal expected wait time and is
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given by W =
√
βc
h(q+cδ) .
We write the optimal proﬁts for the monopoly as
pi∗ (Λ) = (r − c) Λ− z (cδ + q)
β
− 2
√
ch (cδ + q)
β
− k (2.9)
We deﬁne social welfare, SW , as the sum of industry proﬁts and consumer welfare. We can
write the social welfare for the optimal monopolist decisions as
SWmon = pi
∗ (Λ) + Λb = (r − c) Λ− z (cδ + q)
β
− 2
√
ch (cδ + q)
β
− k + Λb (2.10)
Now we transition to an asymmetric competitive duopoly market structure with two providers.
Let pi∗i (Λ) denote the optimal proﬁts of Provider i = 1, 2 if operating as a single provider in
the market. We can derive pi∗i (Λ) from Equation (2.9) by making the appropriate substitutions.
Note that pi∗i (Λ) is linearly increasing in Λ. Let Λi denote the breakeven arrival rate for Provider
i when it operates as a monopolist (the value of Λ such that Provider i = 1, 2 may enter the
market and earn non-negative proﬁts). Assume without loss of generality that Λ1 ≤ Λ2. This
assumption implies that Provider 1 has a lower breakeven market arrival rate than Provider 2.
Using this notation we write the duopoly equilibrium as follows
Theorem 2.1. The duopoly equilibrium of the above optimization problem can be described by
the following four scenarios:
If Λ < Λ1, then neither provider operates in the market.
If Λ1 ≤ Λ < Λ2, then Provider 1 operates as a monopoly with λ1 = Λ
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If Λ2 ≤ Λ < Λ1 +Λ2, then either provider can operate as monopoly, capturing the full market
(λi = Λ).
If Λ1 + Λ2 ≤ Λ then either provider operates as a monopoly or both ﬁrms enter such that
• λ1 + λ2 = Λ; λi ≥ Λi
• xi =
√
cih
β(qi+ciδi)
+ ziβ , µi = Λ +
δizi
β + (2ciδi + qi)
√
h
βci(ciδi+qi)
, λi = Λ
• Wi =
√
βci
h(qi+ciδi)
.
Comparing the duopoly equilibrium with the monopoly equilibrium, we obtain several key results
regarding the impacts of competition. First, we observe that if any provider enters the market,
the full market potential is captured by the entering provider(s), i.e. competition does not impact
the total number of consumers served by the market because 1) consumers are homogenous and
2) any provider can increase its capacity to meet its demand. Second, the optimal quality
decision at a given provider is unchanged regardless of whether the competitor enters. Though
a competitor will claim some market share, a provider will choose the same quality eﬀort under
competition that it would choose with no competitor. Quality does not escalate at a given
provider but will increase within the industry due to competition. Third, each provider adjusts
its capacity to match its relative demand such that wait time remains the same at a given
provider whether or not the competitor enters the market. From these results we see that
competition does not impact quality or wait-time at a given provider. From the consumers'
point of view, there is no change in the overall service received as the quality and wait-time
are not aﬀected by competition. Whether there are one or two providers in the market, the
consumers' expected utility at any entering provider is equal to that of the outside option.
Competition does impact the overall industry expenditure on quality eﬀort and capacity.
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When two providers are in the market, both invest in quality and capacity, yet no additional
consumers are served and the utility consumers receive from service is unchanged. When the
ﬁrms have symmetric cost and price parameters, i.e. ci = c, qi = q, zi = z, ri = r, then
competition will lead to duplication but not escalation of investments in quality and capacity
buﬀers. This supports the Medical Arms Race argument that overall industry expenditure on
quality and capacity will increase, but it may happen via duplication as opposed to strictly
escalation.
As with the monopolist case, we can write the equilibrium expected proﬁts for Provider
i = 1, 2 when capturing λi share of the market as:
pi∗i (λi) = (ri − ci)λi −
zi (ciδi + qi)
β
− 2
√
cih (ciδi + qi)
β
− k (2.11)
If only a single provider enters the market, we can write the social welfare as in the monopolist
case above. When both providers enter the market, we write the social welfare as
SWduo = pi
∗
1 (λ1) + pi
∗
2 (λ2) + Λb (2.12)
= (r1 − c1)λ1 − z1 (c1δ1 + q1)
β
− 2
√
c1h (c1δ1 + q1)
β
+−k
+ (r2 − c2)λ2 − z2 (c2δ2 + q2)
β
− 2
√
c2h (c2δ2 + q2)
β
+−k + Λb
Note that the consumer surplus does not change because the full market is served and
consumers receive the same utility regardless of competition due to wait-time eﬀects. Let SWi
denote the social welfare when Provider i operates as a monopolist. We can write the change
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in social welfare due to simultaneous competition with Provider j 6= i as
SWi − SWduo = (ri − ci)λj − pi∗j (λj) (2.13)
= λj ((ri − ci)− (rj − cj)) + zj (cjδj + qj)
β
+ 2
√
cjh (cjδj + qj)
β
+ k
= λj ((ri − ci)− (rj − cj)) + cj
W ∗j
+ qjx
∗
j + k
Assume without loss of generality that r1 − c1 ≥ r2 − c2 (i.e. Provider 1 is the high margin
ﬁrm). The above equation states that a social welfare loss will always occur when both ﬁrms
enter the market compared to when Provider 1 alone operates in the market. The reason is
that the sum of the second and third terms must be positive for x∗j ≥ 0. However, the equation
also shows that compared to a market with a low-margin monopolist, a duopoly market with
an additional high-margin competitor may have higher social welfare. The implications for
health care policy is that a monopoly market leads to higher social welfare unless adding an
additional provider means adding a higher margin (i.e. lower capacity cost) provider, in which
case competition may be beneﬁcial in terms of social welfare. Adding a second provider at lower
cost could happen in cases where a new provider has a disruptive innovation which allows it to
enter the market at low cost, or the new provider is another major health system which beneﬁts
from even greater economies of scale and scope.
Note that Theorem 1 and the above interpretation does not apply to a market-entry game.
When we refer to entry, we simply refer to any simultaneous equilibrium where both providers
choose capacity strictly greater than zero, i.e. µi > 0 ∀i = 1, 2.
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2.3.2 Special Case, δ = 0
For convenience, we consider the symmetric case where ri = r, ci = c, qi = q, and pi = p and
δ = 0 for the remainder of this section. The assumption that δ = 0 simply implies there is no
correlation between quality-eﬀort and eﬀective capacity; i.e. the provider can increase quality
eﬀort without slowing its service speed.
Now let Λ1 = Λ2 = Λ0 where Λ0 denotes the breakeven proﬁt for the symmetric provider.
From Theorem 1 we know that if Λ < Λ0, then neither provider operates in the market, and
if Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2Λ0, then either Provider can operate as monopoly, capturing the full market
(λi = Λ). If 2Λ0 ≤ Λ then either provider operates as a monopoly or both ﬁrms enter such
that λ1 + λ2 = Λ; λi ≥ Λ0 and xi =
√
ch
βq +
z
β , µi = λi +
√
hq
βc . The equilibrium proﬁts for the
symmetric case are given by
pi∗ (λi) = (r − c)λi − 2
√
chq
β
− qz
β
− k (2.14)
The change in social welfare for the symmetric case can then be written as
SWmon − SWduo = 2
√
chq
β
+
qz
β
+ k (2.15)
Since the ﬁxed operating cost is non-negative, i.e. k > 0, then there will be a loss in social
welfare due to competition, because 2
√
hcq
β +
qz
β =
c
W ∗ + qx
∗ ≥ 0.
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Table 2.1: Comparative Statics: Optimal Quality, Wait Time, Proﬁt, and Social Welfare
x∗i µ
∗
i W
∗
i pi
∗
i (SW
∗) SW Loss
(symmetric)
Λ no change increases no change increases no change
ri no change no change no change increases no change
ci increases decreases increases decreases increases
qi decreases increases decreases decreases increases
h increases increases decreases decreases increases
β not monotone decreases increases increases decreases
zi increases increases if
δ > 0,
decreases o.w.
no change decreases increases
δi decreases increases decreases decreases increases
2.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
To gain further insight into how the optimal decisions behave with respect to the parameters, we
perform comparative statics on the optimal decisions and key outputs of the model. Table 2.1
summarizes the monotonicity of the optimal quality eﬀort, wait time, proﬁt, and social welfare
loss. Since the structure of the optimal solution is the same whether one or two ﬁrms compete
in the market, the comparative statics are the same for both cases (except at the boundaries).
We obtain several key insights into the providers' optimal quality eﬀort and capacity decisions
from the table.
The ﬁrst insight obtained is that in equilibrium providers balance the tradeoﬀ between
costs of quality eﬀort and capacity. When the cost of capacity increases and all else remains
equal, capacity becomes more expensive relative to quality eﬀort, and the provider invests less
in capacity and more in quality eﬀort. The reverse is true for when the cost of quality eﬀort
increases. Given ﬁxed prices, a provider will balance the costs of a quality eﬀort increase and a
wait time reduction in order to capture the respective market share. The managerial implication
for health providers is that quality improvement and capacity expenditures should be balanced
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with one another relative to their costs. Intuitively, these tradeoﬀs can be thought of as moving
along the respective edge of the Iron Triangle. This explains why a provider located in a
downtown area where capacity expansion is limited, would spend more on quality eﬀorts such
as infrastructure or facility renovation. The policy implication is that higher costs lead to lower
provider proﬁts without impacting consumer welfare, therefore contributing to a greater loss
of social welfare. To maximize social welfare, policy should continue to emphasize innovation
which lowers marginal costs of capacity expansion and quality-improvement eﬀort.
The second insight is that changes in either price or out-of-pocket payment do not impact
wait-time, but quality eﬀort increases with out-of-pocket price. According to Table 2.1, a
change in the price does not aﬀect the quality eﬀort or wait time, it only aﬀects the providers'
proﬁts, the industry proﬁt, and social welfare. On the other hand, if the out-of-pocket payment
increases, thereby increasing zi, consumers are paying more for service and the provider increases
the quality eﬀort accordingly to compensate for the utility lost, which leads to higher costs.
Adjusting the out-of-pocket payment has no eﬀect on optimal wait time. Higher prices generate
higher proﬁts for the provider but do not impact the quality eﬀort or wait time seen by the
consumer unless we assume the out-of-pocket payment is a function of the price. For example,
if consumers pay pi = p0 +αri where p0 is the ﬁxed co-pay and α is the percent of the price paid
by the consumer, then increasing the price would lead to an increase in quality eﬀort, but no
impact on the optimal wait time. Higher prices lead to higher social welfare because industry
proﬁt increases. Higher prices do not impact the loss of social welfare, unless a correlation exists
between price and out-of-pocket payment. For example, if consumer out-of-pocket payment is
structured as above, then higher prices lead to greater loss of social welfare. These results have
implications for policy makers and analysts as they demonstrate how changes in price and out-
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of-pocket made by third-party payers or policy makers may impact equilibrium quality eﬀort
and wait time. One might hypothesize that if out-of-pocket payments drop, moral hazard would
increase and wait times would go up. In this model, however, quality eﬀort is the lever used
by the provider(s) to adjust to such a change in payments, as the provider would decrease its
quality eﬀort in order to leave wait times unchanged.
The third insight is that higher wait sensitivity leads to higher quality and lower wait,
whereas higher quality sensitivity may lead to lower quality eﬀort. From Table 2.1 we see that
increasing wait time sensitivity leads to lower wait times and higher quality eﬀort. The com-
plement is not true with regard to quality eﬀort sensitivity. Increasing quality eﬀort sensitivity
always leads to higher wait times because consumers are willing to wait longer for a service which
gives them higher value. Increasing quality sensitivity does not necessarily lead to higher quality
eﬀort. While optimal quality eﬀort x∗ is not always increasing in quality eﬀort sensitivity, β, the
optimal utility consumers earn from quality eﬀort, βx∗, is increasing in β. Equilibrium quality
eﬀort at a given provider is increasing in quality eﬀort sensitivity if and only if β ≤ 4z2(q+cδ)ch
and decreasing otherwise. The result may seem counter-intuitive as it states that under certain
conditions, namely when the consumer sensitivity to quality is low, an increase in consumer
quality sensitivity may cause the provider to invest less in quality eﬀort. If quality sensitiv-
ity increases, the consumers are willing to wait longer for service. If the optimal wait-time is
relatively high, the provider would prefer to decrease quality eﬀort so that consumers receive
the same eﬀective value from service and wait times do not increase too dramatically. Optimal
(equilibrium) service rate at a given provider is increasing in quality eﬀort sensitivity if and only
if β ≤ 4cδ2z2(q+cδ)
h(4cδ(q+cδ)+q2)
and increasing otherwise. The implication for managers and policy makers
is that increasing quality sensitivity can increase wait times, and it is important to understand
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the value consumers in the market receive from service relative to the disutility they receive
from wait time.
From Table 2.1 we also ﬁnd that the loss of social welfare due to competition is higher when
costs are higher. The implication for policy makers is that programs, such as Certiﬁcate of Need,
aimed at limiting competition in health care markets should continue to emphasize controlling
high-cost medical services where the loss to society due to competition is greater, e.g. transplant
services, cardiac surgery services, advanced radiation and imaging equipment. Social welfare
loss is higher when the out-of-pocket payment is higher. The loss of social eﬃciency due to
competition can be mitigated if government regulation or insurers reduce the out-of-pocket
payment. However, this reduction in social welfare loss will be connected to a reduction in
quality eﬀort. Social welfare loss is also increasing in consumer sensitivity to wait-time and
decreasing in consumer sensitivity to quality. Previous economic theory suggests that a loss of
social welfare will occur when prices are ﬁxed and ﬁrms compete on quality, but as discussed
in the Literature Review section of this chapter, these papers have not explicitly incorporated
wait-time dynamics. Our analysis shows that including consumer sensitivity to wait-time only
increases the loss of social welfare as the loss is present even when the wait-time sensitivity, h,
is zero. The loss of social welfare increases as wait-time sensitivity increases because a single
provider can more eﬃciently invest in service capacity as a buﬀer against arrival and service
variation in the market.
It is also important to understand the eﬀect of the parameter δ which represents the correla-
tion between quality eﬀort and eﬀective capacity. One key ﬁnding from these results is that the
loss of social welfare is higher when δ is higher (higher δ implies a greater reduction in capacity).
This result then agrees with the earlier intuition that higher costs imply a greater loss of social
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welfare due to competition. When δ > 0, higher out-of-pocket payment leads to higher capacity
because in order to keep wait times the same, the provider must invest in additional capacity
to oﬀset the higher quality eﬀort. When δ < 0, then an increase in out-of-pocket payment leads
to higher quality eﬀort which increases the eﬀective capacity and allows the ﬁrm to lower its
investment in base capacity, µ.
2.4 Fixed Price Competition: Quality Eﬀort Reduction
In the base model we ﬁnd that provider competition does not impact the quality eﬀort at a given
provider, but leads to duplication in the market. In this section, we consider some variations
on the base model where ﬁxed-price competition between health providers may lead to lower
quality eﬀort at a given provider.
2.4.1 Utilization-Dependent Utility
One limitation of the base model is the simplifying assumption that service times and arrival
times are exponential. In particular, these assumptions may over-estimate the variability in
clinic capacity. To check for robustness, we derive results for a congestion-dependent utility
function which does not incorporate expected wait-time into the utility function directly, but
instead uses utilization-sensitivity. We let ρ = λµ−δx represent the capacity utilization of the
health system and h now represents the per unit disutility from higher utilization.
We adjust the provider's optimization problem as follows:
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max
xi≥0,µi≥0
pii = riλi − qixi − ciµi − k (2.16)
βxi − hλi
µi − δxi − zi = 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.17)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (2.18)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.19)
λi < µi − δxi ∀i = 1, 2 (2.20)
Compared to the base model, the primary diﬀerence is the second term in Equation (2.17)
which now references utilization as opposed to wait-time. We will assume cδ+q > 0 to eliminate
trivial solutions and also assume Λ ≤ h(cδ+q)βc so that the optimal solution which covers the
full market satisﬁes the stability condition. Solving for the monopoly outcome, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2.2. If proﬁtable to enter the market, the monopoly solution to the above problem
is given by x = zβ +
√
chΛ
β(cδ+q) ; µ =
δz
β + (q + 2cδ)
√
hΛ
cβ(cδ+q) ; λ = Λ; ρ =
√
cβΛ
h(cδ+q) ; pi =
rΛ− z(cδ+q)β − 2
√
chΛ(cδ+q)
β − k.
Comparing this solution with the optimal monopoly solution from the base case we see several
similarities. In both models, the monopoly provider captures the full-market (if any consumers
at all). In neither model does the price, either full price or out-of-pocket payment, impact the
optimal wait-time (or congestion). There are also important diﬀerences in the results of this
model and the base model. In this model, the market potential has a concave, increasing impact
on both the quality eﬀort and the capacity decisions as opposed to only a linearly increasing
impact on capacity in the base model. This will aﬀect our base case results regarding the impact
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of competition on quality, access, and social welfare as stated in the following Theorem. Let Λ0
denote the breakeven arrival rate for the monopoly.
Theorem 2.2. The duopoly equilibrium to the congestion-dependent model is given by the fol-
lowing three scenarios:
If Λ < Λ0, then neither provider operates in the market.
If Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2Λ0 then either provider can operate as monopoly, capturing the full market
(λi = Λ).
If 2Λ0 ≤ Λ then either provider operates as a monopoly or both ﬁrms enter such that
λ1 + λ2 = Λ; λi ≥ Λ0
xi =
z
β +
√
chλi
β(cδ+q) ; µi =
δz
β + (q + 2cδ)
√
hλi
cβ(cδ+q) ; ρi =
√
cβλi
h(cδ+q) .
The symmetric duopoly equilibrium structure is similar to the base model except that now
the quality and access at each provider will be lower than that at the monopoly provider.
The diﬀerence in total quality eﬀort in the market is given by
xmon − (x1 + x2) = − z
β
+
√
ch
β (cδ + q)
(√
Λ−
√
λ1 −
√
λ2
)
(2.21)
If z ≥ 0, then competition will imply a higher quality eﬀort in the market as both terms in
Equation (2.21) will be non-positive and the second term will be strictly negative.
The social welfare in the duopoly setting is given by
SWDUO = rΛ− 2z (cδ + q)
β
− 2
√
chλ2 (cδ + q)
β
− 2
√
chλ1 (cδ + q)
β
− 2k (2.22)
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In this model setting, the symmetric market split, λi = Λ/2, minimizes the social welfare
and maximizes total quality eﬀort in the market.
The non-linearity with respect to the market potential has additional implications regarding
the impact of competition. If both providers enter, the quality and wait time at each provider
will be lower than in the monopoly equilibrium. The change in social welfare between the
monopoly and the symmetric duopoly equilibrium when Provider 1 captures λ1 will be given by
SWMon − SWDuo = z (cδ + q)
β
+ k + 2
√
ch (cδ + q)
β
(√
λ1 +
√
Λ− λ1 −
√
Λ
)
(2.23)
If z ≥ 0, then we are guaranteed there will be a loss of social welfare due to competition as
all three terms in Equation (2.23) will be non-negative. However, if z < 0, social welfare may
increase or decrease. The actual loss of social welfare will depend on how the market is split
between the competing providers. The maximum loss of social welfare will be at the symmetric
split of λi = Λ/2 and the minimum loss of social welfare is obtained by giving as much demand
as possible to one provider λi = Λ0 and λj = Λ− Λ0 for i = 1, 2; j 6= i.
2.4.2 Technical vs. Functional Quality
In our base model we assume that quality eﬀort may impact the value the consumer receives
from service and/or the eﬀective provider capacity. However, quality eﬀort may also impact the
service outcome in terms of probability of a successful service outcome which does not require
repeat service. We assume that this probability of a successful outcome is given by γxi where
γ > 0 represents the correlation between quality eﬀort and probability of the intended outcome.
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In a healthcare context, we can think of the probability of an unsuccessful service outcome as
representing rework, readmission, follow-up due to medical error, or a try-and-see approach to
diagnosis and treatment, etc. We assume that the provider does not earn additional revenue
for the rework, but the results are qualitatively similar when revenue is earned for each patient
visit (when there are multiple patient encounters). We write the provider optimization problem
as follows.
max
xi≥0,µi≥0
pii = riλi − qixi − ciµi − k (2.24)
βxi − h
µi − λiγxi
− zi = 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.25)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (2.26)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.27)
λi
γxi
< µi ∀i = 1, 2 (2.28)
γxi ≤ 1 (2.29)
In optimality, the monopoly solution is to take the full market and the solution satisﬁes the
following equations.
Λ
x2
+
βhγ
(βx− z)2 =
qγ
c
(2.30)
µ =
Λ
γx
+
h
βx− z (2.31)
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To simplify these conditions and obtain a closed-form solution we will consider the case
where β = 0, i.e. quality eﬀort only impacts the probability of a successful service outcome
and not the service valuation. We will assume z < 0 so that the optimal solution is feasible
according to the stability condition. We also assume γ is small enough such that γx ≤ 1
Proposition 2.3. The monopoly solution to the above problem is given by x =
√
cΛ
qγ ; µ =√
Λq
cγ − hz ; λ = Λ; W = − zh ; pi = rΛ + hcz − 2
√
qcΛ
γ − k.
Comparing this special case solution with the optimal solution from the base case we see
several similarities. In both models, the optimal solution for the monopoly is to capture the
full-market. In neither model does the (reimbursement) price or out-of-pocket payment, impact
the optimal wait-time (or congestion).
There are also diﬀerences in the results of this model and the base model. In this model,
the optimal wait time decreases in the out-of-pocket price but the out-of-pocket price does not
impact the quality eﬀort. This supports the idea of moral hazard, that as consumers pay less,
wait times will increase as more consumers try to join the queue. Similar to the congestion-
dependent utility model, the market potential has a concave, increasing impact on both the
quality eﬀort and the capacity decisions as opposed to only a linearly increasing impact on
capacity in the base model. Letting Λ0 be the break-even arrival rate, the structure of the
duopoly equilibrium follows as in the base model.
Theorem 2.3. The duopoly equilibrium to the congestion-dependent model is given by the fol-
lowing three scenarios:
If Λ < Λ0, then neither provider operates in the market.
If Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2Λ0 then either provider can operate as monopoly, capturing the full market
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(λi = Λ).
If 2Λ0 ≤ Λ then either provider operates as a monopoly or both ﬁrms enter such that
λ1 + λ2 = Λ; λi ≥ Λ0
xi =
√
cλi
qγ ; µi =
√
λiq
cγ − hz ; Wi = − zh .
The non-linearity with respect to the market potential has additional implications regarding
the impact of competition. If both providers enter, the quality and wait time at each provider
will be lower than in the monopoly equilibrium. The symmetric duopoly equilibrium structure
is similar to the base model except that now the quality and access at each provider will be
lower than that at the monopoly provider.
The diﬀerence in total quality eﬀort is given by.
xmon − (x1 + x2) =
√
c
qγ
(√
Λ−
√
λ1 −
√
λ2
)
(2.32)
Since
(√
Λ−√λ1 −
√
λ2
)
is always negative, the total quality eﬀort in the duopoly market
will be more than in the monopoly market. The change in social welfare between the monopoly
and the symmetric duopoly equilibrium when Provider 1 captures λ1 will be given by
SWMon − SWDuo = −hc
z
+ k + 2
√
qc
γ
(√
λ1 +
√
Λ− λ1 −
√
Λ
)
(2.33)
Since we assume z < 0, social welfare must decrease due to competition as all terms in
Equation (2.33) must be non-negative.
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2.5 Fixed-Price Competition: Quality Eﬀort Escalation
2.5.1 Quality cost per arrival
Earlier we discussed the limitation of a linear cost function. One alternative we consider is a cost
function where the margin earned per arrival decreases linearly in the quality eﬀort, e.g. higher
quality may imply additional tests, safety checks, sanitation steps, etc. associated with each
individual arrival. In this setting, the cost of quality eﬀort is incurred per arriving consumer as
opposed to a one-time cost per period. We write the revised optimization problem as follows;
max
xi≥0,µi≥0
pii = (ri − qxi)λi − ciµi − k (2.34)
βxi − h
µi − λi − zi = 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.35)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (2.36)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.37)
λi < µi − δxi ∀i = 1, 2 (2.38)
The primary diﬀerence between this model and the base model is in the objective function
where now the cost of quality eﬀort qx is incurred per arrival. Solving the above optimization
problem for the monopolist, we obtain the following proposition
Proposition 2.4. The monopoly solution to the above problem is given by x = zβ +
√
ch
β(cδ+qΛ) ;
µ = Λ+ δzβ +(qΛ + 2cδ)
√
h
βc(cδ+qΛ) ; λ = Λ; W =
√
βc
h(cδ+qΛ) ; pi = rΛ− z(cδ+qΛ)β −2
√
ch(cδ+qΛ)
β −k.
This model provides results which are similar to the base case in that the optimal quality
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eﬀort, capacity, and wait time take nearly identical forms as in the base case. However, now the
total market arrival rate will impact all three in a non-linear fashion. Compared with previous
extensions, the quality eﬀort and wait-time in this extension of the model are decreasing in the
market arrival rate. Competition strictly increases the quality eﬀort at each provider but in
return, the wait time will be higher.
Theorem 2.4. The duopoly equilibrium when quality costs are incurred per arrival is given by
the following three scenarios:
If Λ < Λ0, then neither provider operates in the market.
If Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2Λ0 then either provider can operate as monopoly, capturing the full market
(λi = Λ).
If 2Λ0 ≤ Λ then either provider operates as a monopoly or both ﬁrms enter such that
λ1 + λ2 = Λ; λi ≥ Λ0
xi =
z
β +
√
ch
β(cδ+qλi)
; µi = λi +
δz
β + (qλi + 2cδ)
√
h
βc(cδ+qλi)
Wi =
√
βc
h(cδ+qλi)
.
The non-linearity with respect to the market potential has additional implications regarding
the impact of competition. If both providers enter, the quality and wait time at each provider
will be higher than in the monopoly equilibrium. The structure of the symmetric duopoly
equilibrium is similar to that in the base case, but the impact of competition on quality and
access is diﬀerent; now the quality and access at each provider will be strictly higher than that
at the monopoly provider.
The diﬀerence in total quality eﬀort is given by
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xmon − (x1 + x2) = − z
β
+
√
ch
β (cδ + q)
(√
1
Λ
−
√
1
λ1
−
√
1
λ2
)
(2.39)
The change in social welfare between the monopoly and the symmetric duopoly equilibrium
will be given by
SWMon − SWDuo = z (q + cδ)
β
+ k +
√
2ch (cδ + q)
β
(√
λ1 +
√
λ2 −
√
Λ
)
(2.40)
If z ≥ 0, then we are guaranteed there will be a loss of social welfare due to competition as
all three terms in Equation (2.40) will be non-negative. However, if z < 0, social welfare may
increase or decrease. The actual loss of social welfare will depend on how the market is split
between the competing providers.
2.5.2 Capacity-Dependent Cost of Quality
An alternative method for modeling a volume-based quality cost is to consider a cost function
where the cost of quality eﬀort depends on the capacity, e.g. it may cost more to conduct
additional noise abatement at a larger facility than at a smaller facility. In this setting, the cost
of quality eﬀort is incurred per unit of capacity as opposed to only being linked to the quality
eﬀort. We write the revised optimization problem as follows;
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max
xi≥0,µi≥0
pii = riλi − ciµi − qµixi − k (2.41)
βxi − h
µi − λi − zi = 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.42)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (2.43)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.44)
λi < µi − δxi ∀i = 1, 2 (2.45)
The primary diﬀerence between this model and the base model is in the objective function
where now the cost of quality eﬀort qx is incurred per unit of capacity. Solving the above
optimization problem for the monopolist, we obtain the following proposition
Proposition 2.5. The monopoly solution to the above problem is given by x = zβ +
√
(zq+cβ)
2β2qΛ
;
µ = Λ +
√
2hqΛ
(zq+cβ) ; λ = Λ; W =
√
(zq+cβ)
2Λqh ; pi = Λ (r − c)− q(2zΛ+h)β − 2β
√
2hqΛ (zq + cβ)− k.
This model provides results which are similar to the base case in that the optimal quality
eﬀort, capacity, and wait time take nearly identical forms as in the base case. However, now the
total market arrival rate will impact all three in a non-linear fashion. Compared with previous
extensions, the quality eﬀort and wait-time in this extension of the model are decreasing in the
market arrival rate. Competition strictly increases the quality eﬀort at each provider but in
return, the wait time will be higher.
Theorem 2.5. The duopoly equilibrium when quality costs are incurred per unit of capacity is
given by the following three scenarios:
If Λ < Λ0, then neither provider operates in the market.
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If Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2Λ0 then either provider can operate as monopoly, capturing the full market
(λi = Λ).
If 2Λ0 ≤ Λ then either provider operates as a monopoly or both ﬁrms enter such that
λ1 + λ2 = Λ; λi ≥ Λ0
xi =
z
β +
√
(zq+cβ)
2β2qλi
; µi = λi +
√
2hqλi
(zq+cβ) ; Wi =
√
(zq+cβ)
2λiqh
.
The non-linearity with respect to the market potential has additional implications regarding
the impact of competition. If both providers enter, the quality and wait time at each provider
will be higher than in the monopoly equilibrium. The structure of the symmetric duopoly
equilibrium is similar to that in the base case, but the impact of competition on quality and
access is diﬀerent; now the quality and access at each provider will be strictly higher than that
at the monopoly provider.
The diﬀerence in total quality eﬀort in the market is given by
xmon − (x1 + x2) = z
β
+
√
ch
β (cδ + q)
(√
1
λ1
+
√
1
λ2
−
√
1
Λ
)
(2.46)
The change in social welfare between the monopoly and the symmetric duopoly equilibrium
when Provider 1 captures λ1 will be given by
SWMon − SWDuo = z (q + cδ)
β
+ k +
√
2ch (cδ + q)
β
(√
λ1 +
√
λ2 −
√
Λ
)
(2.47)
If z ≥ 0, then we are guaranteed there will be a loss of social welfare due to competition as
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all three terms in Equation (2.47) will be non-negative. However, if z < 0, social welfare may
increase or decrease. The actual loss of social welfare will depend on how the market is split
between the competing providers.
2.6 Single Decision Variable Model
In this sub-section we consider a variation on our model where quality and service capacity
decisions are linked by a single decision variable. This variation applies to cases where the
provider is constrained in terms of its capacity or quality eﬀort. Relevant applications of this
model in health care services include cases where the provider is unable to greatly expand its
bottleneck resources, e.g. facility space, limited number of diagnostic imaging machines, limited
supply of certain specialists.
Assume each provider chooses its quality eﬀort xi at a cost of qi per unit, and that quality
eﬀort decreases eﬀective capacity by δi per unit and increases customer utility by β per unit.
Let µi equal the base capacity available to Provider i = 1, 2 when xi = 0. We can write the
duopoly optimization problem as follows:
max
xi≥0
pii = riλi − qixi − k (2.48)
βxi − h
µi − δixi − λi − zi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.49)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (2.50)
λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (2.51)
λi < µi − δxi ∀i = 1, 2 (2.52)
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We assume that q+rδ > 0 to eliminate trivial cases. Further, we assume the parameters are
such that x∗ ≥ 0; λ∗ ≥ 0; and pi∗ ≥ 0, i.e. if the market potential were unlimited the monopolist
could enter the market and earn non-negative proﬁts by setting a non-negative quality eﬀort.
Note that the consumer utility constraint in the above problem has two roots when the market
constraint is binding. We will assume that the parameters are such that these roots exist and
that they are non-negative, i.e. the minimum quality eﬀort needed to capture the full-market
potential is non-negative. This simplifying assumption eliminates some trivial boundary cases.
x (Λ) =
1
2βδ
(
µβ − Λβ + δz ±
√
(µβ − Λβ − δz)2 − 4δβh
)
≥ 0
Under these assumptions, the optimal solution to the monopolist problem is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.6. The optimal decision for the monopolist depends on the following two cases
• If q + rδ ≤ 0, then it is always optimal for the monopolist to capture the full market, i.e.
λ = Λ and x = x (Λ) where x (Λ) is the minimum of the two solutions to βx− hµ+δx−Λ−z =
0.
• If q + rδ > 0, then the monopolist sets x = min
(
x (Λ) ,
√
rh
β(q+rδ) +
z
β
)
such that λ =
min
(
µ− δzβ − (2rδ + q)
√
h
rβ(q+rδ) ,Λ
)
.
If the monopolist chooses to capture the full market, the equilibrium proﬁt and social welfare
are
pi∗ (Λ) = rΛ− qx (Λ)− k (2.53)
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Unlike the base model, in some cases here the monopoly provider may choose not to capture
the entire market. Even if some consumers are un-served, the overall consumer surplus in
unchanged as consumers will play an equilibrium strategy such that the utility of the local
provider is equal to that of the outside option. Regardless, the total consumer surplus is still
given by Λb. Using this equilibrium result we can show that when prices and capacity are ﬁxed,
there exists a region where the duopoly providers both enter the market and invest strictly less
in quality eﬀort than the monopolist. If the demand constraint is binding, then wait times
will be lower than for the monopoly. If the monopolist chooses to capture the full market, the
equilibrium proﬁt and social welfare are
pi∗ (Λ) = rΛ− qx (Λ)− k (2.54)
SWmon (Λ) = rΛ− qx (Λ)− k + Λb (2.55)
If the monopolist chooses not to capture the full market, we write the equilibrium proﬁt and
social welfare as
pi∗ = rµ− (q + rδ)
(
z
β
)
− 2
√
rh (q + rδ)
β
− k (2.56)
SWmon = rµ− (q + rδ)
(
z
β
)
− 2
√
rh (q + rδ)
β
− k + Λb (2.57)
Let Λ0 be the minimum market potential where the monopolist obtains breakeven proﬁts.
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Let ΛMAX = µ − δzβ − (2rδ + q)
√
h
rβ(q+rδ) be the arrival rate chosen by the monopolist if the
total market potential were unbounded. Assume that at the breakeven rate, Λ0, the total market
arrival rate is binding for the monopolist, i.e. Λ0 ≤ ΛMAX . Solving the symmetric duopoly
problem we obtain the following proposition which captures the duopoly equilibrium.
Theorem 2.6. The duopoly Nash equilibrium of the symmetric single-decision model can be
described by the following three scenarios:
If Λ < Λ0, then neither provider operates in the market.
If Λ0 ≤ Λ < Λ0 + Λ∞ then either Provider can operate as monopoly
xi = min
(
x (Λ) ,
√
rh
β(q+rδ) +
z
β
)
.
If 2Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2ΛMAX then a continuum of equilibria exist where both providers enter and
capture the full market
xi = min
(
x (λi) ,
√
rh
β(q+rδ) +
z
β
)
λ1 + λ2 = Λ
λi ≥ Λ0.
If 2ΛMAX ≤ Λ, then a single equilibrium exists
xi =
√
rh
β(q+rδ) +
z
β
λi = Λ∞.
Observe that there exists a region, 2Λ0 ≤ Λ < Λ0 + ΛMAX , where it is possible to have
either both providers enter, or one provider operate as a monopolist and capture a large enough
market share to bar entry of the competitor. Now we write the symmetric provider proﬁt and
social welfare for the two cases where both providers enter the market and either 1) capture the
53
full market, or 2) capture part of the market.
If both providers enter and capture the full market, i.e. 2Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2ΛMAX , then we write
the equilibrium proﬁt and social welfare as
pi∗i (Λ) = rλi − qx (λi)− k (2.58)
SWduo = rΛ− q (x (λ1) + x (λ2))− 2k + Λb (2.59)
If both providers enter and capture part of the market, i.e. 2ΛMAX ≤ Λ, then we write the
equilibrium proﬁt and social welfare as
pi∗i (Λ) = rµ− (q + rδ)
(
z
β
)
− 2
√
rh (q + rδ)
β
− k (2.60)
SWduo = 2rµ− 2 (q + rδ)
(
z
β
)
− 4
√
rh (q + rδ)
β
− 2k + Λb (2.61)
According to Theorem 2.6, we can now compare the equilibrium results when there are one
or two potential providers in the market. Clearly, if Λ < Λ0 no provider may enter the market
and the equilibrium results do not diﬀer. If Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2Λ0 then under duopoly competition
only a single provider (one of the two) will operate. Therefore, once again the equilibrium
results do not diﬀer between the case of one provider or two providers. The interesting cases for
comparison are the three cases where both ﬁrms may enter under a duopoly setting.
If the market potential is small such that the both the monopoly and the duopoly capture
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the full market, i.e. 2Λ0 ≤ Λ < Λ∞, then the diﬀerence in social welfare is given by
SWmon − SWduo = q (x (λ1) + x (λ2)− x (Λ)) + k (2.62)
If the market potential is large enough that the monopoly leaves some consumers un-served
but small enough that the duopoly captures the full market, i.e. 2Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2ΛMAX and
ΛMAX ≤ Λ < 2ΛMAX , then the diﬀerence in social welfare is given by
SWmon − SWduo = r (µ− Λ)− q (x (λ1) + x (λ2))− (q + rδ)
(
z
β
)
− 2
√
rh (q + rδ)
β
+ k (2.63)
If the market potential is large enough, the two duopoly providers operate as if monopoly
providers and some consumers remain un-served, i.e. 2Λ0 ≤ Λ < 2ΛMAX . The diﬀerence in
social welfare is given by
SWmon − SWduo = −rµ+ (q + rδ)
(
v
β
)
+ 2
√
rh (q + rδ)
β
+ k ≤ 0 (2.64)
In Equation (2.64), the market beneﬁts from having a second provider because consumer
surplus is unaﬀected due to the outside option, but industry proﬁts increase because a second
provider enters the market proﬁtably due to a large segment which was previously un-served.
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2.6.1 Special Case: δ = 0
When δ = 0, we have simpliﬁed the problem to optimizing the ﬁrm's quality decision when
capacity is ﬁxed. Under this special case x (Λ) = zβ +
h
µ−Λ . According to Proposition 2.6 the
optimal decision for the monopolist is given by
x = min
(
z
β
+
h
β (µ− Λ) ,
z
β
+
√
rh
βq
)
(2.65)
The optimal arrival rate is given by
λ = min
(
Λ, µ−
√
hq
βr
)
(2.66)
For the special case δ = 0, when both providers enter for the symmetric duopoly, the
equilibrium is given by
xi = min
(
z
β
+
h
β (µ− Λ + λj) ,
z
β
+
√
rh
βq
)
λi + λj ≤ Λ;λi ≥ Λ0 (2.67)
The optimal arrival rates are given by
λi = min
(
Λ− λj , µ−
√
hq
βr
)
∀i = 1, 2 (2.68)
When the duopoly captures the full-market the social welfare can now be expressed as
SWduo = rΛ− 2qz
β
− qh
β
(
1
µ− λ1 +
1
µ− Λ + λ1
)
+ Λb (2.69)
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Using the above function, we see that the social welfare for the duopoly will be maximized
at λ1 = Λ/2, assuming the queueing stability condition, µ > Λ/2, is met. To maximize social
welfare, the market potential should be split evenly between the two providers. This maximum
social welfare is given by
SW ∗duo = rΛ−
2qz
β
− 2qh
β
(
1
µ− Λ/2
)
+ Λb (2.70)
If both the monopolist and the duopoly capture the full market, the diﬀerence between the
social welfare for the monopolist and the maximum duopoly social welfare is given by
SWmon − SW ∗duo =
qz
β
+ k +
qh
β
(
2µ− 3Λ
(µ− Λ) (2µ− Λ)
)
(2.71)
Solving for when the right hand side of Equation (2.71) is non-negative, we derive the fol-
lowing condition for the social welfare being maximized by having a single provider. Otherwise,
social welfare is higher with two providers.
kβ
hq
+
z
h
>
−2µ+ 3Λ
(µ− Λ) (2µ− Λ) (2.72)
This is an important and interesting result because it shows that even when the number
of consumers served by the local market is the same, two providers may be able to increase
social welfare by providing lower quality eﬀort and lower wait times. This contradicts previous
economic theory and the Medical Arms Race argument which claims that ﬁxed-price competition
always leads to duplication/escalation of quality eﬀort, generating higher costs, and lower social
welfare.
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2.6.2 Interpretation and Sensitivity Analysis
Competition may lead to increased social welfare when base capacity is ﬁxed. We will use the
special case of δ = 0, in which capacity is ﬁxed and the provider chooses only its quality eﬀort,
to intuitively explain how this may happen. Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of two numerical
cases, showing how industry proﬁt depends on market size for symmetric providers. Since
consumer surplus does not vary across the models, the ﬁgure also provides insight regarding
social welfare. The graphs show industry proﬁt as a function of the total market potential.
In the ﬁrst graph, when r = 100, if the total market potential is less than 32 than neither
provider can enter. First we look at the monopolist. If the market potential is at least 32, the
monopolist captures the full market. If the market potential is at least 44, then the marginal
cost of obtaining the additional consumer is too high, and the monopolist chooses to serve only
part of the market. Since the monopolist is not receiving reimbursement for these un-served
consumers, industry proﬁts ﬂatten. For the duopoly, if market potential is less than 64, then
only one provider may enter and it behaves as the monopolist. If the market potential is at least
64 but less than 88, then both providers may enter as a duopoly and quality and wait-time at
each duopoly provider are lower than in a monopoly market. Beyond a market potential of 88,
the duopoly does not capture the full market and some consumers take the outside option. At
a market potential of 73.895, the capacity gained from having a second provider in the market
increases industry proﬁts and thereby beneﬁts social welfare as there is no diﬀerence in consumer
welfare.
The second graph is similar except the reimbursement for services is higher. This means
the providers can break-even with fewer consumers served. Providers are also willing to take on
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Figure 2.1: Competition Can Increase Social Welfare if Capacity Is Fixed
more consumers before leaving some of the market un-served. First we look at the monopolist.
If the market potential is at least 13.987, the monopolist captures the full market. If the market
potential is at least 45.333, the monopolist chooses to serve only part of the market. For the
duopoly, if market potential is less than 27.974, then only one provider may enter and it behaves
as the monopolist. If the market potential is at least 27.974, but less than 90.666, then both
providers may enter as a duopoly and quality and wait-time at each duopoly provider are lower
than if a single monopoly operates in the market. Beyond a market potential of 90.666, the
duopoly does not capture the full market and some consumers take the outside option. At a
market potential of 57.177, the capacity gained from having a second provider in the market
increases industry proﬁts and social welfare. The two graphs illustrate how in one case it may
be unproﬁtable for a second provider to enter even when part of the market is un-served. This
is the case when r = 100 but not the case when r = 225.
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Table 2.2: Comparative Statics: Single Decision Model
x∗i - full x
∗
i - partial λ
∗
i W
∗
i pi
∗
i (SW
∗)
ri no eﬀect increases increases increases increases
Λ increases no eﬀect increases no eﬀect increases
qi no eﬀect decreases decreases decreases decreases
h increases increases decreases decreases decreases
β not monotone
βy∗i increases
not monotone
βy∗i increases
not
monotone
increases increases
δi decreases decreases decreases decreases decreases
vi increases increases decreases no change decreases
Another diﬀerence between the results for this extension and those of the base case model is
that the optimal wait-time for the monopolist now depends upon the price - see Table 2.2. This
is true even for the special case when δ = 0. In this case, a higher price indicates a higher optimal
waiting time and the out-of-pocket payment does not impact the optimal wait time (whereas
in the base case neither the price nor the out-of-pocket payment impact the wait time). This
result is somewhat surprising, especially since we demonstrate that lower reimbursement prices
could actually lead to lower waiting times as opposed to increase moral hazard leading to higher
demand and higher waiting times. We oﬀer an explanation assuming β > 0 and q > rδ, -
i.e. higher quality eﬀort improves quality and slows service speed or improves service speed
at high cost. In this case, lower reimbursements make quality eﬀort relatively more expensive,
and therefore the provider chooses a lower quality eﬀort. Since quality eﬀort is reduced in
equilibrium, more consumers choose the outside option and wait times decrease as consumers
are not willing to wait as long for lower service value. While the equilibrium wait-time is lower,
quality has also been eﬀectively reduced.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Impact of Competition on Quality, Access, Social Welfare
Impact of Competition On Quality
Eﬀort
On Wait-Time On Social
Welfare
Base Model duplication no impact -
Utilization-Dependent reduction lower +,-
Technical Quality reduction lower -
Quality cost per
arrival
escalation higher -
Quality cost per unit
of capacity
escalation higher -
Single Decision
Variable
reduction,
duplication
lower, no
impact
+, - *
*Duplication of quality eﬀort will consistently correspond with social welfare loss, but reduction
in quality eﬀort due to competition can correspond to settings with either a social welfare gain
or loss.
2.7 Summary
We have presented various models to show how competition under ﬁxed prices may impact
quality, access, and social welfare. Table 2.3 summarizes the key results of the six diﬀerent
settings for the model. In our base model we ﬁnd that competition leads to duplication of
quality eﬀort and loss of social welfare which supports the duplication, but not the escalation
side of the Medical Arms Race. We show other model extensions where competition leads to
escalation. However, an important overall takeaway is that under our relatively simple, stylized
assumptions, we show that competition can lead to lower quality eﬀort and wait-time at a
given provider whereas the previous literature consistently supports duplication or escalation
of quality eﬀort due to competition. We ﬁnd that incorporating wait-times may present an
opposing argument to the Medical Arms Race argument and previous economic theory, and we
show how it is important to consider both the consumer's valuation for service and the wait-time
for service.
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2.8 Conclusions & Future Work
In this work, we use a competitive queuing model to compare quality, access, cost, and social
welfare between monopoly and duopoly equilibria with ﬁxed prices. Under the assumptions of
homogenous consumers, exponential service times and additive linear costs, we ﬁnd that any
entering provider(s) always captures the full market and the optimal quality and wait-time
at a given provider are independent of whether a competitor enters the market. Consumers
follow a queueing equilibrium strategy and their utility does not change due to competition.
When two symmetric ﬁrms are in the market, a duplication of quality eﬀorts and capacity
buﬀers results in a corresponding loss of social welfare. The monopolist setting corresponds
to the industry proﬁt-maximizing and socially eﬃcient outcome. These results agree with the
medical arms race argument with regard to duplication, but not escalation. If policy makers
wish to maximize social welfare, then competition leads to poor performance and the base model
supports restricting market entry for certain services through programs such as Certiﬁcate of
Need.
We ﬁnd that competition may lead to either higher or lower quality at a given provider, and
higher or lower social welfare under ﬁxed-price competition when we allow for alternative model
assumptions on the relationship between quality and capacity. The extensions to the model
oﬀer arguments both for and against the established result from economic theory that ﬁxed-
price competition will consistently lead to higher quality eﬀort. We ﬁnd that quality eﬀort and
wait-time will decrease due to competition in cases where higher quality eﬀort leads to higher
technical quality, i.e. higher probability of successful outcome. For example, in the inpatient
care scenario, higher quality eﬀort may imply longer patient stays but also fewer readmissions
for patients who were incorrectly or incompletely treated on an initial visit. In the outpatient
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scenario, higher quality eﬀort could also mean a more complete and thorough diagnosis of the
problem which would minimize potential rework in the future. In these settings we ﬁnd that
competition leads to lower wait and lower quality eﬀort. Alternatively, quality eﬀort and wait-
time will increase due to competition when the cost of quality eﬀort is volume based, either
in terms of per arrival or per unit of capacity. We ﬁnd that competition may decrease quality
and wait-time at a given provider when the quality and capacity decision are driven by a single
choice, e.g. when base capacity is ﬁxed.
Numerous insights for mangers can be found within our work. First, managers should balance
the costs of quality and capacity such that when marginal cost of quality increases (above its
original value), providers should respond by decreasing quality eﬀort and increasing capacity
which improves access through lower wait-time. If the cost of capacity increases, providers
should respond by increasing quality eﬀort and wait-time (decreasing capacity). This balance
of the costs of quality and access connects with the idea of the Iron Triangle of health service
delivery in that relative cost tradeoﬀs determine the optimal allocation between quality and
access. Second, our sensitivity analysis shows that if consumer-wait time sensitivity increases,
providers increase quality and capacity (lower wait-time). Therefore, as consumers become
increasingly informed about wait-time expectations, providers should increase capacity to keep
wait times low, but also increase both quality eﬀort and capacity to oﬀset the loss of service
value and make waiting for service more worthwhile from the patient's perspective.
Our research also has implications for policy makers. First, the loss of social welfare due
to competition exists even when consumers are not wait-sensitive. The loss of social welfare
increases as wait sensitivity increases. This is due to a higher capacity buﬀer at each provider
and a corresponding higher level of buﬀer duplication. Second, to maximize social welfare or
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minimize the social welfare loss due to competition, policy makers should set consumer out-
of-pocket payments low. Lowering out-of-pocket payment, however, will lead to a decrease in
optimal quality in both the monopoly and duopoly settings with no eﬀect on optimal expected
wait time. Higher out-of-pocket payments may decrease moral hazard, but this may not imply
lower wait times, as providers respond by increasing quality eﬀort which leads to a higher
arrival rate for a given price. Third, when quality and capacity are independent decisions, the
reimbursement price only impacts proﬁtability but not quality or access. When quality and
capacity decisions are correlated by a single decision, we ﬁnd that higher reimbursement prices
lead to higher wait times. The implication for policy makers is that reducing reimbursement
prices may bring about savings in overall expenditures for payers. This could lead to reduced
quality eﬀort from the providers but with the beneﬁt of reduced wait-time for service.
Our work oﬀers multiple opportunities for future research. One primary avenue for future
research is to consider multiplicative heterogeneity among customers, i.e. cases where patients
have a heterogeneous sensitivity to quality, e.g. some patients prefer new amenities more than
others or some patients are more sensitivity to side eﬀects of treatment than others. Further-
more, future research should consider how an underlying health state may lead to heterogeneity
among multiple components of the consumer utility function: quality sensitivity, wait sensitiv-
ity, service time, service value, etc. For example, patients in a more urgent or critical condition,
may receive higher valuation from service (because the pain relieved and loss of productivity
restored by treatment could be potentially greater) and also be more sensitive to waiting time.
Future work might also examine a model where consumers may observe queue lengths or wait-
time signals before making decisions regarding which queue to join. For example, patients may
call to check appointment delays or backlogs with specialty providers before conﬁrming which
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specialist to schedule for service. Two ongoing works by the authors examine a provider pricing
model as well as vertical competition between the provider and the third-party payer which sets
the coinsurance rate to minimize its costs.
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Chapter 3
Capacity Planning for Cancer Prevention
3.1 Introduction
Colorectal Cancer (CRC) is a signiﬁcant health concern both in the US and worldwide. The
National Cancer Institute estimates 146,970 new cases in 2009 with 106,100 of those being colon
cancer (National Cancer Institute 2013b). CRC is the second leading cause of cancer death
in the United States (National Cancer Institute 2013b). Colorectal cancer is a cancer which
begins in the colon or rectum, typically as a small polyp. Risk factors for CRC, ranging from
diet, incidence of smoking, and family history of cancer, have been identiﬁed through various
empirical studies (Walsh and Terdiman 2003). Age is an important risk factor. After 50 years
of age the incidence of polyps in the colon increases exponentially for the general population.
Less than 5% of all cases are diagnosed before age 44 while the median age at diagnosis is
70. CRC has an asymptomatic disease progression in that the symptoms associated with colon
cancer are diﬃcult to distinguish from other more common ailments and many patients show
no pain or symptoms. Diagnosis relies primarily on various screening techniques. As with other
cancers, there are beneﬁts of early detection due to the eﬀectiveness of treatments in reducing
mortality when the disease is detected at an early stage. One example is that the 5-year relative
survival rates are 90.3% for localized CRC; 70.4% for regional CRC, and 12.5% for distant CRC
(National Cancer Institute 2013a) .
Colonoscopy has become a standard screening procedure for colorectal cancer in people
who are over 50 because it has few risks and it is highly eﬀective (National Cancer Institute
2013c). Colonoscopy is a type of endoscopy where a ﬂexible colonoscope is passed through the
anal canal into the rectum and colon. If the test does not detect abnormal growth of polyps,
future colonoscopies may be scheduled at 5 to 10 year intervals. Alternative screening options
are also available which include, but are not limited to, fecal occult blood testing (FOBT)
and sigmoidoscopy. Colonoscopy, because it is a more thorough exam, is more eﬀective and
more costly ($550 to $1500), but is also more likely to include greater risks and discomforts
to the patient, such as sedation (Leshno et al. 2003). Sigmoidoscopy diﬀers from colonoscopy
in that colonoscopy allows an examination of the rectum and entire colon (ﬁve feet) whereas
sigmoidoscopy only allows an examination of the lower colon (two feet). Sigmoidoscopy ranges
from $200 to $400, and though it causes some discomfort for the patient, it is usually performed
relatively quickly without sedation (Leshno et al. 2003). FOBT testing is not as eﬀective in
diagnosing CRC with an estimated sensitivity rate of 50% and a speciﬁcity rate of 90%; however,
it is a widely available, quick, and inexpensive test ($5-$35) (Leshno et al. 2003). New tests such
as virtual colonoscopy, or CT assisted colonoscopy, and stool based molecular testing expand
the screening possibilities but are less common in practice because of costs, availability of new
technology, and comparative lack of empirical validation compared to colonoscopy (Walsh and
Terdiman 2003, Markowitz and Bertagnolli 2009, Link et al. 2010, Dachman and Laghi 2011).
None of the tests are 100% accurate and stakeholders including patients, providers, and insurers
must balance the cost of the test against the accuracy of the test in determining which screen, if
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any, to use. The National Cancer Institute provides a publicly available comprehensive summary
of the methods for colorectal cancer screening and the evidence of beneﬁt for each (National
Cancer Institute 2013c). While the accuracy of a colonoscopy may vary based on the subjective
judgment of the physician, it remains the most common, thorough and well-established screening
exam. Colonoscopy is often used to conﬁrm diagnosis of suspected CRC in patients who show
positive symptoms or results from other screens (National Cancer Institute 2013c). Therefore,
colonoscopy screening is the focus of this work.
Despite well-established guidelines, adherence to CRC screening is a public health concern
in the US and worldwide. The guidelines endorsed by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) recommend routine
screenings beginning at age 50 following one of three plans: 1) FOBT every year; 2) Sigmoi-
doscopy every 5 years with FOBT every 3 years; 3) Colonoscopy every 10 years (CDC 2013b).
The CDC guidelines describe how colonoscopy is also used as a diagnostic test when a person
has symptoms or the results of another colorectal cancer screening test are unclear or abnor-
mal. Subramanian et al. (2004) estimate that 34% of the US population obtained recommended
screening in 2000. Taylor et al. (2011) ﬁnd that 48.4% of those 60-69 had a colonoscopy in the
last ten years. Inadomi et al. (2012) estimate 38% adherence rate for colonoscopy guidelines.
Numerous studies identify factors, including both patient and health system characteristics,
which drive patient adherence to CRC guidelines and levels of CRC testing. These factors
shed light on interventions which could potentially improve colonoscopy adherence. Physician
recommendation for testing and patient education regarding CRC screening are found to be
signiﬁcant drivers across several studies (Brawarsky et al. 2004, Myers et al. 1991, Vernon 1997,
Zapka et al. 2002). Patients may be informed about the need for CRC screening by their primary
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care provider, local health clinic, or insurance provider. Screening information may also come
from mass-media campaigns, e.g. the Katie Couric eﬀect refers to an estimated 20% increase
in the rate of colonoscopies across America after Katie Couric's televised colonoscopy in 2000
(Cram et al. 2003). Studies have identiﬁed demographic and other patient-level characteristics
such as age, ethnicity, family history of the disease, and type of insurance coverage as impacting
a patient's screening adherence level (Walsh et al. 2002, Brawarsky et al. 2004, Zapka et al.
2002). Some studies ﬁnd fear of pain or embarrassment to be a factor which inﬂuences patient
adherence to guidelines and screening recommendations (Brawarsky et al. 2004).
Within the health system, there are also ﬁnancial barriers to why some do not choose to
obtain routine colonoscopies. The price of the service can be a limiting factor for some, espe-
cially those without insurance coverage or those with insurance coverage which does not cover
screening. A 2013 article in the NY Times, The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill: Colonoscopies
Explain Why U.S. Leads the World in Health Expenditures describes how colonoscopies are
the most expensive screening test that healthy Americans routinely undergo and that many
are unaware of the overall amount billed or their out-of-pocket cost until after scheduling the
procedure (Rosenthal 2013). Figure 3.1 from the article shows how the cost of a colonoscopy
varies by region and cites the use of an anesthesiologist as one explanation for the variation
in cost (Rosenthal 2013) . Liu et al. (2012) ﬁnd an increase in the the level of colonoscopies
over time as well as increase in the use of anesthesia services with colonoscopy. They ﬁnd that
from 2003-2009, gastroenterology procedures per million enrollees remained relatively stable in
the Medicare population but increased more than 50% in commercially insured patients. In
both populations the use of anesthesia services increased from approximately 14% to 30% over
the same time frame, and there was substantial regional variation in the proportion of proce-
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Figure 3.1: Cost of Colonoscopy Varies Across the US (Rosenthal 2013)
dures using anesthesia (13% to 59%). Payments for anesthesia services doubled in Medicare
patients and quadrupled in commercially insured patients. Better understanding the relation-
ship between various factors, including patient population characteristics, disease progression
parameters, and economic drivers, and how these factors together impact operational decisions
such as capacity, may help to explain regional variation with respect to cost and access.
Another barrier to colonoscopy adherence is appointment access. In 2002 and 2003, two
NY Times articles chronicled this problem with quotes and anecdotes from various health pro-
fessionals facing the challenges surrounding long delays for colonoscopies (Scott 2002, Kolata
2003)
Healthy patients at the center cannot have colonoscopies because the waiting
lists are closed. . . It's ﬁne to say everyone should have a colonoscopy, Dr. (John H.)
Bond (VAMC Minneapolis) said. But we are talking about 70 million people. It is
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unclear whether that is even feasible in the United States. - (Kolata 2003)
If you're urging people to be screened and then you say, O.K., the colonoscopy
will be a year from now, you shoot yourself in the foot, said Dr. Robert H. Fletcher,
(Harvard Med.). The meta-message from the health care community is, well, it's
not that important after all. - (Kolata 2003)
In the year since Medicare began paying for wider access to colonoscopy to look
for colon cancer (2001), the number of people having the test has greatly increased,
and doctors say they are struggling to keep up with demand. Dr. Michael Pignone,
(UNC-CH), said the average waiting time for an appointment for a colonoscopy was
three to six months. - (Scott 2002)
In DeForest, Wis., 20 minutes from Madison, the waiting lists for the colono-
scopies are closed to healthy patients. Dr. Peter Pickhardt, a family practitioner,
says he has learned to be blunt with patients. I tell them up front, he said. If
they want a colonoscopy, it's not available. - (Kolata 2003)
While increased education about the guidelines is a key to adherence, it is unclear whether
current system capacity could even sustain the demand generated if all patients were to follow
the guidelines for routine screening. The concerns around a lack of supply are magniﬁed by shifts
in the population distribution which lead to more patients over age 50, and also major health
policy reform which requires insurers to cover certain preventive services, including colonoscopy
screening.
Little is understood about how screening guidelines and capacity planning decisions are
related in practice. The question of how often an individual should be screened for various
forms of cancer has been well-documented in the literature from the perspective of optimizing
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an individual's qualify-of-life tradeoﬀs or comparative eﬀectiveness analysis (Alagoz et al. 2011,
Walsh and Terdiman 2003). However, service system design and control issues surrounding
cancer screening have received less research attention. When considering a market or system-
level approach to this problem, it is important to consider that an individual patient's screening
behavior impacts not only the cost and disutility for that patient, but the access to service,
system load, and wait time for service experienced by other patients requesting screens. As
a contribution to the established medical literature on CRC screening, our model investigates
system-level dynamics which clinical screening optimization models for individuals may ignore.
Patient adherence to colonoscopy screening is not simply split into those who adhere to the
guidelines and those who do not, but can be more accurately described as a continuum of how
well patients adhere to the guidelines (i.e. how much longer do they wait between screens than
is recommended). Some patients may wait so long that they die from other causes before ever
being screened. Other patients may request a screen immediately after it is recommended. We
capture the range of imperfect patient adherence behavior by modeling the time patients request
the next screen to be a random variable. This heterogeneity with respect to the time patients
spend waiting to schedule the next screen represents variation in patient adherence to the
guidelines which could be driven by variation in patient education and information throughout
the population.
In this work we develop a queuing network for colorectal cancer screening in order to 1)
analyze how a social planner should optimize cancer screening capacity in order to minimize the
sum of detection delay and capacity operating costs; 2) examine what tradeoﬀs exist between
the capacity planning decision and the time between screens (i.e. screening guidelines). In
Section 2, we provide a review of the relevant literature spanning from empirical work on the
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comparative eﬀectiveness of CRC screening to operations research models for cancer screening.
In Section 3, we describe our model and provide some preliminary analysis to characterize the
model dynamics. In Section 4, we address the ﬁrst research problem, by studying the capacity
planning decision when the average time until patients schedule the next screen is constant, i.e.
screening guidelines and patient adherence are relatively stable. We address the second research
problem in Section 5 and Section 6. In Section 5, we assume that the screening capacity is
constrained, but the social planner may determine the average time until patients schedule the
next screen. We examine sensitivity of the optimal time until the next screening request to
changes in capacity. In Section 6, we investigate a model where the social planner minimizes
total cost by simultaneously optimizing screening capacity and the average time until patients
schedule a follow-up screen. The joint optimization allows further investigation of the tradeoﬀs
between the two decisions. In Section 7, we perform a numerical study using parameter estimates
derived from public health data in order to 1) relax special case assumptions needed for some
parts of earlier analysis; 2) estimate capacity, average time until scheduling the next screen, total
cost, and wait time based on public health data; and 3) quantify the eﬀects of parameters on
optimal decisions and system performance. In Section 8, we present conclusions of our research
and describe opportunities for future research.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work relates to literature on empirical studies which assesses the impact, value and cost
eﬀectiveness of colorectal cancer screening and analytical models for health screening
An extensive body of research covers empirical study of the value and cost eﬀectiveness
of colorectal cancer screenings. Walsh and Terdiman (2003) provide an extensive review of
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evidence-based literature on colorectal cancer screenings. Sonnenberg et al. (2000) develop
computer models of a Markov process to evaluate three screening policies, annual FOBT, ﬂexible
sigmoidoscopy, and colonoscopy. The authors ﬁnd that annual FOBT results in higher cost
savings but saves fewer life-years than colonoscopy. The authors also use sensitivity analysis to
investigate the impact of patient compliance, ﬁnding that colonoscopy is the most cost-eﬀective
primary screening strategy for low compliance. Frazier et al. (2000) also use a Markov model
to compare 22 diﬀerent CRC screening strategies, 7 non-dominated, under the outcomes of life
expectancy and discounted lifetime costs. The authors allow for variation in the compliance rate
and ﬁnd that even with imperfect compliance, CRC screening signiﬁcantly reduces mortality at
costs comparable to other cancer screenings. Of the policies considered the authors ﬁnd that
FOBT plus sigmoidoscopy every ﬁve years is the most cost eﬀective strategy.
There is also a signiﬁcant body of literature on the application of mathematical decision
models to the health screening decision. Kirch and Klein (1974) develop an early model for
determining screening schedules in age-dependent diseases such as colorectal cancer. The authors
seek to choose the optimal number of examinations over a ﬁxed time period (frequency) in
order to minimize the (expected) detection delay. A key assumption of their models is that
examinations are performed at equal intervals. Another limitation is that they assume that
examinations are 100% eﬀective. Despite these limitations, the authors formulate a simple
model for which they can derive the optimal schedule explicitly as non-periodic. This means
that the optimal number of examinations is proportional to the square root of the age-speciﬁc
incidence probability of the disease.
Stochastic dynamic programming is a common method of analysis used to model the health
maintenance decision in the literature. Alagoz et al. (2011) review operations research models
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for cancer screening examining 41 papers and 33 models. Ozekici and Pliska (1991) develop
a semi-Markov model for the optimal scheduling of health inspections with false positives and
negatives. The authors use a cost minimization framework with total costs being comprised
of inspection costs, false-positive costs, false-negative costs, and true-positive costs associated
with onset of the disease. A limitation of the model is that the costs of a false-positive or a
false-negative have less tangible meaning than other reward functions such as quality-adjusted
life years or mortality. Therefore, these costs can be diﬃcult to estimate in practice. Hauskrecht
and Fraser (2000) use a Partially-Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) to formulate
the problem of treating ischemic heart disease. The characterization of hidden disease states
allows them to investigate treatment procedures and cost-beneﬁt trade oﬀs for diﬀerent policies.
Maillart et al. (2008) use a POMDP to investigate various mammography screening policies.
The authors formulate an eﬃcient frontier of policies with respect to lifetime mortality and
mammography count. The authors use a policy evaluation approach, as opposed to optimal
policy evaluation, so that they may compare current policies in practice and provide a menu
of eﬃcient policies from which an individual patient / decision maker may choose a preferred
option. Zhang et al. (2012) develop a POMDP for prostate cancer screening with two available
actions: treat (based on screening results) or wait. The authors extend previous research by
establishing theoretical results such as conditions for the existence of a control-limit policy. A
limitation of this model is that it does not integrate the screening decision and the treatment
decision. In general these models view the screening decision from the perspective of a single
patient without taking into consideration the screening behavior of other patients. Also, the
authors do not study the eﬀect of imperfect patient compliance with the suggested guidelines.
Many operations research models have employed simulation or stochastic dynamic program-
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ming (or a combination of the two) to study colorectal cancer screening in particular. Clemen
and Lacke (2001) perform decision analysis using a deterministic growth model for colorectal
cancer and Monte Carlo simulation to address uncertainty about model parameters. The au-
thors also perform utility analysis to ﬁnd that colonoscopy every three years is the top-ranked
strategy of those they considered. These results diﬀer from the empirical ﬁndings above which
typically refer to colonoscopy every 10 years or FOBT and sigmoidoscopy every 5-10 years.
Leshno et al. (2003) use a POMDP to study colorectal cancer screening policies. The authors
perform a detailed cost-eﬀectiveness analysis of several standard policies using the POMDP;
however, they do not address the optimal policy or heuristic policies which may be an improve-
ment over current practice. Another limitation, is that there is no optimization of the time
between screenings; for instance, the authors assume 10-year intervals for colonoscopy as the
given guideline. The model could be also extended to integrate multiple treatment decisions
and objectives.
The primary contribution of this research will be to examine how social planners should plan
capacity for a screening population as opposed to using a medical decision making model to
optimize the screening decision for an individual patient within the population. An important,
relevant distinction is that in our model patient wait-times (appointment delays) impact the
time until patients can access screening and the time until those with cancer can be diagnosed
and begin treatment. These delays will result in higher treatment costs, lower quality of life, and
increased mortality for those in whom cancer is detected. The cost to society of screening an
individual does not depend solely on the monetary cost to that individual but also the increased
system load and subsequent waiting cost incurred by other patients. We formulate an objective
function for a social planner which minimizes the cost tradeoﬀs between the detection delay
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costs and capacity costs associated with a cancer screening facility. We use public health data
for CRC screening to calibrate our model and inform government planning and intervention
decisions such as how much to invest in additional endoscopy suite capacity or what eﬀorts
should be made to inﬂuence the average time until patients schedule the next screen. Our
model is not meant to supersede other models developed in the clinical and medical decision
making literature which are used as a basis for the screening guidelines, because it employs more
stylized assumptions. However, our model can provide support for those guidelines or reason to
investigate them further. It can also be used to judge the economic implications of how much
capacity is needed to ensure adherence to established guidelines can be accommodated with
relatively low wait times.
3.3 Model Description
In this section we present a model for optimizing the capacity decision for cancer screening.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the model setting. We will describe our model as a queueing network with
2 nodes: 1) Home; 2) Endoscopy suite. Patients cycle between these two nodes until either
they die from other causes or cancer is detected via screening or other methods. We will let
the total input rate into Node i = 1, 2 (number of patients arriving to a node per unit time)
be given by ai. New patients enter the system once they reach the minimum age for routine
screening as a Poisson process with rate λ - e.g. λ represents the number of persons within
the endoscopy suite's market who turn age 50 in a given week. Each patient enters with three
random variables which correspond to the patients' health states. Let the random variable Xn
denote for patient n = 1, 2, ... the time after entry into the system until cancer is detectable via
screening. For all intents and purposes, we can think of Xn as the time of onset of the disease.
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For example, if Patient j develops cancer at age 62 after entering the system at age 50, then
Xj = 12 years. Let the random variable Ln denote the time after entry into the system until
patient n dies (would die) from other causes. For example, if Patient j dies at age 89 after
entering the system at age 50, then Lj = 39 years, . Let Yn denote for patient n the time after
cancer becomes detectable via screening until cancer is detected via symptoms or diagnosis by
methods other than the primary screen (e.g. FOBT testing as opposed to colonoscopy). For
example, if Patient j develops cancer at age 62 and then ﬁnds the cancer via FOBT testing
at age 66, then Yj = 4 years. The inherent assumption behind Xn and Yn being continuous
random variables for all patients is that if patients lived forever, eventually everyone would get
colorectal cancer and eventually it would be ﬁnd via other methods. However, the incidence rate
of colorectal cancer is relatively low compared to the mortality from other causes, so it is likely
that in relevant applications of the model Xn will be much larger than Ln for most patients.
Also, some patients will call to request a screen before, Xn + Yn, the time when cancer is found
via other methods, and the cancer will be found via screening ﬁrst.
Given these three health states we now describe the time line for an entering new patient.
The patient n = 1, 2, ... spends a random amount of time at the Home node, H1n before
attempting to schedule her ﬁrst screen. During the time at home, the patient may die from
other causes if Ln = min (H1n, Ln, Xn + Yn) or detect cancer via other methods if Xn + Yn =
min (H1n, Ln, Xn + Yn). If either event happens, the patient leaves the system. If the patient
has not died from other causes or detected cancer via other methods by the end of the time at
home, she schedules the ﬁrst available appointment and joins the queue for the endoscopy suite
where the total colonoscopy throughput time (sum of appointment delay and service time for
colonoscopy) is given by W1n. After service, either cancer is detected and the patient leaves the
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Figure 3.2: Model Setting
system to begin treatment, or cancer is not detected and the patient returns to the home stage
where the cycle repeats. The total arrival rate into the home node, a1, is equal to the sum of
the new patient arrival rate and the rate of patients who were screened for cancer with negative
results and return to the home stage. For subsequent cycles, we generalize the above notation as
follows: let Hin denote the time until patient n schedules screen i; Win denote the appointment
delay for screen i for patient n; Sin = Hin + Win denote the total cycle time between screen
i − 1 and screen i for patient n. (e.g. H2n denotes the time patient n waits at home before
scheduling her second colonoscopy screening appointment).
We make the following distribution assumptions on the above random variables. We model
the home node as having an inﬁnite number of servers each with an exponential service-time
distribution with mean 1τ . The inﬁnite number of servers assumption implies that patients
do not wait to enter the home stage, but simply spend a random service time there until
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requesting the next screen - i.e. patients have self-service at home. Therefore, Hin follows
a common exponential distribution with mean 1τ . We model the endoscopy suite as a single
server with service rate µ. The single server is an approximation of the aggregate clinic process.
The variability in service time refers to aggregate variability as opposed to variability at any
given stage within the clinic. Given this assumption, Win follows an exponential distribution
with mean 1ω =
1
µ−a2 ; recall that a2 is the total input rate (demand per week) for screens. We
assume that the time until cancer is detected in patient n, Xn, is exponentially distributed with
mean 1β . This means that given a patient has not developed cancer by age t the probability of
developing within the next δ time units is the same regardless of the time expired, t. We assume
that the lifetime random variable, Ln, is exponentially distributed with mean
1
α . We assume
that the time until cancer becomes detectable via other methods once detectable via screening,
Yn, is exponentially distributed with mean
1
θ . We assume that these distributions are common
to the entire patient population. Assuming the exponential distribution of the patient health
random variables implies age-independence with regard to mortality rate and cancer rate. We
discuss below the limitations of and justiﬁcation for the exponential distribution as well as the
assumption of a common distribution for all patients.
There are two sets of Markov chains driving the system dynamics. The ﬁrst Markov chain
describes the queueing network and patient ﬂow between screening and waiting to be screened.
This is characterized by a birth and death process at each of the two nodes. The second set
of Markov chains describes the health state of the patient who at any time can be healthy,
have cancer undetected, have cancer detected via screening (and left the system), have cancer
detected via other methods (and left the system), or have died from other causes (and left the
system). The chain is a continuous Markov chain, i.e. the patient spends a random time in each
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of the health states and the random variables, Xn, Ln, and Yn and the events speciﬁed below
describe the transitions between the possible states for the patient. Under general assumptions
on the random variables, a complete characterization of the state of the system requires tracking
every patient in the system, each patient's health state, and whether they are at the home node,
in service at the endoscopy suite, or waiting to be screened. The exponential distributions allow
for great simpliﬁcation of the state space. Due to the memoryless property of the distribution,
each patient's cycle time between screens (time at home plus time waiting for screen) and health
random variables will regenerate upon any entry into the home node. Therefore, we can drop the
subscripts on the random variables as any given screening cycle will have the same distributions
across patient and cycle number.
Now we can describe the dynamics of the system using four possible events which may
happen to any patient in any given cycle: 1) death from other causes while at home (DH); 2)
other detection of cancer while at home (SH); 3) screen which tests positive for cancer developed
at home (CH); 4) screen which tests negative for cancer (NC). For analytical tractability we
assume that the wait time for an appointment is relatively small compared to the time spent at
home (e.g. 10 weeks vs. 10 years) such that the probability of a patient dying from other causes,
detecting late stage cancer via other methods, or developing cancer while waiting to be screened
is negligible. In order to make this assumption we reassign some of the possible sequences of
the random variables and assume the process regenerates upon completion of the screen. For a
given cycle, if a patient dies at home, i.e. event DH occurs, we assume she leaves the system
without cost to the social planner. If cancer is detected via other methods within a cycle, i.e.
event SH occurs, a patient also leaves the system but the social planner incurs a penalty cost b2
per unit of time during the detection delay (the time from the onset of cancer, Xn, to the time
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Xn + Yn when cancer is detected via other methods). If the patient does not die or have cancer
detected via other methods while at home, she calls to make a screening appointment and will
wait to be screened. If the screen detects cancer, i.e. event CH occurs, then the patient leaves
the system and the social planner incurs a penalty cost b1 per unit of time during the detection
delay. If the screen does not detect cancer, i.e. event NC occurs, then the patient returns to
the home node and the cycle regenerates due to the memoryless distribution.
The social planner wishes to minimize the total expected cost per unit time, TC. As above,
let b1 denote the detection delay cost per unit time for patients whose cancer is found via
screening and b2 denote the detection delay cost per unit time for patients whose cancer is
found via other methods. These parameters represent how the cost of treatment, disutility from
treatment, and risk of mortality from cancer are increasing in the time between the onset of
the disease and the time the disease is detected. We assume that these delay costs are linear,
whereas in reality, in could be that the delay costs increases at an increasing rate - e.g. delaying
a patient's treatment from 4 to 8 weeks might have a much smaller cost than delay from 64
to 68 weeks when the cancer is more likely to be spreading to a distant stage more rapidly.
Though not a restrictive assumption of the model, it is likely for our application of the model
that b1 ≤ b2 because the cancer grows relatively asymptomatically. If CRC is detected via other
methods, it is likely detected in a much later stage with high treatment costs. Let c denote the
marginal cost of capacity per unit time; we assume a linear cost of capacity for simplicity as
the results will not diﬀer dramatically if we use a convex cost function (e.g. quadratic). The
marginal cost of capacity, c, represents the average cost per time unit (e.g. week) of increasing
the capacity by one. We write the long-run average total cost function, TC, as follows
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TC = b1λE [Delay Screen Detection] + b2λE [Delay Other Detection] + cµ (3.1)
The motivation for using this model is to gain insights into the operational issues regarding
capacity planning and guideline decisions for colorectal cancer screening. The model has several
limitations as it is a stylized representation of reality. One important limitation of the model
is that we do not explicitly model the treatment of patients once cancer has been detected.
We also assume that patients who have been treated for cancer do not return to the screening
process. In reality, patients who have been treated for CRC will continue to be screened, often
times even more frequently than those with no previous diagnosis. This would require clinics to
carry additional screening capacity than is estimated by our model.
A second limitation of the model is that we make extensive use of the exponential distribution
for our assumptions regarding randomness in the model, including: time until death, time until
cancer is detectable, time until cancer is discovered via other methods, time in queue, and time
at home. In reality, the exponential distribution may over-estimate the variability for some of
the randomness described by the model. In terms of estimation, the exponential distribution
only allows one parameter for scale and not one for shape. The remaining lifetime for the
exponential distribution is time-independent whereas in reality, rates such as the mortality rate
may increase as patients age. These changes in mortality rate due to age of the patient are less
of a concern in a long-run planning model compared to a short-range scheduling or capacity
allocation decision model. A multi-class model would be a natural extension of our work which
could incorporate such heterogeneity in patient characteristics.
Another limitation is that we look at the model from the perspective of a long-term steady-
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state, whereas in practice, regional population growth or shifts in the population age distribution
may cause changes in the arrival rate over time (e.g. current aging of the baby boomers). Since
our model is a high-level strategic planning model, we are able to obtain relevant insights
regarding changes in the arrival rate from our sensitivity analysis. Another limitation of the
model is that we assume that a screen for cancer is completely accurate in terms of 100%
sensitivity and speciﬁcity. In reality, whether a colonoscopy detects colorectal cancer within a
patient is subject to the proﬁciency of the provider and the test may not be entirely accurate
(National Cancer Institute 2013c). This assumption is still appropriate for the level of decision-
making considered in the model and the reality that colonoscopy is by far the most thorough
and accurate form of colorectal cancer screening available (National Cancer Institute 2013c).
A ﬁnal limitation is that the model does not account for heterogeneity among patients with
respect to risk factors for the disease including gender, ethnicity, and family history.
3.3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Using the memoryless property of the exponential distribution and our simplifying assumptions,
we derive Lemma 3.1 which characterizes the probability of the four events within any given
cycle.
Lemma 3.1. The probability of the four events within a cycle are given by P (DH) = α(τ+β+α+θ)(τ+α+β)(τ+α+θ) ;
P (SH) = βθ(τ+α+β)(τ+α+θ) ; P (CH) =
βτ
(τ+α+β)(τ+α+θ) ; P (NC) =
τ
τ+α+β
Proof. All proofs in the Appendix.
Note that our simplifying assumption implies that the transition probabilities will not depend
on the mean wait time (though the delay costs will depend on the mean wait time). Using the
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above probabilities we write the balance equations for the described Jackson Network as follows.
a1 = λ+ a2P (NC | Screen) (3.2)
a2 = a1P (Screen) (3.3)
Substituting the transition probabilities using Lemma 3.1, we solve the balance equations
and the results are given in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. Solving the balance equations,3.2-3.3, we obtain the following expressions for the
steady-state input rates of the queueing network: a1 =
λ(τ+α+β)
α+β ; a2 =
λτ(τ+β+α+θ)
(α+β)(τ+α+θ) .
In order to calculate the long-run average total cost function we need to calculate the ex-
pected delay when cancer is detected via other methods and the expected delay when cancer is
detected via screening. Conditioning on all possible sequences of the random variables within a
cycle we derive the expected delay cost per cycle, DC, as follows. We let 1ω =
1
µ−a2 denote the
mean wait time.
DC =
b1a1τβ (α+ τ + θ + ω)
ω (τ + α+ θ)2 (τ + α+ β)
+
b2a1βθ
(τ + α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)2
(3.4)
Evaluating the above expression at ω = µ − a2 and substituting for a2, we write the long
run average delay cost per unit time, DC, as follows:
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DC = λ
(
β
α+ β
)( τ
τ + α+ θ
) b1
τ + α+ θ
+
b1
µ− λτ(τ+β+α+θ)(α+β)(τ+α+θ)

+ λ
(
β
α+ β
)((
θ
τ + α+ θ
)(
b2
τ + α+ θ
))
(3.5)
Assuming a linear cost of capacity per unit time we write the provider's optimization prob-
lem.
min
µ>a2
TC = λ
(
β
α+ β
)( τ
τ + α+ θ
) b1
τ + α+ θ
+
b1
µ− λτ(τ+β+α+θ)(α+β)(τ+α+θ)

+ λ
(
β
α+ β
)((
θ
τ + α+ θ
)(
b2
τ + α+ θ
))
+ cµ (3.6)
The terms in the total cost function can be explained as follows. On average, λ new patients
arrive to the system every period. The probability that a new patient develops cancer before
she dies of other causes is given by
(
β
α+β
)
. In the cycle when the patient develops cancer (at
home), if it is detected via screening, the delay cost is b1 per unit time from onset until the
patient schedules the next screen and also b1 per unit time waiting for the screen once requested.
In order for this to happen, the next event after developing cancer must be leaving the home
stage, with the associated probability
(
τ
τ+α+θ
)
. The expected time in the home stage until
the patient requests the appointment is
(
1
τ+α+θ
)
. The expected time waiting for a screen is(
1
µ−a2
)
. In the cycle when the patient develops cancer, if it is detected via other methods, the
delay cost is b2 per unit time from onset until detection via other methods. In order for this
to happen, the next event after developing cancer must be detection via other methods, and
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the associated probability is
(
θ
τ+α+θ
)
. The expected time in the home stage until the patient
detects cancer via other methods is
(
1
τ+α+θ
)
. We assume that the provider may increase its
capacity without limit by acquiring additional resources, addressing bottlenecks, or expanding
the facility. The marginal cost of doing so is assumed to be linear for mathematical convenience.
This assumption simpliﬁes the model for the sake of obtaining relevant insights.
3.4 Model Analysis: Capacity Decision
We now consider a scenario where a social planner must determine the optimal capacity which
minimizes the long-run average total cost (the sum of the detection delay cost and the capacity
operating cost) as given in Equation (3.6). For example, a state policy maker may have a budget
for cancer prevention and be faced with the decision of how much colorectal cancer screening
capacity is needed at an endoscopy suite serving a particular region of the state.
3.4.1 Cost-Minimizing Capacity
We will ﬁrst analyze the above model for the case where the social planner makes only the
capacity decision and has no inﬂuence over the time patients spend in the home stage. This
analysis applies to cases where the guidelines for cancer screening are well-established and con-
sumer behavior is relatively insensitive to education eﬀorts, price changes or subsidies enacted
by the social planner. To proceed with the analysis, ﬁrst we show that the above long-run
average total cost function is convex in the capacity decision.
Proposition 3.1. The long-run average total cost given in 3.6 is convex in the capacity decision,
µ.
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Using the objective function property shown in Proposition 3.1, we derive the equilibrium
capacity decision in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. The long-run average total cost minimizing capacity decision is given by µ∗ =
λτ(θ+β+α+τ)
(α+β)(τ+α+θ) +
√
λβτb1
c(α+β)(τ+α+β) ; W
∗ =
√
c(α+β)(τ+α+β)
λβτb1
; TC∗ = cλτα+β +
λβ(θb2+cτ(τ+α+θ)+τb1)
(α+β)(τ+α+θ)2
+
2
√
βλτcb1
(τ+α+θ)(α+β)
We rewrite the optimal total cost function so that the terms in the cost function reﬂect
expressions which are more intuitive to the model dynamics.
TC∗ =
cλτ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
+ λ
(
β
α+ β
)(
τ
τ + α+ θ
)(
b1
τ + α+ θ
)
+ λ
(
β
α+ β
)(
θ
τ + α+ θ
)(
b2
τ + α+ θ
)
+ 2
√
βλτcb1
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
(3.7)
The ﬁrst term in the total cost function is the marginal cost of capacity multiplied by the
input rate, a2, into screening. This cost corresponds to the capacity which must be carried to
meet the demand exactly. The second term corresponds to the delay at home for patients who
develop cancer (at home) that is detected via screening during the cycle the cancer is detected.
The third term corresponds to the delay at home for patients who develop cancer (at home)
which is detected via other methods during the cycle the cancer is detected. The capacity
decision does not impact this delay cost as carrying more capacity does not inﬂuence patients to
schedule appointments sooner (or at a diﬀerent frequency), it simply impacts the delay for the
appointment. The last term is the long-run average cost of carrying a capacity buﬀer to decrease
wait-times which explicitly beneﬁts those who have undetected cancer. When the marginal cost
of capacity is higher, the buﬀer decreases, but the cost of the buﬀer still increases due to the
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higher marginal cost of capacity. When the delay cost is higher, the buﬀer increases as does the
cost of the capacity buﬀer.
Other performance measures can be derived using the above equilibrium result. One per-
formance measure given below which is not previously deﬁned, is the number of screens per
new-patient arrival, N = a2λ . This gives a measure of the average number of colonoscopies in a
patient's lifetime (assuming no colonoscopies before entering the system, e.g. at age 50).
a1 =
λ (τ + α+ β)
α+ β
(3.8)
a2 =
λτ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
(3.9)
N =
a2
λ
=
τ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
(3.10)
P (Other.Detection) =
βθ
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
(3.11)
P (Screen.Detection) =
βτ
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
(3.12)
P (Negative.Screen) =
τ
τ + α+ β
(3.13)
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Table 3.1: Sensitivity of Optimal Solution
Parameter µ∗ W ∗ TC∗ N∗
α : mortality rate decreases increases decreases decreases
β : cancer rate not monotone decreases not monotone decreases
θ : inverse of mean
time to other
detection
decreases increases not monotone decreases
b1 : delay cost for
screening
increases decreases increases no eﬀect
b2 : detection delay
cost for other methods
no eﬀect no eﬀect increases no eﬀect
c : marginal cost of
capacity
decreases increases increases no eﬀect
λ : new patient arrival
rate
increases decreases increases no eﬀect
τ : inverse of mean
time at home
increases decreases not monotone increases
P (Death) =
α (τ + β + α+ θ)
(τ + α+ θ) (α+ β)
(3.14)
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The comparative statics for the optimal capacity, wait time, total cost, and number of screens
per new patient arrival are summarized in Table 3.1
From Table 3.1 we obtain several important insights regarding the capacity planning decision.
We ﬁrst look at the impact of an increase in the new patient arrival rate, λ, in order to consider
the impact of an aging population, and growing demand for health services due to health policy
reform and increased health insurance coverage. As more new patients enter the system, i.e.
a greater number of people reach the minimum screening age, the optimal screening capacity
increases as we would expect. Since we are examining a cost minimization model, more new
patients mean a greater total cost as they adds greater load to the network. However, as the new
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patient arrivals increase, the wait-time for screening decreases. This result is counter-intuitive,
especially if one considers capacity to be relatively ﬁxed or linearly increasing in new patient
arrivals. In this long-run model, we assume the provider is not capacity constrained and can
set its capacity to any level. In Theorem 3.1 we see that the optimal capacity decision, µ∗, is a
function of a2, the input rate, and a capacity square-root term which is a function of the new
patient arrival rate. The input rate, a2, is increasing in the arrival rate, but the capacity buﬀer
is also increasing in the arrival rate in a non-linear fashion. Therefore, as more new patients
enter the system, the clinic chooses an even higher capacity buﬀer. Since the capacity buﬀer
is increasing in the new patient arrival rate, the wait time decreases (total throughput time as
well as time in queue). We can think of this result as an economies of scale beneﬁt in terms
of service delivery (better access to service). This is an interesting result given the current
changes in the market for preventive health services. The result claims that as the demand
grows, delays for appointments for screens should go down assuming providers can adjust their
capacity accordingly. In a later section we consider what happens in cases where capacity is
constrained.
Secondly, we examine the impact of changing the average time patients spend at home,
1
τ . Changes in the mean time at home may be due to changes in the guidelines or increased
education eﬀorts by providers, policy makers, and insurers to encourage guideline adherence.
When the average time spent at home between screens decreases, the needed capacity increases
as patients now return to be screened more frequently. The input into the screening node
increases due to more frequent screening, as does the number of screens per new arrival. Again,
we see that wait times drop. This result is counter-intuitive as one might suspect that since
patients are spending less time waiting at home, the clinic can aﬀord for them to wait longer
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for their appointment and still achieve the same balance of delay and capacity costs. However,
we see that as the average time spent at home decreases so does the capacity buﬀer because the
volume eﬀect dominates. The eﬀect of changing the average time at home on the total cost is
not monotone. Let's consider the special case of α = 0, θ = 0; i.e. patients do not die of other
causes nor is cancer detected via other methods. In this case, the change in total cost with
respect to the inverse of the mean time at home is given by ∂TC
∗
∂τ∗ =
cλ
β − b1λτ2 . When patients
are spending a relatively long amount of time at home, then lowering the time spent at home
will decrease the optimal total cost because the risk of extremely long cancer detection delays
is reduced. If patients are already being screened very frequently (the mean time at home is
extremely small), then further decreasing the time spent will have little impact on the delay
cost, but require signiﬁcantly more capacity from the clinic and increase long-run average total
costs.
Our results also provide insights regarding changes in the cancer incidence rate, β. Such
changes may be due to diﬀerences in patient populations or changes in patient behavior which
contribute to risk factors for the disease such as diet or environment. As the cancer incidence rate
increases, the average wait time decreases. This relationship is consistently monotone though
the eﬀect of β on the capacity decision is not. To reach an intuitive explanation, consider the
special case where patients do not die from other causes. In this case, the cancer incidence rate
is extremely (inﬁnitely) high compared to the mortality rate, α. It is straightforward to show in
this case that the capacity is monotonically decreasing in β. As patients develop cancer faster,
they are also leaving the system at a faster rate. In the special case, where there is no mortality
from other causes and no detection from other methods, patients only leave the system through a
positive screen for cancer. The increased rate of patients exiting the system dominates the eﬀect
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of a longer detection delay for those who now develop cancer sooner. This result is reinforced
by another result that in the special case of α = 0, the total cost is monotonically decreasing
in β. Patients are not dying from other causes in the special case, so when the mean time until
patients develop cancer decreases, patients leave the system faster. Less capacity is needed, and
less cost is incurred.
When the mortality rate, α, increases, more patients die from other causes which decreases
the capacity needed for screening since patients are leaving the system faster. Wait times increase
because the clinic loses economies of scale beneﬁts due to fewer patients in the system in steady
state. The total cost decreases because patients stay in the system less time on average due to
increased deaths from other causes. The average number of screens per new patient arrival also
drops.
As the average time until cancer is detected from other causes, 1θ , decreases, the optimal
screening capacity decreases. This result provides particular insight for colonoscopy screening
where increasing the accuracy or adherence to other relatively inexpensive methods of detection
such as FOBT could decrease the need for colonoscopy capacity. However, remember that we
have only modeled the screening capacity of colonoscopy and not the diagnostic capacity. This
result may not hold in cases where a colonoscopy is still performed in order to conﬁrm the
presence of cancer when suspected via other methods. Also, we are not taking into account
how the cost of other detection methods may change with improved accuracy. For example,
molecular based stool testing may improve accuracy for other methods of detection, but may
also be comparatively expensive (Markowitz and Bertagnolli 2009).
Higher delay costs, for both b1 and b2, imply higher optimal capacity. Alternatively, a higher
marginal cost of screening capacity, c, implies lower optimal capacity.
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3.5 Model Analysis: Choosing Average Time Between Screens for Fixed
Capacity
In order to fully understand the relationship between the capacity planning decision and the
average time until patients schedule the next screen, we now consider the social planner's optimal
decision for the time at home assuming the service capacity is ﬁxed. We rewrite the social
planner's problem as follows.
min
τ : µ>a2(τ)
TC = λ
(
β
α+ β
)( τ
τ + α+ θ
) b1
τ + α+ θ
+
b1
µ− λτ(τ+β+α+θ)(α+β)(τ+α+θ)

+ λ
(
β
α+ β
)((
θ
τ + α+ θ
)(
b2
τ + α+ θ
))
+ cµ (3.15)
In general it is diﬃcult to show that the above function is unimodal in the decision variable,
τ , where 1τ is the average time at home. It is also diﬃcult to explicitly solve the ﬁrst order
conditions in closed-form. We examine a special case of the model in order to gain some
analytical insights and leave further analysis of the model for the Numerical Study.
3.5.1 Special Case, α = 0; θ = 0
In this subsection, we assume that patients do not die from other causes, nor is cancer detected
via other methods. Patients continue to be screened until cancer is eventually detected via
screening. This model is an approximation but provides us with mathematical expressions
which are helpful for obtaining insights. For this special case we evaluate the objective function
at α = 0 and θ = 0 and deﬁne h = 1τ .
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min
h : µ>a2(h)
TC = cµ+ λb1
(
h+
1
µ− λ− λβh
)
(3.16)
In the following proposition we show that the cost function is convex in the average time
spent at home, h. For the special case, we assume µ > λ, for long-run stability of the queueing
network.
Proposition 3.2. The long-run average total cost given in Equation (3.16) is convex in the
average time spent at home, h.
Using the above proposition we solve for the optimal time at home in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.2. The optimal average time at home which minimizes the long-run average total
cost is given by the following two scenarios:
1. If λ ≥ β, no feasible solution
2. If β > λ, h∗ = λ+
√
λβ
β(µ−λ) ; W
∗ = λ+
√
λβ
(µ−λ)√λβ ; TC = cµ+
λb1(λ+
√
λβ)(β+
√
λβ)
β(µ−λ)√λβ
Though the above results apply to an extreme case, some useful insights can still be obtained
for the non-trivial case where β > λ. This condition is required for feasibility because patients
only leave the system by developing cancer; therefore current patients must develop cancer at
least as fast as new patients enter the system or else the system is unstable (i.e. 1β <
1
λ) for
this special case. This condition is unreasonable in practice since the mean time until cancer
detection should be much lower on average than the mean inter-arrival time. However, the
special case results still provide insights into the optimal average time at home. The comparative
statics for this special case are summarized in Table 3.2.
In this model, the service capacity is assumed to be exogenous. We look at the sensitivity
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Table 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis: Choose time at home for ﬁxed capacity, α = 0; θ = 0
h∗ a∗2 W ∗ TC∗
β decreases decreases decreases decreases
b1 no eﬀect no eﬀect no eﬀect increases
λ increases increases increases increases
µ decreases increases decreases decreases*
*assuming c = 0
analysis table to observe the impact of a change in capacity given all other parameters are held
constant. When capacity increases, the clinic has more slack and can increase the screening
frequency by lowering the average time spent at home. The increase in capacity increases
the demand for screens, but the faster service speed eﬀect dominates and average wait time
decreases.
If the capacity is exogenous, increasing the new patient arrival rate will put increased load
on the system. The clinic will increase the time patients spend at home in order to control the
demand for screens. The input into screening still increases, as does the wait time and the total
cost. This result has important implications given the current environment of growing demand
for preventive services. If capacity for colonoscopy screening is relatively ﬁxed due to limited
resources (physicians, clinic space, budget for capacity expansion), wait times will continue to
increase and practical expectations may need to be set regarding the clinics ability to eﬀectively
deliver screening according to the guidelines.
3.6 Model Analysis: Joint Optimization for Capacity and Time Between
Screens
In this Section, we allow the provider to simultaneously choose its capacity and the screening
frequency. We rewrite the provider's problem as follows.
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min
µ,τ : µ>a2(τ)
TC = λ
(
β
α+ β
)( τ
τ + α+ θ
) b1
τ + α+ θ
+
b1
µ− λτ(τ+β+α+θ)(α+β)(τ+α+θ)

+ λ
(
β
α+ β
)((
θ
τ + α+ θ
)(
b2
τ + α+ θ
))
+ cµ (3.17)
In general, it is diﬃcult to show that the above function is unimodal in the two decision
variables. We examine a special case of the model in order to gain some analytical insights and
leave further analysis of the model for the numerical study in a later section.
3.6.1 Special Case, α = 0; θ = 0
In this subsection, we assume that patients do not die from other causes, nor is cancer detected
via other methods. Patients continue to be screened until cancer is eventually detected via
screening. This model is an approximation but provides us with mathematical expressions
which are helpful for obtaining insights. For this special case we evaluate the objective function
at α = 0 and θ = 0 and let h = 1τ .
min
µ≥0,h≥0 : µ>a2(h)
TC = cµ+ λb1
(
h+
1
µ− λ− λβh
)
(3.18)
In the following proposition we show that the cost function is jointly convex in the average
time spent at home, h and the capacity decision, µ. We assume µ > λ, for long-run stability of
the queueing network.
Proposition 3.3. The cost function in Equation (3.18) is jointly convex in the capacity, µ, and
average time at home, h.
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Choose time at home and capacity, α = 0; θ = 0
h∗ = 1τ∗ µ
∗ W ∗ N∗ TC∗
β decreases decreases no eﬀect decreases decreases
b1 decreases increases decreases increases increases
c increases decreases increases decreases increases
λ no eﬀect increases decreases no eﬀect increases
In the following Theorem we derive the optimal capacity and average time at home decisions
for the above optimization problem.
Theorem 3.3. The long-run average total cost minimizing capacity and average time at home
decisions are given by µ∗ = λ+ λ
√
b1
βc +
√
b1λ
c ; h
∗ =
√
c
βb1
; W ∗ =
√
c
b1λ
; TC = cλ+ 2λ
√
cb1
β +
2
√
cb1λ
Though the above results apply to an extreme case, some useful insights can still be obtained.
The comparative statics for this special case are summarized in Table 3.3.
Using sensitivity analysis for this special case, we compare in greater detail the impact of
a change in a parameter on the average time waiting at home, h, compared to the average
time waiting for a screen once requested, W = 1µ−a2 . When the new patient arrival rate, λ,
increases, screening frequency does not change but the average appointment delay (wait time)
decreases meaning greater appointment access for patients. The change in the new patient
arrival rate has a greater (absolute) impact on the appointment delay than on the screening
frequency. When the cancer rate, β, increases, patients request screens more frequently, but
the expected appointment delay does not change. The change in the cancer rate has a greater
(decreasing) impact on the screening frequency than on the appointment wait time. When the
delay cost, b1, increases, patients will screen more frequently and also spend less time waiting
for a screening appointment. The change in time spent waiting to schedule (at home) is given by
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∂h∗
∂b1
= − 12b1
√
c
βb1
. The change in average wait time is given by ∂W
∗
∂b1
= − 12b1
√
c
βλ . The change
in the delay cost has a greater (absolute) impact on the time waiting to schedule if β < λ and
a greater (absolute) impact on average appointment wait time if β > λ.
A surprising result in this model is that as the cancer incidence rate increases, the capacity
decreases. This is mostly due to the special case assumptions. Since patients only leave the
system once cancer is detected through screening, and not from dying due to other causes, then a
higher incidence rate means that patients leave the system faster and fewer screens are needed.
The total cost of the system is also lower. Though the average time at home decreases and
patients request screens more frequently while alive, the eﬀect of an increased rate of system
exit dominates, and fewer screens are requested per new arrival on average.
The sensitivity of the optimal decisions, objective function, and performance measures with
respect to the cost parameters remains intuitive. Higher delay cost implies higher capacity, less
time waiting for a screen once requested, less time spent at home between screens, and higher
total cost. Higher capacity cost implies lower capacity, increased waiting time for a screen once
requested, more time spent at home on average, and higher total cost.
3.7 Numerical Study
We conduct a numerical study in order to solve the model using parameters estimated from real-
world data. The numerical study provides further insights into the more complicated models
which cannot be solved analytically.
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3.7.1 Estimating Parameters
First we describe how we estimate each of the parameters of the model using public health data
for colorectal cancer.
• We assume a time unit of weeks.
• The current guidelines endorsed by the CDC and the USPSTF recommend routine screen-
ings beginning at age 50 with a FOBT test every year, sigmoidoscopy every 5 years, and
a colonoscopy every 10 years (CDC 2013b). We assume that patients enter the system
at age 50 and wait a random time at home before their ﬁrst screen. We assume that the
time at home between age 50 and the ﬁrst screen follows the same distribution as the time
spent at home between any subsequent screens. Our base estimate for the average time
(at home) until the next screen is scheduled is 520 weeks (10 years). While colonoscopy
screening is recommended to begin at age 50, not all patients will immediately request a
screen once turning age 50. We could adjust this parameter, by assuming that patients
enter the model at age 40 or 45 so that a higher number have requested a screen by age
50.
• The death rate due to other causes, α = 11623.5284 . From data collected from the Social
Security Administration (SSA) 2009 period Actuarial Life Table we observe the remaining
life expectancy at age 50 to be 29.35 years for males and 33.02 years for females (SSA -
Oﬃce of the Cheif Actuary 2013). Using US Census data, we calculate the population
distribution between sexes to at age 50 to be approximately 51% female and 49% male
(U. S. Census Bureau 2013). We use a weighted average on the two expected remaining
lifetimes to calculate an average remaining life expectancy of 31.2217 years. The patients
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average remaining lifetime when entering the system is given by an exponential distribution
with mean 31.2217 years. We solve for alpha by taking the inverse of this mean converted
to weeks. Since the death rate due to colorectal cancer is relatively small, we do not
adjust the life expectancy to be only deaths due to other causes; therefore we slightly
over-estimate the death rate due to other causes.
• The rate of people who reach screening age, λ = 10.662 patients per week. We observe
data from the US Census Bureau on population distribution by age and we estimate a
current rate of approximately 12, 500 people in the US turn 50 every day (U. S. Census
Bureau 2013). This amounts to 87, 500 people per week. We divide this by an estimate
of the number of clinics administering colonoscopies, 8207, to get the average number of
patients per clinic who turn 50 per week (Seeﬀ et al. 2004).
• The cancer incidence rate, β = 0.00001924. From data collected from the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention we observe that 52.7 men per 100,000 men and 39.7 per
100,000 women are diagnosed with colorectal cancer each year (CDC 2013a). We average
the incidence rates to get the incidence rate for all people assuming the population is
51% female and 49% male to get an incidence rate of 46.070 per 100,000 people (U. S.
Census Bureau 2013). Using the data on number of people who turn 50 each week we solve
the following equation for β using the estimates below and the mortality rate calculated
above. Note that using this equation to estimate β assumes a stable population size. An
alternative estimate from the National Cancer Institute of 102,480 new cases of colorectal
cancer in 2013 or the estimate from the ﬁrst paragraph of the introduction could also be
used on the right hand side of the equation and will provide a slightly higher estimate
(currently the right hand side is estimated to be 138,210 new cases per year). Our estimates
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for α and β, imply that about 3% of all people will develop colorectal cancer at some point
in their lifetime (though it may go undetected in some who die from other causes before
detection).
 (Turn 50 Per Y ear)P (Cancer After 50) = (Incidence Per 100000)(USPopulation)100000
 (Turn 50 Per Y ear) = (12500) (365) = 4, 562, 500
 P (Cancer After 50) = βα+β
 (Incidence Per 100000) = 47.070
 (USPopulation) = 300, 000, 000
 Substituting and solving for β we get the above parameter estimate.
(4, 562, 500)
(
β
1
1623.5284 + β
)
=
(47.070) (3, 000, 000)
100000
• The rate until cancer is detected via other methods θ = 1260 . We found this parameter
diﬃcult to estimate, so we assume in the base case that the average time until cancer
is detected via other methods once the person has cancer to be half of the established
screening guideline.
• The cost of colonoscopy capacity, c = 3.081. We observe an estimate for the average cost
of a colonoscopy to be $3,081 which is the average cost of a colonoscopy estimated by
BCBSNC for an uninsured patient ((CostHelper.com 2013)). This cost does not include
the cost associated with lost utility or lost productivity when the patient actually attends
a screen. We write the costs in terms of thousands of dollars per week. Rosenthal (2013)
states the average price in the US as $1,185, but this appears to be an out of pocket price,
which does not reﬂect the total cost and does not include additional fees for sedation.
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• The cost of delay when cancer is detected via screening b1 = 0.3851. This parameter is
also diﬃcult to estimate due to the slow growing nature of colorectal cancer and lack of
available data. Luo et al. (2010) provide estimates of 1-year costs attributable to colon
cancer by stage of diagnosis. They ﬁnd that patients diagnosed with cancer in local stage
had the lowest costs ($27,551), followed by patients with distant stage ($29,933), and
patients with regional cancer had the highest cost ($30,748). From these ﬁndings we see
that there is a high ﬁxed cost for treating cancer from any stage (even local) and the
increase in costs by stage above does not account for other costs such as increased chance
of death from cancer or disutility for the patient. We assume that 8 weeks of delay for a
patient with cancer will cost as much in treatment as one colonoscopy.
• The cost of delay when cancer is detected other methods b2 = 0.7703. This parameter is
also diﬃcult to estimate so we assume it to be twice the delay cost when cancer is detected
via screening.
• The base capacity is µ = 33.327. We observe from Seeﬀ et al. (2004) an estimate of 14.2
million colonoscopies for 8,207 practices in 2002. This translates to an average screening
rate of 33.327 colonoscopies per week per clinic. Assuming that utilization for colono-
scopies is very high (as observed by high waiting time) we use this estimate as the estimate
for capacity. However, the authors also ﬁnd that all physicians combined report that they
could increase to 22.4 million colonoscopies within 1 year. This translates to a capacity
of µ = 52.488. We can use the ﬁrst estimate as a low estimate for average weekly clinic
capacity and the second estimate as a high estimate for average weekly clinic capacity.
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3.7.2 Capacity Decision, Fixed Time at Home
In this subsection of the numerical study, we provide numerical analysis for the model described
in Sections 3 and 4, where the average time at home is ﬁxed and the provider chooses its
capacity. This is an important model to consider because the guidelines for colorectal cancer
are relatively well-established and considerable education eﬀorts have already been executed. It
may be diﬃcult for policy makers and providers to greatly inﬂuence the average time patients
wait before trying to schedule a screen. The proceeding analysis also addresses the question of
how much capacity is needed to meet a speciﬁed adherence level or current adherence level as
modeled by a random time at home before scheduling the next screen.
Table 3.4 provides numerical calculations of the capacity decision, equilibrium wait time,
and optimal total cost for the base parameters across six scenarios which vary the delay costs
within the set {
[
b1 =
c
16 , b2 =
c
8
]
,
[
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4
]
,
[
b1 =
c
4 , b2 =
c
2
]
} and the arrival rate within
the set {λ = 10.662, λ = 42.647}. The two arrival rates correspond to an average size clinic, and
a clinic 4 times the average size. While it is diﬃcult for us to estimate some of the parameters
of the model such as the delay costs and the time until cancer is detected via other methods,
our results indicate that the range for the optimal capacity at our base parameters falls below
our estimate for the current average clinic capacity, i.e.µ ∈ [32.454, 32.532] ≤ µ = 33.327 . This
would indicate that current average clinic capacity could be enough to meet all demand for
cancer screening at the currently established guidelines. In the model, since colorectal cancer
is fairly rare, the clinic keeps a very small capacity buﬀer (utilization close to 1), and the wait
time for screening ranges from 6.413 to 12.825 weeks. In practice waits of 6-12 weeks could
discourage patients from scheduling screens and be long enough to contribute to poor adherence
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Table 3.4: Optimal Capacity, Wait Time, and Total Cost
µ∗ W ∗ TC∗
λ = 10.662
b1 =
c
16 , b2 =
c
8 32.454 12.825 114.899
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4 32.487 9.069 129.766
b1 =
c
4 , b2 =
c
2 32.532 6.413 159.382
λ = 42.647
b1 =
c
16 , b2 =
c
8 129.661 6.413 458.636
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4 129.726 4.534 517.704
b1 =
c
4 , b2 =
c
2 129.817 3.206 635.606
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, τ = 1/520, θ = 1/260]
to screening guidelines.
Using our model and base parameter estimates for average clinic capacity and new patient
arrival rate, we estimate an average wait time of 1.11 weeks for screening at a clinic with
current average capacity. The probability of waiting more than 2 weeks is 16.618%. In order to
guarantee an average wait-time of less than t weeks the clinic would need W = 1µ−a2 ≤ t. Given
our assumption that cancer does not develop while waiting, the input rate a2 =
λτ(τ+α+β)
α+β
does not depend upon the capacity decision, µ. For our base set of parameters we estimate
a2 = 32.37. Solving for µ we obtain µ ≥ 1t + a2. Given our model assumptions we know the
distribution of the wait time function to be exponential. In order to guarantee that no more than
x% of patients wait more than t weeks for an appointment, we solve P (W > t) = x ≥ e−(µ−a2)t.
To guarantee a service level of (1− x) % of patients wait less than t weeks, the clinic requires a
capacity of µ ≥ a2 − ln(x)t . In Table 3.5 we solve these two equations for diﬀerent combinations
of the threshold for time waiting, t, and the percent waiting more than threshold, x. We also
show the percent change in total cost over the optimal for delivering the corresponding service
level %4TC = TC−TC∗TC∗ .
We graph the sensitivity of the four results from Table 3.1 which were not monotone to see
whether these statics are monotone near our base case estimates. In Figure 3.3, we can see
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Table 3.5: Capacity Needed to Guarantee Low Wait Times
t=2 t=1
Avg. x = 0.1 x = 0.05 x = 0.01 Avg. x = 0.1 x = 0.05 x = 0.01
µ 32.876 33.528 33.874 34.679 33.376 34.679 35.37 36.98
%4TC 0.72% 2.23% 3.05% 4.95% 1.88% 4.96% 6.60% 10.41%
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, τ = 1/520, θ =
1/260, λ = 10.662]
that while µ∗ is not generally monotone in the cancer rate, the optimal capacity decreases in β
within the reasonable range of 0 ≤ β ≤ α.
In Figure 3.4, we see that the optimal cost is increasing in the cancer rate β for our base
set of parameters though the cost function is not generally monotone in β. The patients who
develop cancer will develop cancer faster and, on average, experience a longer delay before being
screened. Patients also leave the system faster as they are now more likely to develop cancer
sooner. When β increases, the patients who get cancer are now more likely to get cancer sooner
in their life and the number of screens per new patient arrival decreases. The provider will
decrease its capacity because demand is lower and the cost of capacity dominates the cost of
delay.
In Figure 3.5, we see that the cost is not monotone in the rate until cancer is detected via
other methods. In this case, if θ is extremely low, lower than α even, (meaning that on average
the patient's remaining lifetime will be shorter than the time it takes to detect the disease from
other methods), then increasing θ will increase the total costs. Since θ is very small, increasing
it slightly will have a signiﬁcant impact on the average time until cancer is detected via other
methods. An extremely rare event becomes less rare, and the higher delay cost will be incurred
for those patients. If θ increases above a threshold, further increases lead to a decrease in total
cost. This result gives insight into other forms of screening and diagnosis used in practice. In our
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Figure 3.3: Optimal Capacity Increases in Mean Time Until Onset of Cancer
[α = 0.000616, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, τ = 1/520, θ = 1/260, λ = 10.662, b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4 ]
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Figure 3.4: Optimal Cost Decreases in Mean Time Until Onset of Cancer
[α = 0.000616, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, τ = 1/520, θ = 1/260, λ = 10.662]
model we assume these other forms of diagnosis do not require patients to schedule a follow-up
screen, so faster diagnosis via other methods reduces the number of screens demanded and the
lower capacity costs dominates the increased cost due to detection from other causes as opposed
to detection from screening.
In Figure 3.6, we see that the cost function is increasing monotonically in the rate at home
(decreasing in the average time at home) when the other parameters are at the base estimates.
As shown analytically in Section 4, this is not generally the case, as the optimal cost function can
be non-monotonic in the average time at home. Less time at home on average means increased
screening frequency, and this means an increase in the number of screens demanded. For the
base set of parameters, the higher capacity cost dominates the cost saved from shorter detection
delay and optimal costs increase when the screening frequency increases.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Cost is Not Monotone in Mean Time Until Other Detection
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, τ = 1/520, λ = 10.662]
3.7.3 Average Time at Home Decision, Fixed Capacity
In this subsection of the Numerical Study, we provide numerical analysis for the model described
in Section 5, where capacity is limited and the provider can inﬂuence the average time patients
spend at home. In this section we set µ = 33.27. In Figure 3.7 we see that the long-run average
cost function is convex in the inverse of the mean time at home within the feasible range. The
upper boundary of the x-axis is given by the condition a2 (τ) < µ. This condition guarantees
that the total input for screening does not exceed the screening capacity and the queueing
network is stable.
Table 3.6 provides numerical calculations of the average time at home decision, equilibrium
wait time, and optimal total cost for the base parameters across six scenarios which vary the
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Figure 3.6: Optimal Cost Decreases in Mean Time Until Next Screening Request
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, τ = 1/520, λ = 10.662]
delay costs within the set {
[
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
8
]
,
[
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4
]
,
[
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
2
]} and the arrival
rate within the set {λ = 10.662,λ = 15.992}. We calculate the optimal decision by solving
the ﬁrst-order conditions numerically, checking the solution set for feasibility (non-negativity
and queueing stability conditions) and then evaluating the total cost. The two arrival rates
correspond to an average clinic market size, and a clinic 50% above average e.g. growth due
to population aging, and/or increased insurance coverage. At the estimates for current average
clinic capacity and clinic market size (number of people reaching age 50), we calculate the
optimal average time at home to be within the range of h∗ = [509.336, 513.883] based on our
choices for the delay cost parameters. This estimate for optimal average time at home is close
to the established guidelines of colonoscopy screening every ten years, but our current results
under-estimate the demand for all colonoscopies by not including diagnostic colonoscopies or
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Figure 3.7: Cost Function Is Convex in Mean Time at Home in Feasible Region
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, µ = 33.273, λ = 10.662]
screening for those who have already been treated. The optimal expected wait time is within
1.952 to 4.543 weeks.
We notice some important patterns from Table 3.6 in terms of sensitivity of the optimal
solution to the parameters. First, when the cost of delay for other detection increases relative to
the cost of delay for screening, the average time at home decreases and the wait time increases.
Table 3.6: Optimal Time at Home, Wait Time, and Total Cost
h∗ = 1τ∗ W
∗ TC∗
λ = 10.662
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
8 513.883 1.952 120.135
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4 510.969 3.071 131.760
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
2 509.336 4.543 154.953
λ = 15.992
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
8 770.624 2.029 131.530
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
4 766.127 3.329 153.126
b1 =
c
8 , b2 =
c
2 763.801 4.997 196.237
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, b1 = 0.385125, b2 = 0.77025, µ = 33.2737, θ = 1/260]
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The clinic would prefer patients spend less time at home so that when cancer occurs it is more
likely to be found via screening than via other methods. The wait time increases because the
demand for screens has now increased for ﬁxed capacity. The total time between screens, the
sum of expected time at home and expected wait time, remains fairly constant (dropping only
slightly). This eﬀect is more pronounced when λ is higher. Even under our assumption of no
onset of cancer while waiting, higher delay cost due to other causes does not mean that the
clinic merely shifts the lower time at home to more time waiting. Instead, there is some (small)
change in the overall expected time between screens.
The second important sensitivity result from Table 3.6 is that increasing the new patient
arrival rate by 50% for an average clinic implies that the optimal average time at home ranges
from 763.801 weeks to 770.624 weeks. This result is signiﬁcant, not because of its ordinal
direction, but because of its magnitude and implication for current changes in the health care
environment which many colonoscopy providers are facing. Increasing the demand by 50%
implies that the optimal time at home increases approximately 255 weeks for our base set of
parameters. Since the average clinic currently operates at high utilization, increasing the patient
arrival rate by 50% implies an approximately 50% increase in the average time spent at home.
The wait time increases very slightly (e.g. 3.071 to 3.329), especially compared to the large
change in the optimal time at home between screens.
3.7.4 Joint Capacity and Average Time at Home Decisions
In this subsection of the Numerical Study, we provide numerical analysis for the model described
in Section 6, where the provider may choose both the capacity and the average time patients
spend at home. We calculate the optimal decision by solving the ﬁrst-order conditions numeri-
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Table 3.7: Optimal Capacity, Time at Home, Wait Time, and Total Cost - 1
µ∗ h∗ = 1τ∗ W
∗ N∗ TC∗
λ = 10.662
b1 = c, b2 = 2c 30.082 565.395 3.303 2.793 336.111
b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c 64.402 263.466 1.835 5.989 535.382
b1 = 4c, b2 = 8c 111.252 152.338 1.140 10.352 812.193
λ = 15.992
b1 = c, b2 = 2c 45.123 564.332 2.694 2.798 503.653
b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c 96.526 263.266 1.498 5.994 802.149
b1 = 4c, b2 = 8c 166.706 152.274 0.931 10.357 1216.803
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, θ = 1/260]
cally, checking the solution set for feasibility (non-negativity and queueing stability conditions)
and then evaluating the total cost for any candidate solutions.
Table 3.7 provides numerical calculations of the average time at home decision, equilibrium
wait time, and optimal total cost for the base parameters across six scenarios which vary the
delay costs within the set {[b1 = c, b2 = 2c], [b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c], [b1 = 4c, b2 = 8c]} and the arrival
rate within the set {λ = 10.662,λ = 15.992}. We initialize the parameter estimates for the
delay costs to be higher than in the earlier models to ensure non-trivial, feasible solutions exist
(i.e. the delay penalty is large enough s.t. τ > 0 and µ > a2 (τ)). In Table 3.7 we vary the
magnitude of the delay costs while keeping the ratio between the delay costs constant. The two
arrival rates correspond to an average clinic market size and a clinic 50% above average. In the
parameter setting of λ = 10.662; b1 = c; b2 = 2c, we see that the optimal capacity is slightly
below the current clinic average we observed from our data (µ = 30.082 compared to µ = 33.27).
The average time at home is slightly above the established guidelines (h∗ = 565.39 compared to
h∗ = 520). The estimated average wait time for this case is 3.303 weeks with an average total
cost of $336, 111.
Patterns in the results from Table 3.7 provide insight into the sensitivity of the optimal
solution to the parameters. First, we observe sensitivity with respect to the arrival rate. When
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the delay costs are b1 = c, b2 = 2c, a 50% increase in the arrival rate indicates a 50% increase in
the capacity, the average time at home drops 0.19% and the average wait time drops by 18.44%.
When delay costs are b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c, the increase in capacity is 49.88%, the average time
at home drops 0.08%, and the average wait time drops by 18.37%. When the delay costs are
b1 = 4c, b2 = 8c the increase in capacity is 49.85%, the average time at home drops 0.04%, and
the average wait time drops by 18.33%. Across multiple settings, a 50% increase in the arrival
rate leads to roughly a 50% increase in capacity, but as delay costs are higher, the percent
increase in capacity due to a change in the arrival rate decreases slightly. The average time
at home decreases only slightly due to a 50% increase in the arrival rate and this increase is
diminishing as the delay cost increases. The wait time decreases by approximately 18% due
to a 50% increase in the arrival rate and this decrease is slightly smaller when the delay costs
are higher. These numerical results are fairly consistent with the intuition derived from the
analytical results for the special case of α = 0; θ = 0. As the arrival rate increases, the capacity
increases and the expected wait time drops, with little impact on the average time at home.
Second, we observe sensitivity with respect to the delay costs. When the new patient arrival
rate is equal to 10.662, increasing the delay costs from b1 = c, b2 = 2c to b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c increases
the capacity by 114.09%, decreases the average time at home by 53.40%, and decreases the
average wait time by 44.44%. Increasing the delay costs from b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c to b1 = 4c, b2 = 8c
increases the capacity by 72.75%, decreases the average time at home by 42.18%, and decreases
the average wait time time by 37.87%. When the new patient arrival rate is equal to 15.992,
increasing the delay costs from b1 = c, b2 = 2c to b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c increases the capacity by
113.92%, decreases the average time at home by 53.35%, and decreases the average wait time
by 44.39%. Increasing the delay costs from b1 = 2c, b2 = 4c to b1 = 4c, b2 = 8c increases the
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capacity by 72.71%, decreases the average time at home by 42.16%, and decreases the average
wait time by 37.85%. For both arrival rates, the absolute decrease in the time spent at home
due to delay costs is much greater than that for the expected wait time. This agrees with our
earlier analytical result for the special case of α = 0; θ = 0 that increasing the delay cost will
have a greater negative impact on the average time at home than on the expected wait-time
if β < λ. In this case the cancer rate, β, is much less than λ, and we see that increasing the
delay cost decreases the average time at home much more than the average time waiting. The
numerical results above show that this argument holds true even when converting to percent
changes. The percent decrease in time at home is also larger (more negative) in all cases than
the percent decrease in average waiting time. The percent changes in capacity, average time at
home, and wait time appear to be fairly consistent across both arrival rates.
In Table 3.8, we calculate the optimal solution for multiple combinations of β and λ with
the other parameters set to base estimates. We observe the sensitivity of the parameters with
respect to changes in the cancer rate, β. For both new patient arrival rates, λ = 10.662 and
λ = 15.992, we see that increasing the cancer rate increases the optimal capacity, decreases
the optimal average time at home, and decreases the optimal wait time. When λ = 10.662,
increasing the cancer rate by 100% from β = 0.00001924 to β = 0.00003848 causes the capacity
to increase by 108.05%, the average time at home to decrease by 53.35%, and the average
wait time to decrease by 43.60%. When λ = 10.662, increasing the cancer rate by 100% from
β = 0.00003848 to β = 0.00007697 causes the capacity to increase by 63.59%, the average
time at home to decrease by 42.16%, and the average wait time to decrease by 36.07%. When
λ = 15.992, increasing the cancer rate by 100% from β = 0.00001924 to β = 0.00003848 causes
the capacity to increase by 107.89%, the average time at home to decrease by 53.29%, and the
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Table 3.8: Optimal Capacity, Time at Home, Wait Time, and Total Cost - 2
µ∗ h∗ = 1τ∗ W
∗ N∗ TC∗
λ = 10.662
β = 0.00001924 30.082 565.395 3.303 2.793 336.111
β = 0.00003848 62.587 263.778 1.863 5.820 520.134
β = 0.00007697 102.386 152.582 1.191 9.525 746.381
λ = 15.992
β = 0.00001924 45.123 564.332 2.694 2.798 503.653
β = 0.00003848 93.804 263.576 1.521 5.824 779.290
β = 0.00007697 153.415 152.516 0.973 9.529 1118.147
[α = 0.000616, c = 3.081, θ = 1/260, b1 = c, b2 = 2c]
average wait time to decrease by 43.54%. When λ = 15.992, increasing the cancer rate by 100%
from β = 0.00003848 to β = 0.00007697 causes the capacity to increase by 63.55%, the average
time at home to decrease by 42.14%, and the average wait time to decrease by 36.03%. These
results diﬀer from the analytical results we derived for the special case α = 0; θ = 0 in that
an increased cancer rate does lead to lower wait times (in the special case there was no eﬀect
on wait time). The results are consistent with the special case, however, in that the impact of
increasing the cancer incidence rate is greater on the average time at home than on the average
wait time, both in terms of absolute and percent change.
In Table 3.9 we allow the parameter for the time until detection from other methods, θ,
to vary and also vary the ratio of the delay cost parameters {b2 = 2b1, b2 = 3b1}. Across
both combinations of delay cost parameters, we observe that decreasing the time until cancer
is detected via other methods leads to lower capacity, higher average waiting time at home,
and higher average waiting time for the primary screen. When b1 = c, b2 = 2c, and θ =
1
260 ,
increasing the mean time until detection via other methods by 1.5 years (78 weeks), leads to
an increase of 8.788 units of capacity (29.21% increase), a decrease of 128.162 average weeks at
home (22.67% decrease) and a decrease of 0.486 weeks waiting (14.71%). When b1 = c, b2 = 2c,
and θ = 1338 , increasing the mean time until detection via other methods by 1.5 years (78 weeks),
leads to an increase of 4.922 units of capacity (12.66% increase), a decrease of 99.207 average
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weeks at home (22.69% decrease) and a decrease of 0.224 weeks waiting (7.95%). When b1 = c,
b2 = 2c and θ =
1
260 , increasing the mean time until detection via other methods by 1.5 years
(78 weeks), leads to an increase of 6.643 units of capacity (13.12% increase), a decrease of 38.855
average weeks at home (11.60% decrease) and a decrease of 0.255 weeks waiting (9.18%). When
b1 = c, b2 = 2c, and θ =
1
338 , increasing the mean time until detection via other methods by 1.5
years (78 weeks), leads to an increase of 3.356 units of capacity (5.86% increase), a decrease of
16.356 average weeks at home (5.53% decrease) and a decrease of 0.134 weeks waiting (5.31%).
When the delay cost ratio is higher, increasing the time until cancer is detected by other methods
will have a greater (absolute) impact on the optimal solution. Also, we see that increasing the
time until cancer is detected via other methods appears to have a greater impact on average
time at home (both absolute and percentage) than it does on average waiting time.
Additionally, we see from Table 3.9 that increasing the detection delay cost ratio so that
the cost of detection via other methods becomes much more costly than detection via screening
generally leads to higher optimal capacity, lower average time at home, and lower expected
wait times. When θ = 1416 , increasing the delay cost ratio from 2 to 3 leads to an increase of
16.821 units of capacity (38.41%), a decrease of 58.368 average weeks at home (17.27%) and
a decrease of 0.203 (7.83%) average weeks waiting. When θ = 1338 , increasing the delay cost
ratio from 2 to 3 leads to an increase of 18.387 units of capacity (47.30%), a decrease of 141.219
average weeks at home (32.30%) and a decrease of 0.293 average weeks waiting (10.40%). When
θ = 1260 , increasing the delay cost ratio from 2 to 3 leads to an increase of 20.532 units of
capacity (68.25%), a decrease of 230.526 average weeks at home (40.77%) and a decrease of
0.524 average weeks waiting (15.86%). Therefore, when the average time until detection from
other methods is lower, increasing the delay cost ratio appears to have a greater impact on the
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Table 3.9: Optimal Capacity, Time at Home, Wait Time, and Total Cost - 3
µ∗ h∗ = 1τ∗ W
∗ N∗ TC∗
b1 = c, b2 = 2c
θ = 1416 43.792 338.026 2.593 4.071 370.692
θ = 1338 38.870 437.233 2.817 3.613 358.458
θ = 1260 30.082 565.395 3.303 2.793 336.111
b1 = c, b2 = 3c
θ = 1416 60.613 279.658 2.390 5.646 434.791
θ = 1338 57.257 296.014 2.524 5.333 429.870
θ = 1260 50.614 334.869 2.779 4.714 417.569
[α = 0.000616, β = 0.00001924, c = 3.081, λ = 10.662]
optimal solution. We see that changing this ratio also appears to have a greater impact on
average time at home (both absolute and percentage) than it does on average wait time.
3.8 Conclusions and Future Work
We develop a queueing network model to analyze capacity planning and screening guideline
decisions for a social planner who minimizes the long-run average total of detection delay cost
and capacity cost. Patients spend a random amount of time at home before attempting to
schedule a screen for which they must wait according to the queueing dynamics at the endoscopy
suite. Between any two screens, patients may either die from other causes or develop cancer.
If cancer is developed, it may be detected via a screen or via other methods. We solve for
the optimal capacity decision when the average time patients spend at home is exogenous, and
we perform sensitivity analysis on the optimal solution. When the capacity is ﬁxed and the
provider optimizes the average time at home, the function is not convex in the general case so
we solve a special case and perform sensitivity analysis. We investigate the general case via
numerical study. When we allow the provider to jointly optimize both the capacity decision
and the average time at home, we consider a special case for our analytical results because it is
diﬃcult to show unimodality and to solve the model in the general case. We use a numerical
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study to generate real-world estimates of our results from public health data and to further
investigate the model under general assumptions.
A primary objective and contribution for this research, beyond developing a model to op-
timize and guide capacity planning decisions for colorectal cancer screening, is capturing and
understanding the tradeoﬀ between screening guidelines and screening capacity. If screening
guidelines are developed using medical decision making which only takes into account the utility
and health state tradeoﬀs for a single individual, they may suggest policies which are unsus-
tainable or sub-optimal given the system capacity or cost of adding additional capacity. If we
assume the average time at home to be exogenous, e.g. due to well-established guidelines, we
ﬁnd that increasing the average time at home causes the optimal capacity to increase due to
increased demand for screens, but also an increased capacity buﬀer. The increased buﬀer results
in lower average waiting time. The impact on total cost is non-monotonic which leads us to
the joint optimization model where we ﬁnd through our numerical study that changes in the
parameters which cause the optimal capacity to increase generally correspond to decreases in
the optimal average time at home (and often the average wait time as well). An exception to
this general pattern is the special case where patients only leave the system by getting cancer.
In this case increasing the cancer rate would lead to lower capacity and lower average time at
home as the provider wants to detect cancer faster, but patients also leave the system sooner.
In reality, patients are much more likely to die from other causes than colorectal cancer, so this
exception seems unlikely in practice.
From our analysis, we obtain several important insights for policy makers and cancer screen-
ing providers. Our ﬁndings suggest that if providers have the ﬂexibility to adjust capacity at
fairly constant marginal cost, increased demand will lead to improved service delivery in terms
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of reduced wait time for colonoscopy. We ﬁnd that as the new patient arrival rate increases,
e.g. due to shifts in the population distribution or increased insurance coverage, the optimal
capacity increases due to an increased demand for screens but also an increased capacity buﬀer.
If the new patient arrival rate increases approximately 400% at an average clinic, we see that
the capacity increases approximately 399%. This is because the clinic is operating at very high
utilization and therefore keeps a relatively low slack (capacity - input rate) compared to capacity
itself. The increase in the capacity buﬀer leads to lower average wait times. If clinics are capac-
ity constrained, and choose only the average time at home, we see from our numerical study that
increasing the new patient arrival rate by 50% leads to a roughly 50% increase in the average
time spent at home with little eﬀect on wait time. The social planner prefers that patients
screen less frequently (wait longer on average until scheduling the next screen) when they are
capacity constrained. This lengthens the eﬀective screening guidelines to what the provider can
reasonably deliver to the population. In reality, another way the shortage of capacity may play
out is through increased wait-times for appointments rather than by adjustments in the time
until the patient tries to schedule her next screen. Some patients may become frustrated with
how lengthy appointment delays make it more challenging to adhere to guidelines and those
patients may become less likely to be compliant. When social planners have the ﬂexibility to
adjust provider capacity and inﬂuence the average time patients spend at home, increasing the
new patient arrival rate will again lead to lower wait times with little impact on the average
time at home. This result is supported by the range of parameters estimated for our numerical
study from public health data, and also derived analytically for a special case of the parameters.
These results indicate that while growing demand is a concern in capacity-constrained environ-
ments, it can also result in improved appointment access when resources are available to adjust
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capacity accordingly.
A challenge with cancer screening, and colorectal cancer in particular, is asymptomatic
disease progression and the accuracy of aﬀordable alternatives for screening and diagnosis such
as FOBT. In our model we ﬁnd that if the time until detection from other methods decreases,
i.e. patients are encouraged to use FOBT tests with greater frequency and improved accuracy,
this will reduce the optimal colonoscopy screening capacity required and likely decrease the
optimal screening cost. Though the optimal cost is not generally monotone in the time at
home, we observe it to only be increasing for a range of parameters which is unlikely in practice
(e.g. average time until detection from other methods exceeds average lifetime). Lower screening
capacity will lead to higher expected wait time for those who do request screens. In our numerical
study of the joint optimization model, we also see that decreasing the time until detection via
other methods will result in lower optimal capacity, higher optimal average waiting times, higher
optimal average time at home, and lower optimal average cost. The provider prefers that patients
wait at home longer so that the disease is more likely to be detected via other methods before
requesting an expensive screen. An exception to these ﬁndings in practice is that colonoscopy
is often used as a follow-up screen to conﬁrm suspected diagnosis from other methods (e.g.
positive FOBT test or symptoms). The assumptions of our model could be adjusted to account
for such a setting. It could be in that case that faster detection from other methods implies
an increase in capacity along with higher wait times and either higher or lower costs. Another
caveat is how these results should be interpreted across diﬀerent types of other detection. For
example, if cancer is being detected faster because it is spreading to other organs and parts of
the body faster, then a correlation between lower time until detection from other causes and
higher detection delay penalty for other detection may exist. Future research could examine the
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eﬀect of such a correlation or model cancer detected via other screens (e.g. FOBT) separately
from cancer detected via late stage progression, symptoms, or death.
Using public health data collected for our numerical study, our analysis also provides esti-
mates of current capacity needs, economic validation of guidelines, and service delivery perfor-
mance measures. Assuming the average time at home to be ﬁxed at the current guideline of 10
years (520 weeks), we use public health data to estimate our model parameters and estimate
that the average clinic sees a market size of 10.662 new patients per week and should provide
an optimal capacity of 32.487 screens per week at an estimated long-run average weekly cost
of $129,766 (capacity operating cost + delay cost). The average wait time will be 9.069 weeks.
In order to guarantee that no more than 5% of patients are delayed more than 2 weeks for
screening, the provider should choose a weekly capacity of 33.874 which results in an increase in
the long-run average weekly costs of of 3.05% over optimal. While these estimates provide some
insight into screening capacity needs, the model we develop is a stylized optimization model
which was built for theoretical analysis as opposed to empirical estimation. Certain parameters
of our model, such as the delay costs, are diﬃcult to estimate due to the more implicit nature
of what they represent. Initializing the model with data which is more speciﬁc to a particular
market or geographic region would increase the reliability of the model estimates. We leave for
future research further empirical estimation of colonoscopy screening capacity needs.
There are several opportunities for future research stemming from our model. One primary
limitation of the model is that the exponential distribution assumptions may not fully charac-
terize consumer behavior. The time patients spend at home might be more correctly modeled
as a deterministic time (e.g. 10 years) plus some random time until the patient remembers to
call and make the appointment or is reminded to do so by a primary care provider. We leave
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this issue for future research, because while it may accurately describe the real-world behavior,
the added complexity to the model may have little marginal beneﬁt in terms of the research
questions posed in this paper. This paper primarily focuses on issues regarding the design of the
queueing network; whereas future research may emphasize problems regarding queueing control
such as how to prioritize screens based on risk factors and how long it has been since the patient
was last screened. Other future research might investigate reasons for poor adherence rates for
colonoscopy screening and consider to what degree poor operational issues such as appointment
access are drivers for poor patient adherence to screening guidelines. Other work might use
location network analysis to investigate issues relevant to state and federal policy makers such
as where to invest in additional cancer screening resources and where to build new endoscopy
suites. Finally, future research might extend the general approach used within this work to
other types of cancer or other diseases. Some of the assumptions of this paper, and most of
the parameter estimates for the numerical study, were speciﬁcally motivated by the application
to colorectal cancer; however the model is generalizable to screening for other diseases. Models
which investigate the tradeoﬀs between supply planning and provider-driven demand in health
services are beginning to be investigated more by the operations management and operations
research community, and future work could bring about greater understanding of these types of
problems.
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Chapter 4
Revenue Management for Outpatient
Appointments
4.1 Introduction
Outpatient clinics use appointment systems to match supply and demand while balancing goals
of provider service eﬃciency with timely access for patients. Appointment scheduling helps to
smooth work ﬂow for resources and reduce variability in patient wait time for service. How-
ever, poor appointment utilization and excessive delays for outpatient appointments are widely
recognized as signiﬁcant barriers to eﬀective health care delivery. Several studies document the
high ﬁnancial costs associated with no-shows and cancellations as well as their impact on staﬀ
satisfaction and productivity. Moore et al. (2001) estimate the cost of no-shows and cancella-
tions at 3% to 14% of revenues. Other studies emphasize the cost of long appointment delay,
the time between the request for and service of an appointment, highlighting lower patient sat-
isfaction, decreased quality of care, and system-wide costs incurred when patients end up in the
emergency room for non-emergency treatment. Strunk and Cunningham (2002) conclude that
the percent of patients reporting an inability to obtain a timely appointment rose from 23% to
33% from 1997 to 2001.
Figure 4.1: Attendance Rate by Appointment Delay
Much evidence suggests a relationship between appointment waste and appointment delay.
The longer the appointment delay, the less likely the patient is to attend the appointment, and
in turn, wasted appointments, due to no-shows and late cancellations, do nothing to reduce
the backlog of patients waiting. Festinger et al. (2002) randomly assign outpatient clients to
diﬀerent appointment delays and ﬁnd that 72% of subjects scheduled 1 day later attend their
appointments compared to 41% for 3 days later and 38% for 7 days later. Gallucci et al. (2005)
ﬁnd a similar relationship between appointment delay and rate of kept appointments for referrals
to an outpatient program at a community mental health center. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the
relationship between appointment waste and delay across three types of clinics within a major
university health care system. Clinics, therefore, have incentive to reserve capacity for patients
who schedule closer to the appointment date as they more likely to attend the appointment. In
this study, we analyze how clinics should allocate appointments to customer classes with hetero-
geneous no-show rates by developing a capacity control and overbooking model for outpatient
appointments.
Many proposed solutions for better outpatient appointment scheduling have seen limited
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success in practice because they emphasize either appointment waste or appointment delay
without considering the relationship between them. Solutions which emphasize service eﬃciency
include no-show penalties, appointment reminders, and overbooking. In practice, it is diﬃcult
to collect ﬁnancial penalties from patients who do not attend appointments. Other solutions
emphasize improving customer access by dedicating capacity or resources to urgent requests.
Clinics may dedicate one resource to urgent requests such as a same-day doctor, and larger
health care systems may administer urgent care clinics or minute clinics. Healthcare providers
may also carve-out (reserve) capacity for urgent requests. Problems with these solutions
are high ﬁxed costs associated with operating a resource dedicated to urgent problems and the
resource costs associated with triaging which patients qualify to use capacity reserved for urgent
requests. Clinics, such as private boutique clinics, may also reduce delay by limiting panel size,
or new patients, as a means of controlling demand upfront.
Open access, also known as same-day scheduling or advanced access, is a popular paradigm
in which the clinic attempts to do today's work today by oﬀering each patient a same-day
appointment and/or encouraging patients to book within a short window (Murray and Tantau
2000, Murray and Berwick 2003). Open access reduces the need for triage, by emphasizing
patient-centered care as a means for simultaneously achieving lower appointment waste and
delay simultaneously. Open access alleviates some problems, but if not managed eﬀectively, can
lead to greater variation in daily demand and conﬂicts with patient preferences. A pure open
access system, similar to a walk-in clinic where no advance appointments are allowed, could
make the clinic more vulnerable to costly under- or over-utilization because of the absence of an
appointment system buﬀer. These costs can be particularly high in clinics with providers who
are not in clinic full-time, such as academic medical centers with residents and faculty. Open
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access may also conﬂict with preferences of patients who must make advance arrangements such
as transportation, absence from work, childcare, or lodging. The underlying issue of managing
clinic capacity is not eliminated with open access. Clinics still must decide how to allocate
appointments to diﬀerent demand classes in a way that is both patient-centered and eﬃcient.
While open access is generally presented as an alternative to traditional advance scheduling, it
is unclear exactly how the two may be eﬀectively used together as a hybrid system.
How much ﬁxed service capacity to allocate to diﬀerent demand classes and whether to over-
book are problems faced in outpatient appointment scheduling, but they are common to many
service industries. Within operations and management sciences, these problems are typically re-
ferred to as capacity control decisions which fall under the broader ﬁeld of revenue management.
When there are advance purchase and reservation options, ﬁrms must also decide whether to
overbook their ﬁxed capacity to buﬀer against no-shows and late cancellations. Demand classes
are customarily diﬀerentiated by features such as price and service package oﬀered; however,
diﬀerences in no-show and cancellation rates among demand classes are particularly signiﬁcant
in outpatient clinics which are limited in their ability to collect upfront deposits for service
or to re-sell a wasted reservation to a late-arriving customer. Frequently, capacity allocation
and overbooking decisions are considered separately, but several joint capacity-control and over-
booking models, developed under the assumption that no-show probabilities are the same for all
customers, show ﬁrms can achieve better results by integrating the two decisions (Talluri and
van Ryzin 2005). We relax the assumption that no-show rates are homogeneous across demand
classes, and show how ﬁrms can improve performance by accounting for these diﬀerences.
We construct a joint overbooking and capacity control model to study the optimal appoint-
ment allocation and overbooking decisions for outpatient clinics when patient demand classes
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diﬀer with respect to no-show rates. In Section 2, we review the literature on joint overbooking
and capacity control and the literature on outpatient scheduling. In Section 3 we formulate a
two-stage joint overbooking and capacity control model and provide structural results regarding
the optimal policy. Under general assumptions, a closed form expression for the optimal pol-
icy can be diﬃcult to derive; therefore, we develop lower and upper bounds and near-optimal
approximations. In Section 4 we conduct a numerical study to compare the performance of the
optimal policy with bounds and approximations, as well as policies from previous literature and
clinic practice. In Section 5 we provide conclusions and insights from our work.
4.2 Literature Review
Our work is positioned at the intersection of the revenue management literature addressing joint
capacity control and overbooking and the outpatient appointment scheduling literature. Talluri
and van Ryzin (2005) provide a comprehensive review of the revenue management literature.
They consider capacity control and overbooking separately prior to integration. The simple
two-class allocation rule proposed by Littlewood (1972), is a seminal concept in traditional
capacity control models. Assuming both a discount and a full fare segment, with independent
random demands where the full fare demand, D1, arrives later, Littlewood's rule speciﬁes that
with x units of capacity remaining, a discount unit should be sold as long as the discount fare,
p2, equals or exceeds the product of the full fare price, p1, and the probability that full fare
demand is x or higher, i.e. p1P (D1 > x) ≤ p2. Subsequent work applies stochastic dynamic
programming to analyze models with more than two demand classes and dynamic models with
simultaneous booking - e.g. Belobaba (1989).
Traditional overbooking models use both statistical service levels and economic criteria.
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The number of customers who arrive for service is often modeled as a binomial random variable,
Z (x), which depends on a static show-up probability, q ∈ [0, 1], and the number booked, x.
Economic criteria generally assume a cost of denying service to an overbooked customer, h,
when service arrivals exceed capacity. This may be a direct cost, such as a compensation
voucher for future service, or an indirect cost such as loss of goodwill. The optimal solution for
the static overbooking model is to book up to x so long as P (Z (x− 1) > C − 1) ≤ phq where
p denotes the revenue per customer (collected at time of booking) and C denotes capacity.
Dynamic overbooking models allow booking limit adjustment after realization of cancellations
prior to date of service.
For joint capacity control and overbooking problems, Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) provide
four assumptions for incorporating no-shows and cancellations into the single-resource capacity
control model: (1) Cancellation and no-show probabilities are the same for all customers; (2)
Cancellations and no-shows are independent across customers; (3) Cancellations and no-shows
in any period are independent of the time the reservations on hand were accepted; (4) Refunds
and denied service costs are the same for all customers. Various authors, e.g. Subramanian
et al. (1999), study optimal booking limits under those four assumptions. We relax the ﬁrst
assumption with respect to no-show rates.
Previous literature on outpatient scheduling can be grouped into three signiﬁcant streams:
healthcare practice management research, outpatient appointment scheduling simulation, and
analytical models for appointment scheduling. Healthcare practice management literature sum-
marizes the challenges in outpatient appointment scheduling, approaches for implementing open
access, as well as case studies of scheduling policies across a variety of clinic settings. The term
open access is commonly credited to Murray and Tantau (2000). Murray and Berwick (2003)
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further developed the concept under the name advanced access providing six elements for ef-
fective implementation. Numerous authors have since reported on both the improvements and
challenges encountered when implementing open access within various clinical settings (e.g. Sol-
berg et al. (2004), Belardi et al. (2004), Bundy et al. (2005),Dixon et al. (2006)). Other authors,
such as Lamb (2002) and Mehrotra et al. (2008) have cautioned against open access, contending
that it leaves clinics susceptible to daily demand variation. Gupta and Denton (2008) point out
three challenges of implementing open access: (1) daily demand variation and spillover demand;
(2) forecasting patient preferences from truncated data; (3) variation between clinic resources
with respect to panel size and availability.
Discrete-event simulation is often used to analyze complex appointment scheduling systems
with features such as multiple booking attempts or follow-up appointments. Cayirli and Veral
(2003) and Denton and Gupta (2003) provide extensive reviews of the literature on outpatient
appointments. Many studies analyze in-clinic waiting time and physician utilization as opposed
to delay for appointments, although more recent work addresses open access or appointment
delays speciﬁcally. Giachetti et al. (2005) ﬁnd that open access is a viable strategy for reducing
clinic throughput time. Kopach et al. (2007) ﬁnd that correct conﬁguration of open access can
signiﬁcantly improve clinic throughput rates. Giachetti (2008) ﬁnd that eliminating multiple
appointment types and segregating repeat no-show patients can eﬀectively reduce appointment
delay.
Analytical models of outpatient scheduling generally emphasize either indirect appointment
wait (appointment delay) or direct appointment wait (in-clinic wait time). Cayirli and Veral
(2003) and Gupta and Denton (2008) survey this body of literature and observe an emphasis
on patient scheduling and resource utilization on the appointment date (in-clinic wait time).
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In the direct-wait models, the decision variables typically include the number and length of
appointment slots, the number of patients to schedule in each slot and the service priority
(FCFS or by appointment time). Several such papers allow for overbooking by considering a
static no-show probability, e.g. Kaandorp and Koole (2007), Kim and Giachetti (2006), LaGanga
and Lawrence (2007), Robinson and Chen (2010), and Cayirli et al. (2006). Muthuraman
and Lawley (2008) develop a sequential scheduling model with multiple no-show probabilities
and exponential service which maximizes daily proﬁts comprised of service revenues, patient
waiting costs, and staﬀ overtime costs. The sequential model implies that patient requests arrive
individually, and the clinic must schedule the patient to a slot or terminate scheduling. The
authors show that scheduling should be terminated according to an optimal stopping rule and
develop a myopic scheduling algorithm to determine the best slot for each patient. Zeng et al.
(2009) extend the work of Muthuraman and Lawley (2008) by emphasizing class-dependent no-
show rates and deriving properties of the optimal sequential schedule which were not previously
characterized. Chakraborty et al. (2010) also extend the work of Muthuraman and Lawley
(2008) by considering general service distributions, showing that the unimodality of the proﬁt
function and resulting stopping rule are independent of the service distribution.
Other recent articles examine indirect appointment wait time. Green and Savin (2008)
present a queueing model to optimize panel size and provide timely access to outpatient care.
Assuming patients prefer the ﬁrst available appointment, the authors obtain expressions for
optimal panel sizes for M/D/1/K and M/M/1/K queues with backlog dependent cancellations
and no-shows. These results provide upper and lower bounds, respectively, for simulation re-
sults which incorporate more realistic assumptions on patient preferences. Liu et al. (2010)
study dynamic heuristic policies for outpatient scheduling under time-dependent no-shows and
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cancellations. The authors formulate an inﬁnite horizon Markov decision process where a clinic
chooses to schedule an arriving appointment request to any open booking date.
Several authors study the direct application of revenue management to healthcare settings.
Gupta and Denton (2008) present two challenges with adapting revenue management models
from other industries (such as airlines and hospitality) to ﬁt healthcare. The ﬁrst challenge is
that the patient choice function has multiple elements such as provider, date, time of day. The
second challenge is that diﬀerentiated prices are not used to control access to clinic capacity.
Gupta and Wang (2008) address the ﬁrst challenge by modeling patient choice in a primary
care clinic. They prove the optimal policy is threshold-type for a single physician clinic under
weak conditions on the choice behavior. For the multi-physician model, the authors partially
characterize the structure of the optimal policy and provide policies which perform well in
numerical tests based on clinic data. The authors assume two classes of patients, regular patients
and same-day patients. All regular patients, those requesting an appointment in advance, pay
the same price if booked and incur the same penalty if turned away, while same-day patients
pay higher prices. They note that optimizing accept/deny decisions across multiple booking
attempts has proven to be intractable; although in reality, patients may reattempt booking at
a later stage or appointment date. Signiﬁcantly, they do not allow for no-shows, cancellations
or overbooking.
Our work contributes to the above literature by studying how outpatient clinics can use ca-
pacity control and overbooking to allocate appointments to customer classes with heterogeneous
no-show rates. We need not assume patient classes diﬀer by revenue as in previous work. We
establish some structural characterizations of the optimal solution and compare our allocation
policies with other policies commonly used in the literature and in practice. Gupta and Denton
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(2008) point out that none of the previous overbooking models from outpatient scheduling have
considered the link between appointment delay and no-show rates. More recent papers address
time-dependent no-show rates, and we enhance this research by considering a revenue man-
agement application as a diﬀerent type of patient demand management. We consider a model
where a clinic may limit appointments allocated to an early arriving patient demand class in
order to reserve appointments for a later class. Our approach contrasts with Muthuraman and
Lawley (2008), Zeng et al. (2009), and Chakraborty et al. (2010) who suggest ordering patients
and require scheduling to be terminated for all patients simultaneously. Compared to Green
and Savin (2008), appointment allocation provides the clinic with greater ﬂexibility than con-
trolling its panel size. Instead of assigning patients to a range of appointment dates as with Liu
et al. (2010), our model assumes patients prefer a single date, thereby keeping with the spirit of
patient-centered scheduling. Our model, like much of the prior research, shows that no-show
heterogeneity makes the problem complex and often intractable, requiring the formulation of
heuristics and approximations.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Setting and Notation
We consider a two-stage model where a clinic wishes to maximize its proﬁt by utilizing a single
ﬁxed resource to satisfy demand from two demand classes which diﬀer with respect to no-
show rates. The sequence of events is described graphically in Figure (4.2). We assume that
appointment requests from each class arrive individually and independently with all requests
from Class 2 patients arriving before the ﬁrst request is received from Class 1 patients. In this
setting, we assume Class 2 patients generally represent visits which are scheduled weeks into
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the future, such as follow-up, diagnostic, or routine appointments, whereas Class 1 customers
represent visits related to the patient's immediate medical condition. We denote the total
number of random arrivals from each class as D1 and D2 respectively with distribution functions
F1 () and F2 () with means λ1 and λ2, respectively.
At the start of each booking period, before realizing the demand for that period, the clinic
must decide how many appointment requests to accept during the period. If a request is rejected,
we assume the patient leaves the system without cost to the clinic. The clinic gains a revenue
p for each scheduled patient who arrives for service. The clinic has a ﬁxed capacity of k units
and incurs an overbooking cost C (Z) where Z is the number of scheduled patients that arrive
for service. While overbooking often involves working a patient into the schedule, it also can
result in staﬀ overtime costs and provider productivity loss as the workday becomes longer than
scheduled. Typically C (Z) is deﬁned such that C (Z) = 0 if Z ≤ k and convex for Z > k.
The probability that a patient from class i = 1, 2 actually arrives for service, once booked, is
denoted by αi. We assume that this probability is independent across patients. We assume that
α2 ≤ α1 which is consistent with the relationship previously discussed that higher appointment
delay leads to higher no-show rates. We assume that Class 1 customers attend with certainty,
i.e. α1 = 1, mostly for tractability since our clinic data, as well as data from other studies, show
that even patients who make their appointment less than one day before the appointment time
still have some positive no-show probability. However, for actual clinic data, the probability of
such same-day no-shows is fairly low (5-10%) compared to that of appointments scheduled far
in advance (15-40%) (see Figure 4.1). Using these assumptions, let Zi (xi) be a binomial random
variable with parameters xi and αi where xi denotes appointments booked from Class i = 1, 2
and Zi (xi) denotes the random number of Class i patients who attend the appointment.
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Figure 4.2: Model Setting
Prior to realizing demand from Class i = 1, 2, the clinic decides to accept up to bi reservations
in order to maximize its expected proﬁts. Using the above assumptions we can formulate a
stochastic dynamic program where the state variable is deﬁned as the number of reservations
booked from class 2 and class 1 respectively, (x2, x1). Let Vi (x2, x1) denote the optimal expected
proﬁt at the start of period i with x2 Class 2 reservations and x1 Class 1 reservations already
booked. No-show heterogeneity requires tracking the number of bookings from both classes
individually, not just total bookings. Using this notation, we write the Bellman equations as
follows:
V2 (0, 0) = max
b2≥0
E [{V1 (min (b2, D2) , 0)}] (4.1)
V1 (x2, 0) = max
b1≥0
E [{V0 (x2,min (b1, D1))}] (4.2)
V0 (x2, x1) = E [pZ2 (x2) + pZ1 (x1)− C (Z2 (x2) + Z1 (x1))] (4.3)
Since all Class 2 appointments are made before any Class 1 requests are booked, booking
limit decisions are made sequentially, not simultaneously. After observing the number of Class 2
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appointments booked, the clinic determines the Class 1 booking limit, which may be a function
of Class 2 bookings. Let b1 (x2) denote the Class 1 booking limit given x2 patients have been
scheduled. This value will always be at least as high as b1 (b2), the Class 1 limit when the
Class 2 limit is reached, so at least b1 (b2) units will be held for Class 1 requests. Using revenue
management terms, we can think of b1 (b2) as the Class 1 protection level. When no overbooking
is allowed, the protection level for Class 1 will equal the diﬀerence between capacity and Class
2 booking limit (Talluri and van Ryzin 2005). When overbooking is allowed, the sum of the
Class 2 booking limit and the Class 1 protection level may be above capacity, and the tradeoﬀ
between booking limits need not be linear or one-to-one as the two classes have diﬀerent no-show
rates. Consider an example where capacity is 24 but the clinic initially books up to 25 Class
2 requests and protects 6 slots for Class 1 requests, overbooking by 7. If the clinic receives 15
Class 2 appointment requests, it might now book up to 12 Class 1 patients, not 16, because
Class 1 patients are more likely to attend than Class 2. Thus the actual overbooking pad is 3.
We deﬁne C (Z2 (x2) + Z1 (x1)) = h (Z2 (x2) + Z1 (x1)− k)+ where h is the per-patient over-
time cost. The linear overtime cost assumption is common in previous literature (Talluri and van
Ryzin 2005), although in practice the marginal cost of overtime may be increasing as patients
wait longer and providers work more overtime. Therefore, nonlinear cost structures are possible
and also ﬁt the framework of the model. We assume capacity is soft, which means the clinic
can always complete its overtime work without spillover into the next period, when in practice
some customers promised an appointment today may be asked to return tomorrow. We assume
h > p to avoid the trivial case where every request is accepted since revenue-net-overtime cost
per patient would be non-negative. For convenience, let L (x2, x1) = E (Z2 (x2) + Z1 (x1)− k)+
denote the expected number of overtime patients, i.e. expected overtime work in number of
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patients, and rewrite V0 (x2, x1) as follows:
V0 (x2, x1) = pα2x2 + px1 − hL (x2, x1) (4.4)
There are several diﬀerences between our model and previous revenue management models.
We assume the clinic is only reimbursed for service if the appointment is attended, whereas
payment at the time of reservation is common in the literature (Talluri and van Ryzin 2005).
The two models can be shown to be interchangeable. In reality, third-party payers make it
diﬃcult for clinics to collect payment in advance of service, thus justifying our assumption. We
assume the clinic commits to its booking limit before demand is realized. If the optimal decision
variable bi does not depend on the demand distribution Di as shown in traditional models, the
timing is irrelevant.
Four assumptions of our model merit further discussion. These relate to service of appoint-
ments, patient preferences, multiple resources, and rejection costs. First, we assume the clinic
incurs an overbooking cost only if the total number of attending patients exceeds the total ca-
pacity. We ignore service time variation, spillover between service periods, and in-clinic wait
time, which are key features of models which focus on appointment scheduling. In reality a
clinic with capacity of 3 patients per hour could have 5 patients show up one hour and only 1
patient the next. In this case, no waiting cost would be incurred in our model since attended
appointments do not exceed capacity aggregated over the two-hour interval. While previous
literature considers appointment scheduling on a micro level, e.g. (Muthuraman and Lawley
2008), we aggregate the costs to a daily level to consider an appointment allocation decision
instead of assuming that scheduling of all classes is terminated simultaneously.
137
Second, we assume patients prefer a single appointment date and are indiﬀerent to appoint-
ment time. In reality, patients may have preferences for certain times or a range of dates. In
reality, patients who are rejected from their ﬁrst preference might attempt to schedule for other
dates and times within their preference range.
Third, our model considers a single resource when in reality more complex dynamics arise
from managing multiple resources. If patients are unable to obtain an appointment with their
regular provider, they may choose service from a diﬀerent in-clinic provider, a competitor, or
a costly emergency provider. Analytical models which study care teams or multiple resources
have seen little development in outpatient scheduling literature, an exception being Gupta and
Wang (2008). However, such network models have been developed for revenue management
applications in other industries.
Fourth, we assume there is no cost for rejecting appointment requests. This is a common
assumption in previous literature (Talluri and van Ryzin 2005). Rejecting a request may imply
future congestion or penalties such as lost business or increased emergency room demand, though
the clinic may not incur these costs directly. These rejection costs may also diﬀer across classes,
further impacting the allocation decision. A high rejection total may indicate a problem with
overall capacity, which we assume to be ﬁxed. We do not consider rejection penalties explicitly,
but we model an opportunity cost for rejecting appointment requests, i.e. the potential lost
revenue the clinic could earn if the rejected appointment is attended without increasing the
overtime cost.
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4.3.2 Model Analysis
Given that the clinic's decisions are made sequentially, we proceed with a two-stage analysis in
order to optimize the model using backward induction. In the ﬁrst stage we wish to determine
the optimal number of Class 1 patients the clinic is willing to book given x2 Class 2 patients
have already been booked.
Proposition 4.1. The optimal booking limit for Class 1 as a function of the number of Class 2
patients booked is determined as b1 (x2) = max
{
x1 ≥ 0 : P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph
}
Proof. All proofs appear in the appendix.
An important property of the above result is that the optimal booking limit for Class 1
does not depend upon D1. Even if D1 is known before the booking decision is made, or if the
clinic may alter its booking limit within the booking period, the clinic still accepts up to the
same number of appointment requests from Class 1. It is also important to observe that as x2
increases by one patient, b1 (x2) either remains constant or decreases by one patient. Likewise,
the total number of patients scheduled, from both classes, increases by one or remains constant.
If Z2 (x2) is approximated using a continuous distribution with CDF given by Fx2 (.) then
the optimality condition holds at equality:
b1 (x2) = k − F−1x2
(
1− p
h
)
(4.5)
Before analyzing Stage 2, we discuss a model presented by Talluri and van Ryzin (2005)
where customer classes diﬀer by prices instead of no-show rates. They assume demand for each
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class is realized before the booking decision is made and that prices are collected at time of
booking. Given the homogeneous no-show rate α, let y represent total reservations on hand and
Z (y) be a binomial random variable with mean yα and variance yα (1− α). Assuming linear
overbooking costs, the Bellman equations are:
Vˆ 2 (0) = E
[
max
0≤u≤D2
{
p2u+ Vˆ1 (u)
}]
(4.6)
Vˆ1 (y) = E
[
max
0≤u≤D1
{
p1u+ Vˆ0 (y + u)
}]
(4.7)
Vˆ0 (y) = −hE [Z (y)− k]+ (4.8)
Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) show the value function has non-increasing diﬀerences since the
overbooking cost function is convex with respect to the Class 2 reservations. By deﬁnition, a set
of random variables {X (θ) , θ ∈ Θ} is stochastically increasing convex (SICX) if E [φ (X (θ))] is
increasing convex for all increasing convex functions φ (Shaked and Shanthikumar 2007). Using
the deﬁnition of sample path convexity, which implies stochastic convexity, both Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) show that a binomial random variable
with mean np and variance np (1− p) is SICX. Thus, Vˆ0, the negative expected overbooking
cost, is concave since h (x− k)+ is a convex function of x. The concavity of Vi (y) for i ≥ 1
follows by induction from the properties that the sum of concave functions is concave and that
the component-wise maximum of a concave function is concave.
Letting 4Vˆj−1 (y) = Vˆj−1 (y)− Vˆj−1 (y − 1), the optimal booking limits for the Talluri and
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van Ryzin (2005) model are
sˆj = max {y ≥ 0 : pj ≥ 4Vj−1 (y)} (4.9)
Here sˆj represents the limit on total reservations on schedule in period j not just Class j
reservations accepted in the period j. Given x reservations on hand the optimal Class 1 and
Class 2 booking limits for this model are:
bˆ1 (x) = max
{
y ≥ 0 : P (Z (x+ y +−1) > k − 1) ≤ p1
hα
}
= sˆ1 − x
bˆ2 = max{y ≥ 0 :
P
(
D1 ≥ bˆ1 (y − 1)
)
≤ p2
p1
− hα
p1
bˆ1(x)∑
d=k−x+1
P (D1 = d)P (Z (x+ d− 1) > k − 1)}
In the Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) model, the optimal Class i booking limit does not depend
upon Class i demand due to concavity of the value function. The clinic books up to the same
limit for a class regardless of how demand for that class arrives. In the next section, we show
how the above results regarding concavity and booking limits which are independent of arrival
process may not necessarily hold when no-show rates diﬀer across demand classes.
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4.3.3 Structural Properties
Returning to analysis of our model with heterogeneous no-show rates, presented in Equations
(4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), we proceed to the analysis for Stage 2. At the start of Stage 2, the clinic
must determine the optimal number of Class 2 patients to book given that up to b1 (x2) Class 1
patients will be booked in the following period. In this section we characterize some properties
about the value function assuming D2 = d2 is constant. Under this assumption, we rewrite the
value function as
V2 (0, 0) = max
b2≥0
V1 (min (b2, d2) , 0) = max
0≤x2≤d2
V1 (x2, 0)
Proposition 4.2. If the Class 1 booking limit is constant, i.e. b1 (x2) = b1 ∀x2, the expected
proﬁt at the start of Stage 1, V1 (x2, 0) , is concave in the number of Class 2 reservations, x2.
Clearly, it is unlikely that b1 (x2) is constant for all values of x2; however, the above propo-
sition does show that the marginal expected proﬁt is decreasing anytime b1 (x2) = b1 (x2 − 1) =
b1 (x2 − 2). Next, we use stochastic ordering to show an important structural result when the
total number of bookings, denoted by s ≥ k, is ﬁxed.
Proposition 4.3. If the total number of appointments scheduled is constant, i.e. b1 (x2) =
s− x2 for all x2 and some ﬁxed s ≥ k, then hE [Z2 (x2) +min (D1, b1 (x2))− k]+, the expected
overbooking cost, is increasing up to x2 such that P (D1 ≥ s− x2 + 1) ≤ α2 and decreasing for
x2 such that P (D1 ≥ s− x2 + 1) ≤ α2.
For a ﬁxed s, Proposition 3 does not directly state that the overbooking cost function is
convex or concave. It does state that the function is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
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Therefore, the function will not be convex over all values of x2. The two propositions provide
some characterization of V1 (x2, 0), but they do not guarantee concavity since b1 (x2), the booking
limit for Class 1, depends upon x2, the number of class 2 reservations made. To analyze the
function further we need to derive the ﬁrst diﬀerences and second diﬀerences explicitly.
Assuming x2− 1 Class 2 patients have already booked and the xth2 appointment request has
been received, let 4V1 (x2, 0) = V1 (x2, 0) − V1 (x2 − 1, 0) be the marginal expected proﬁt of
accepting the xth2 Class 2 demand:
4V1 (x2, 0) = pE [Z2 (x2)] + pE [min (b1 (x2) , D1)]− hE [Z2 (x2) + min (b1 (x2) , D1)− k]+
−pE [Z2 (x2 − 1)] + pE [min (b1 (x2 − 1) , D1)]
−hE [Z2 (x2 − 1) + min (b1 (x2 − 1) , D1)− k]+ .
Denote the marginal change in the expected number of overtime patients as
4L (x2, b1 (x2)) = E [Z2 (x2) + min (b1 (x2) , D1)− k]+−E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + min (b1 (x2 − 1) , D1)− k]+
Using this notation we can write
4V1 (x2, 0) = pα2 + p (E [min (b1 (x2) , D1)]− E [min (b1 (x2 − 1) , D1)])
−h4L (x2, b1 (x2)) . (4.10)
The above expression for the marginal proﬁt can be simpliﬁed for two cases corresponding
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to when b1 (x2) = b1 (x2 − 1) and b1 (x2) = b1 (x2 − 1)− 1.
Proposition 4.4. If b1 (x2) = b1 (x2 − 1),
4V1 (x2, 0) = pα2 − hα2S (x2, b1 (x2))
−hα2P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − b1 (x2 − 1)− 1)P (D1 ≥ b1 (x2 − 1)) .
If b1 (x2) = b1 (x2 − 1)− 1,
4V1 (x2, 0) = pα2 − hα2S (x2, b1 (x2))
−P (D1 ≥ b1 (x2 − 1)) (p− h (1− α2)P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − b1 (x2 − 1))) .
where S (x2, b1 (x2)) =
∑b1(x2−1)−1
d=k−x2+1 P (D1 = d)P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − d− 1)
Note that monotonicity of the marginal expected proﬁt cannot be derived straightforwardly
from the simpliﬁed expressions for the two cases. Even when looking at the second diﬀerences,
it is diﬃcult to guarantee the conditional proﬁt function will be concave or even unimodal in
x2. Figure 4.3 shows the expected proﬁt function given unlimited class 2 demand across three
scenarios with k = 24 and p = 100. In two of the examples, when α2 = 0.6, the conditional
proﬁt function is not unimodal; this is more diﬃcult to see in the case where λ1 = 18 because the
modes are only two apart. When the function is multimodal, one cannot ﬁnd the global optimal
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Figure 4.3: Unimodal and Multimodal Proﬁt Functions
solution using standard marginal analysis techniques, thereby making the problem more diﬃcult
to solve. Furthermore, in these two cases, the globally optimal value of x2 is not the ﬁrst local
optimum. This makes ﬁnding the optimal solution even more diﬃcult as the optimal policy will
now depend upon the distribution of D2. For the simple, two-stage model presented here, the
optimal solution can still be found by completing an exhaustive search of all policies; however, a
closed form expression is not possible. This search requires conditioning upon all values of Class
2 demand unless we can show the ﬁrst local optimum is globally optimal. Even if the function
is unimodal, the ﬁrst order conditions do not provide a particularly simple expression for the
optimal policy, though the search time to ﬁnd the optimal policy is dramatically decreased.
4.3.4 Bounds on Optimal Solution
While it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a closed form expression for the optimal class 2 booking limit, two
simple approximations serve as lower and upper bounds respectively.
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Lower Bound A lower bound can be derived by a variation on Littlewood's rule (Littlewood
1972) which provides the optimal class 2 booking limit if no overbooking is allowed. In this
case, let b1 (x2) = k − x2 and x2 = min (D2, b2) and write
V1 (x2, k − x2) = pα2x2 + pE [min (D1, k − x2)] . (4.11)
Using marginal analysis, we ﬁnd a variation of Littlewood's rule where p2 = pα2 and p1 = p.
With no overbooking, we accept the xth2 patient if and only if
4V1 (x2, k − x2) = pα2 − pP (D1 > k − x2) ≥ 0. (4.12)
We can guarantee a single optimum exists because P (D1 > k − x2) is increasing in x2. The
optimal policy if no overbooking is allowed is given by
blw2 = max {x2 : P (D1 > k − x2) ≤ α2} . (4.13)
The lower bound is therefore a special case of the of the original problem where Class 2
appointments attend with certainty but the clinic only receives the expected revenue pα2 < p.
In this case, b1 (x2) = k − x2 and the clinic never overbooks because h > p. If Class 2 requests
have a positive probability of failing to attend, the clinic books at least as many Class 2 requests
as in the case when all show up with certainty, and thus blw2 is a lower-bound for the optimal b2.
Using this lower bound, we also gain insight into conditions for the optimality of a policy,
such as same-day scheduling or pure-open access, which does not book class 2 requests, i.e.
x2 = 0. For such a policy to be superior to all policies, including those that overbook, it must
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also be superior to all policies which do not overbook which implies P (D1 > k − 1) > α2 or
similarly P (D1 ≥ k) > α2. However, this condition does not guarantee that a pure open access
policy will be optimal as later demonstrated numerically in Figure 5.
Upper Bound To derive an upper bound on Class 2 reservations, assume the clinic does not
allow Class 1 patients to book, i.e. b1 (x2) = 0. In this case, the marginal expected proﬁt of
accepting an additional request given x2 − 1 have already been booked is:
4V0 (x2, 0)−4V0 (x2 − 1, 0) = α2p− hα2P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − 1) . (4.14)
Since the expected marginal proﬁt is decreasing in x2, the clinic accepts Class 2 patients
until the expected marginal proﬁt is less than zero or equivalently:
bub2 = max
{
x2 : P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − 1) ≤ p
h
}
. (4.15)
4.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Since we cannot derive a closed-form expression for the optimal solution, we perform sensitivity
analysis using computational search methods. We examine changes in the optimal proﬁt and
booking limits relative to parameter values reﬂecting diﬀerent clinical conditions, and we test
the performance of the upper and lower bounds over these parameter values. We enumerate
all feasible policies, and search over all policies where the clinic chooses the optimal Class 1
booking limit given a choice of the Class 2 booking limit. We assume Poisson distributions
for the demand from each class with mean parameters λ1 and λ2 respectively. The base case
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scenario for the sensitivity analysis uses parameter values: k = 24; α2 = 0.75; λ1 = 10; λ2 = 20;
p = 100; h = 150.
In Figure 4.4, we see that optimal proﬁts are increasing in the Class 2 attendance rate, the
mean Class 1 demand, and the revenue-to-cost ratio. In Figure 4.a we see that the optimal
expected proﬁt increases as the Class 2 attendance rate increases, and in Figure 4.b we ﬁnd
that the optimal class 2 booking limit is generally decreasing in the Class 2 attendance rate
with some minor jumps where it increases due to the discrete nature of the problem. This
result agrees with our intuition that clinic proﬁts should increase as both the no-show rate and
resulting variability in service arrivals decrease. While the expected revenue from booking a
Class 2 customer relative to a Class 1 customer increases with the Class 2 attendance rate, the
clinic chooses to book fewer Class 2 patients as the eﬀects of overbooking outweigh the trade-oﬀs
between class allocations. In Figure 4.c and 4.d we see that the optimal proﬁt is increasing in
λ1 and the optimal booking limit is decreasing in λ1. Since there is no cost for rejecting patient
requests, clinic proﬁts should also increase when mean demand increases because the clinic
cannot do any worse by receiving more requests. Intuitively, the clinic should allocate fewer
slots to Class 2 patients when the probability of an additional Class 1 customer is higher. In
Figures 4.e we see that the optimal proﬁt is increasing in the p/h ratio as the expected marginal
revenue of scheduling an additional patient increasingly outweighs the expected marginal cost.
In Figure 4.f the optimal booking limit is increasing in the p/h ratio as the clinic is willing to
take on more risk.
Across all of the graphs in Figure 4 we see that for each individual parameter, when all other
parameters are held constant, the gap between the upper and lower bound booking limit is either
monotonically increasing or decreasing. In the case of sensitivity to the Class 2 attendance rate,
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Figure 4.4: Optimal Policy and Proﬁt Sensitivity Analysis
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the lower bound value is increasing as the upper bound value is decreasing. For the other
two sensitivity parameters, one bound stays constant (upper bound for Class 1 demand and
lower bound for p/h ratio) while the other converges with the optimal value. Likewise, for each
individual sensitivity parameter, the optimal policy tends to be closer to one bound at one
end of the parameter range and closer to the other bound at the other end of the parameter
range. When the Class 2 attendance rate is low, the optimal policy is closer to the upper bound;
however, as the Class 2 attendance rate increases, both bounds converge toward the optimal
solution with the lower bound showing a greater improvement. When the mean Class 1 demand,
λ1 is low, the optimal Class 2 booking limit is close to the upper bound and when the mean
Class 1 demand is high, the optimal Class 2 booking limit is close to the lower bound. When
the ph ratio is low, revenue per customer is low relative to cost, and the optimal Class 2 booking
limit is close to the lower bound. When ph is high, the optimal Class 2 booking limit is close to
the upper bound since the clinic has more incentive to risk overtime cost. Further sensitivity
analysis in Section 4.3 evaluates changes in policy performance with respect to changes in the
parameters.
4.4 Numerical Study
We build a numerical study to determine the economic value of joint overbooking and capacity
control in a clinic setting, test simple approximations, and provide insights for clinic managers
across a variety of parameter settings. In the ﬁrst subsection, we describe the numerical study
design which involves 198 scenarios from a wide range of model parameters and ten unique
policies developed from our results, previous literature, and common practice. In the second
subsection, we compare each policy's expected proﬁt performance by looking at percent dif-
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ference from optimal, percent improvement over ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve, relative rankings, and
counts of optimal and near-optimal scenarios for each policy. In the third subsection, we discuss
conditions where a pure Open Access policy achieves optimal or near-optimal expected proﬁt. In
the fourth subsection 4.4, we investigate diﬀerences in policy decision variables and other clinic
performance measures. In the ﬁfth subsection, we analyze the sensitivity of expected proﬁts
to model parameters for all policies to test the robustness of our results. Finally, we provide
managerial insights on when to use certain approximations over others.
4.4.1 Experimental Design
We use a full-factorial design of the following parameters and consider 198 scenarios (out of 225
total) in which mean total demand is at least capacity, λ1 + λ2 ≥ k. We build our scenarios
using the following set of parameters: k = 24, α2 ∈ {0.6, 0.75, 0.9}, λi ∈ {6, 12, 18, 24, 30},
p/h ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}; p = 100. The base case refers to the additional scenario used in the
earlier Section 4.3 with parameter values: k = 24; α2 = 0.75; λ1 = 10; λ2 = 20; p = 100;
h = 150. Optimal base case expected proﬁts for each policy are denoted by V policy2 . We now
describe the policies tested, beginning with those developed earlier in this work.
• Optimal (OPT): Policy is determined by global search of full policy enumeration. We
compute the expected proﬁt for each policy by conditioning over all values of Class 2
demand, Class 1 demand, and Class 2 no-shows. We reduce computation time by searching
within upper and lower bounds presented in Section 3.4.
 bopt2 = arg maxb2 {ED2 [V1 (min (D2, b2) , b1 (min (D2, b2)))]}
 b1 (x2) = max
{
x1 : P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph
}
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 Base case: bopt2 = 25; b1
(
bopt2
)
= 6; V opt2 = 2189.89
• Stopping Rule (STOP): Policy approximates the optimal Class 2 booking limit as the ﬁrst
local maximum of the conditional proﬁt function, which is globally optimal if the function
is unimodal and a lower bound otherwise. To derive policy values, we must evaluate the
complex terms in the marginal proﬁt equations.
 bstop2 = min {x2 : 4V1 (x2 + 1, b1 (x2 + 1)) < 0}
 b1 (x2) = max
{
x1 : P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph
}
 Base case: bstop2 = 25; b1
(
bstop2
)
= 6; V stop2 = 2189.89
• Marginal Revenue Update (MR): Policy approximates the Class 2 booking limit as the
maximum value where the expected marginal revenue of accepting a Class 2 patient out-
weighs that of reserving the slot for a Class 1 patient. The policy essentially assumes the
marginal overbooking cost is negligible across diﬀerent Class 2 booking limits when using
the respective optimal Class 1 booking limit. Since the optimal Class 1 booking limit for
any number x2 of Class 2 reservations must be at least k− x2 by the earlier propositions,
then the MR Class 2 booking limit must be at least as high as the lower bound in Section
3.4.
 bmr2 = max {x2 : P (D1 > b1 (x2)) ≤ α2}
 b1 (x2) = max
{
x1 : P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph
}
 Base case: bmr2 = 23; b1 (b
mr
2 ) = 8; V
mr
2 = 2188.74
• Lower Bound (LB): The lower bound approximation for the Class 2 booking limit and
respective optimal Class 1 booking limit is computed using expression (4.13).
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 blb2 = max {x2 : P (D1 > k − x2) ≤ α2} = blw2
 b1 (x2) = max
{
x1 : P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph
}
 Base case: blb2 = 16; b1
(
blb2
)
= 13; V lb2 = 2088.22
• Upper Bound (UB): The upper bound approximation for the Class 2 booking limit and
respective optimal Class 1 booking limit is computed using expression (4.15).
 bub2 = max
{
x2 : P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − 1) ≤ ph
}
 b1 (x2) = max
{
x1 : P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph
}
 Base case: bub2 = 33; b1
(
bub2
)
= 0; V ub2 = 2189.33
The second group of policies for comparison includes solutions to traditional versions of the
problem which impose stricter assumptions.
• Littlewood Rule (LW): The best policy which does not overbook, a straightforward appli-
cation of Littlewood's rule.
 blw2 = max {x2 : P (D1 > k − x2) ≤ α2}
 b1 (x2) = k − x2
 Base case: blw2 = 16; b1
(
blw2
)
= 8; V lw2 = 1944.16
• Single Class (SC): Policy uses FCFS allocation and a single overbooking limit which as-
sumes all patients have the same no-show rate equal to the weighted average of the mean
demands and no-show rates of the two classes.
 α = (λ1α1+λ2α2)λ1+λ2
 Z (x) ∼ Bin (x, α)
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 bsc2 = max
{
x : P (Z (x− 1) > k − 1) ≤ ph
} ≤ xub
 b1 (x2) = b
sc
2 − x2
 Base case: bsc2 = 30; b1 (b
sc
2 ) = 0; V
sc
2 = 2182.54
• Revised Open Access (ROA): Policy sets Class 1 booking limit at capacity and chooses
the optimal corresponding value for the Class 2 booking limit. This policy guarantees all
same-day patients an appointment (up to capacity), while allowing some advance bookings
to hedge against risk of low same-day demand.
broa2 = max{x2 : pα2 − hα2P (D1 ≥ k)
− hα2
k−1∑
d=0
P (D1 = d)P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − d− 1) ≥ 0}
• b1 (x2) = k
 Base case: broa2 = 21; b1 (b
roa
2 ) = 24; V
roa
2 = 2147.31
The ﬁnal group of policies encompasses those which are commonly used in practice.
• Pure Open Access (POA): Policy books Class 1 to capacity, no advance booking.
 boa2 = 0
 b1 (x2) = k
 Base case: boa2 = 0; b1 (b
oa
2 ) = 24; V
oa
2 = 999.99
• First-Come-First Serve (FCFS): This policy satisﬁes all appointment requests, indepen-
dent of patient class, until reaching capacity.
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 bfcfs2 = k
 b1 (x2) = k − x2
 Base case: bfcfs2 = 24; b1 (x2) = 0; V
fcfs
2 = 1878.75
4.4.2 Policy Performance
In this section, we compare expected proﬁts of the policies on the basis of expected diﬀerence
from optimal, relative policy ranking, expected improvement over ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve alloca-
tion, and counts of optimality or near-optimality for each policy.
Table 4.1 provides ﬁve summary statistics for the percentage diﬀerence from optimal ex-
pected proﬁts for each of the nine policies across the 198 scenarios. The STOP policy performs
very well but is the most diﬃcult to compute. The median and mean percent errors are 0%
and 0.09%, respectively, showing that the ﬁrst local maximum of the conditional proﬁt function
tends to perform well compared to the global maximum. The MR policy also performs well with
a median percent error of 0.04% and mean of 0.29%. The MR policy is much easier to compute
than the STOP policy; however, MR may still require ﬁnding multiple values of b1 (x2).
Given their computational simplicity, the LB and UB policies also perform well on average,
but worst case scenarios are much worse than those of STOP and MR policies (19.60% and
26.87%, as opposed to 2.34% and 2.55% respectively). Across all scenarios, the average and
standard deviation for the percent diﬀerence from optimal is lower for UB than is for LB (1.58%
vs. 2.24% and 2.33% vs. 3.49%, respectively). One possible explanation for why UB outperforms
LB on average can be seen in Figure 4.4, where the proﬁt curve plateaus after reaching its
maximum for some scenarios. Therefore, a booking limit well above optimal may perform better
than a booking limit slightly below optimal. For example, when λ1 = λ2 = 18, α2 = 0.75, and
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Percent Diﬀerence from Optimal by policy
% STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
Mean 0.09 0.29 2.24 1.58 3.86 3.95 4.38 13.63 23.00
Std. Dev. 0.37 0.51 3.49 2.33 4.11 4.90 5.55 10.80 24.57
Minimum 0 0 0 0.000 * 0 0.005 0 0.005 0
Maximum 2.34 2.55 19.60 26.87 16.43 26.87 26.39 38.59 74.21
Median 0 0.04 0.55 2.01 2.76 2.01 2.34 9.61 16.96
* UB never exactly matches optimal policy. Actual minimum diﬀerence = 0.0000000227%
h = 200, the optimal policy sets the Class 2 booking limit at 16, whereas the LB policy chooses
9 and the UB policy chooses 32. Though the LB limit is only 7 lower than optimal and the
UB limit is 16 higher than optimal, the UB policy has a higher expected proﬁt (2246.75 vs.
2204.80). Table 4.4 reveals that while UB outperforms LB on average, it is not optimal for any
scenario, though expected proﬁt is close in 34 scenarios, while LB is optimal in 51 scenarios.
Also, the worst case performance for the UB policy is worse than that for the LB policy, as seen
in Table 4.1.
The performances of SC and LW provide some insight into the value of overbooking and
the value of considering multiple classes in patient booking. The best policy which does not
overbook, LW, has expected proﬁts 4.38% less than optimal on average across all scenarios.
Similarly, SC, a policy which assumes a single no-show rate, has expected proﬁts 3.95% less
than optimal on average across all scenarios. Using MR, a relatively simple joint overbooking
and capacity control policy, expected proﬁts average only 0.44% less than optimal. Thus, using
a joint overbooking and capacity control policy means that expected proﬁts are 3.5-4% closer
to optimal as opposed to either one alone. Table 4.2 displays how policies perform compared
to a FCFS allocation policy. This table provides further insight into the value gained from
using either overbooking or capacity control alone and the additional value from integrating the
two practices. By incorporating optimal capacity control without overbooking (LW), expected
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Percent Increase over FCFS by policy
% OPT STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW
Mean 17.823 17.705 17.444 14.894 15.804 13.383 12.619 12.292
Std. Dev. 16.603 16.472 16.251 14.351 15.330 17.474 12.479 14.686
Minimum 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 -15.569 0 0.005
Maximum 62.832 62.832 62.832 62.832 57.312 62.832 56.662 62.832
Median 10.632 10.629 10.147 9.422 9.295 8.506 8.247 6.513
proﬁts increase 12.3% above FCFS on average across all scenarios. By incorporating overbooking
without capacity control, assuming a single weighted no-show rate, expected proﬁts increase
12.6% above FCFS on average across all scenarios. All joint capacity control and overcooking
policies outperform LW and SC with respect to increased expected proﬁts over FCFS by 1.1-5.4%
and 0.9% to 5.1%, respectively.
Summary statistics on the rank ordering of policies are compiled in Table 4.3. An interesting
result is that neither SC nor FCFS is ever the best policy. In fact, the best rankings of these two
policies are third and sixth, respectively. Another interesting result is that although the STOP
policy is never more than 2.34% from optimal, its worst ranking is sixth. STOP tends to have
a low ranking when the probability of Class 2 demand is signiﬁcantly high, since the optimal
solution is likely to be a local optimum other than the ﬁrst. From further investigation, we de-
termine that MR achieves its worst ranking of fourth in three scenarios where it is outperformed
by STOP, UB, and SC respectively. These scenarios are characterized by moderately high mean
Class 1 demand, low mean Class 2 demand, and high no-show rates. In these scenarios, the MR
policy tends to underestimate the optimal Class 2 booking limit as it does not appropriately
capture that the marginal expected overtime cost may actually be decreasing and a higher Class
2 booking limit may be preferable.
Table 4.4 presents the number of scenarios each policy matched the optimal policy and the
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Policy Rankings (1 highest expected proﬁt, 9 lowest)
STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
Mean 1.268 1.970 3.495 3.980 5.404 5.783 4.490 8.136 6.975
Std. Dev. 1.101 0.860 1.930 2.038 2.198 1.736 2.584 0.859 2.867
Best Rank 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 6 1
Worst Rank 6 4 6 7 8 8 7 9 9
Median Rank 1 2 4 3 6 5 6 8 9
Table 4.4: Count of Scenarios (out of 198)
STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
Optimal 148 60 51 0 30 0 51 0 30
0.01% less than OPT 163 87 56 34 30 2 55 1 30
Best policy 185 73 64 3 30 0 64 0 30
number of scenarios each policy resulted in an expected proﬁt less than 0.01% below optimal.
The MR policy generalizes the LW policy and therefore dominates LW in performance. The
simple approximations perform well, with LB less than 0.01% from optimal in 56 scenarios and
UB less than 0.01% from optimal in 34 scenarios. Further investigation of results not captured in
Table 4.3, reveals that both LB and UB are less than 0.01% from optimal in only two scenarios;
meaning that in 88 distinct scenarios either LB or UB (or both) perform extremely well with
expected proﬁts less than only 0.01% from optimal. To provide further detail, for each scenario
we let the Closer Bound Proﬁt (CBP) denote the maximum expected proﬁt achieved by either
LB or UB. On average across all scenarios, we ﬁnd that CBP is only 0.30% diﬀerent from optimal
with a median of 0.03%. Thus, using LB and UB with discretion can be an eﬀective policy. Of
the two policies, LB (UB) should be implemented for high (low) values of λ1 and low (high)
values of p/h. While performance improves for both policies as the Class 2 attendance rate
increases, it improves more for LB, thus LB is also recommended for high values of α2.
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4.4.3 Optimality of Pure Open Access
As seen in Table 4.4, a pure Open Access policy can be optimal under certain conditions. We
further analyze these results in this subsection. Open Access, in particular same-day schedul-
ing, has received much recent attention in practice and in the literature, with little agreement
regarding scenarios under which it will work best. In this section, we contribute to Open Access
research by testing such conditions within our model.
In the numerical study, a pure Open Access policy is optimal whenever P (D1 ≥ k) > α2.
When such a condition holds, the probability the clinic experiences enough Class 1 demand to
ﬁll capacity exceeds the attendance rate for Class 2 requests. The expected marginal revenue
from giving the kth appointment slot to Class 1 is positive and all initial capacity (not including
overbooking pad) should be allocated to Class 1. In the case where α2 ≥ p/h, negative marginal
expected proﬁt is incurred for every additional patient overbooked in Class 2 beyond the k slots
allocated to Class 1. Not only should all k slots of ﬁxed capacity be allocated to Class 1, but
allowing additional overbooking from Class 2 is suboptimal. In the numerical study, the Open
Access policy appears to remain optimal when p/h > α2, so long as P (D1 ≥ k) > α2. This
result, however, does not hold generally as in Figure 4.5 we see that for certain high values of
p/h, even when P (D1 ≥ k) > α2, the optimal policy allows some Class 2 customers to book.
4.4.4 Other Performance Measures
We analyze other performance measures, besides expected proﬁt, such as average booking limit
values, average number of attended appointments, average number of booked appointments,
and average number of rejected appointment requests.
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Figure 4.5: Sensitivity of Optimal Solution to p/h when P (D1 ≥ k) > α2
Table 4.5 summarizes the class 2 booking limit (left column) and protection level (right
column) across diﬀerent policies. We omit FCFS and POA from the table as FCFS always sets
the Class 2 Booking Limit at capacity and the protection level at 0, while POA always sets the
Class 2 Booking Limit at 0 and the protection level at capacity. From the table we observe that
on average across all scenarios the optimal policy will allow up to 56.2% of capacity to be booked
by Class 2 patients and protect 58.4% of capacity for Class 1 patients. The additional 14.6%
above capacity can be interpreted as the average percent of capacity the optimal policy would
be willing to overbook if the Class 2 booking limit was reached, or equivalently, the maximum
amount of overbooking allowed. By comparison, the best policy which does not overbook (LW)
protects an average 65.8% of capacity for Class 1 patients and allows Class 2 patients to book
up to 34.2% of capacity. This provides an interesting comparison; though the optimal policy
is willing to book more total patients than LW through the use of overbooking, it protects a
smaller percentage of its capacity for Class 1 patients on average. One explanation for this
diﬀerence is that when a clinic does not overbook, it has fewer appointments to allocate and
prefers to save more of those limited appointments for the preferred Class 1 patients, who have
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Table 4.5: Class 2 Booking Limit (left) and Class 1 Protection Level (right) by Policy
OPT STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW
Mean 13.5 14.0 13.0 14.3 11.1 15.8 8.2 17.6 32.7 0 8.6 24 27.5 0 8.2 15.8
SD 9.8 6.9 9.8 7.0 9.6 6.9 6.9 5.6 5.8 0 9.2 0 3.0 0 6.9 6.9
Min 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 25 0 0 24 24 0 0 3
Max 37 24 37 24 35 24 21 24 43 0 34 24 39 0 21 24
Med. 13 13 13 14 11 17 7 18 32 0 5 24 27 0 7 17
a lower no-show rate.
Another important ﬁnding from Table 5 is that the best performing policies tend to be
more ﬂexible, demonstrating higher standard deviations and ranges across scenarios. The best
performing policies are more sensitive to changes in the parameter values across scenarios be-
cause they dynamically incorporate the no-show rate (α2), the Class 1 demand parameter (λ1),
and the revenue (p) and overtime cost (h) into the computation of booking limits. The worst
performing policies have static Class 2 booking limits.
Table 4.6 displays additional performance measures, including the expected number of book-
ings across classes, the expected number of attended appointments, and the expected number of
rejected appointment requests across classes. Table 4.6 summarizes actual bookings, attended,
and rejections whereas Table 5 summarizes what the clinic is willing to book before any requests
are received. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that for Class 2, the booking limit, average attended, and
average booked are slightly lower for MR than both OPT and STOP on average. The aver-
age expected total number of bookings, attended, and rejections is similar across these three
policies. The OPT, STOP, MR, UB, and ROA policies all serve an average of about 23 total
patients (95.8% of nominal capacity) with UB and SC serving an average of about 22. However,
some of these policies strongly outperform others in terms of expected proﬁts due to variation in
overtime costs. For instance, the ROA policy does little to control variation in Class 1 demand
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by always protecting its full capacity for Class 1 patients. While ROA sees an average of 23.0
patients, high variation in Class 1 bookings leads to overtime and lower expected proﬁts than
LB which only sees an average of 22.1 appointments. Similarly, UB books many Class 2 patients
so the variation in the number that will attend is higher than with policies which book fewer
class 2 patients.
The policy with the highest average expected number of bookings is the UB policy. This
policy gives preference to Class 2 patients, who have a lower attendance rate. On average, the
UB policy books 18.8 Class 2 patients, 14.0 of which attend, and rejects 10.9 total requests.
POA and ROA have the highest average expected Class 1 bookings (17.4). The policy with the
lowest average expected total bookings (highest rejections) is POA because it does not allow
any Class 2 patients to book. After POA, the next lowest (highest rejections) are the LW and
FCFS policies which, in addition to POA, do not allow overbooking. POA and LW reject mainly
Class 2 patients while FCFS and SC primarily reject Class 1 patients because they do not limit
Class 2 bookings.
Table 4.6 also provides insight into the costs of rejecting appointments. The range of the
total number of rejections across all policies except for pure open access is relatively small (10.9,
15.5), though the rejections diﬀer dramatically for the two classes. We can infer from these
results that incorporating a common rejection cost for both classes will not greatly aﬀect the
relative performance of the policies, although the policy values may change. If rejection costs
diﬀer among classes, this additional heterogeneity will have further impact on the allocation
decision.
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Table 4.6: Alternative Performance Measures by Policy
OPT STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
Class 2 Book 11.1 10.8 9.5 7.7 18.8 7.6 18.4 7.7 17.4 0.0
Class 2 Attend 8.3 8.0 7.1 5.9 14.0 5.6 13.8 5.9 13.1 0.0
Class 1 Book 14.7 14.9 15.7 16.2 9.1 17.4 8.1 15.5 6.2 17.4
Total Book 25.8 25.7 25.2 23.9 27.9 25.0 26.5 23.2 23.7 17.4
Total Attend 23.0 23.0 22.8 22.1 23.1 23.0 21.9 21.4 19.3 17.4
Class 2 Reject 8.3 8.6 9.9 11.7 0.6 11.8 0.9 11.7 1.9 19.4
Class 1 Reject 4.6 4.4 3.7 3.1 10.3 1.9 11.3 3.9 13.1 1.9
Total Reject 12.9 13.0 13.5 14.8 10.9 13.7 12.2 15.5 15.1 21.3
*Average Expectation Over 198 Scenarios. Note Class 1 Book = Class 1 Attend because α1 = 1.
4.4.5 Policy Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the sensitivity of the expected proﬁt of the policies to changes in
parameters. We are interested in the consistency of our revenue-based model results with those
of authors who have used cost-based models, in order to establish generality across diﬀerent
clinic objectives and situations.
Tables 4.7 provides sensitivity analysis of how the expected proﬁt changes with respect to
the Class 2 attendance rate as measured by the average percent diﬀerent from optimal across
scenarios. All of the policies except for ROA and POA show an improvement as the attendance
rate increases. This agrees with intuition that if advanced scheduling is allowed, high no-show
rates imply higher risk for overtime costs. The lower bound policies, such as LB and LW,
show a greater relative improvement than the upper bound policies, such as UB and SC, with
respect to the Class 2 attendance rate. LB proﬁts are less than 0.3% from optimal on average
when α2 = 0.9. Consistent with results found by other authors (Qu et al. 2007, LaGanga and
Lawrence 2007, Robinson and Chen 2010), the performance of POA and the performance of
ROA improve as the no-show rate increases. Across diﬀerent values of mean demand and cost
parameters, POA performs much worse than simple alternatives even when the attendance rate
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Table 4.7: Avg. Percent Diﬀerence from Optimal by Class 2 Attendance Rate
% STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
α2 = 0.6 0.219 0.579 4.471 1.913 2.777 6.090 7.244 23.120 21.563
α2 = 0.75 0.045 0.233 1.949 1.738 3.721 4.057 4.551 13.483 22.984
α2 = 0.9 0.002 0.054 0.285 1.096 5.089 1.713 1.332 4.272 24.461
is quite low. Even FCFS strongly outperforms POA and slightly outperforms ROA, when the
attendance rate is high.
Table 4.8summarizes how the mean percent diﬀerence from optimal expected proﬁt changes
with respect to changes in mean Class 1 demand. As earlier results indicate, lower bound
policies (LB, LW) show improved performance as mean Class 1 demand increases, while upper
bound policies (UB, SC) show decreased performance. This result is illustrated in 4.5 where the
optimal Class 2 booking limit is close to the upper bound when mean Class 1 demand is low and
close to the lower bound when it is high. The MR results are interesting in that performance
worsens as mean Class 1 demand increases; however when mean Class 1 demand is very high,
the policy performs extremely well with an average of 0% diﬀerence from optimal. POA shows
dramatic improvement in performance as mean Class 1 demand increases. Alternatively, ROA
results are mixed as the average diﬀerence ﬁrst increases, then decreases. This is likely due
to the fact that at ﬁrst demand is small enough that the chance of booking up to capacity is
very small. As demand increases, the risk of booking some Class 2 patients and booking up to
capacity in Class 1 patients increases. Once the probability of booking up to capacity in Class 1
patients is high enough, the ROA policy becomes a pure open access policy and does not allow
any advance bookings. These results support a ﬁnding from Qu et al. (2007) that nearly all
appointments will be held open if Class 1 demand is signiﬁcantly higher than capacity. Other
authors, such as Liu et al. (2010) and Green and Savin (2008) ﬁnd that high demand leads to
poor performance in open access because they explicitly model the impact of denying patients
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Table 4.8: Avg. Percent Diﬀerence from Optimal by Mean Class 1 Demand
% STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
λ1 = 6 0.000 0.012 5.242 0.117 2.381 0.451 10.386 12.704 70.511
λ1 = 12 0.002 0.187 3.990 0.328 5.617 1.557 8.241 13.166 44.116
λ1 = 18 0.005 0.380 2.256 0.696 7.893 2.816 4.829 12.328 19.760
λ1 = 24 0.092 0.733 1.241 1.688 3.159 4.877 1.598 13.604 3.921
λ1 = 30 0.292 0.000 0.000 4.246 0.021 8.185 0.000 15.862 0.021
Table 4.9: Avg. Percent Diﬀerence from Optimal by Mean Class 2 Demand
% STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
λ2 = 6 0.114 0.154 0.393 0.679 2.433 1.292 0.997 3.327 6.120
λ2 = 12 0.097 0.245 1.044 1.038 3.512 2.174 2.569 7.934 15.877
λ2 = 18 0.080 0.281 1.948 1.343 3.787 3.297 4.253 12.838 27.484
λ2 = 24 0.082 0.337 3.099 1.932 4.347 5.157 5.883 18.258 28.522
λ2 = 30 0.082 0.364 3.717 2.450 4.591 6.426 6.512 20.511 28.832
service. Our model assumes Class 1 requests leave without cost if rejected.
Sensitivity analysis for the eﬀect of mean Class 2 demand on percent diﬀerence from optimal
expected proﬁt is shown in Table 4.9. Since Class 2 patients have a higher no-show rate,
the percent diﬀerence from optimal increases on average for all policies except for STOP. The
performance for STOP improves slightly because the likelihood that the ﬁrst local maximum
will be the global maximum is higher as λ2, the mean demand for Class 2, increases. When λ2
is extremely low, LB outperforms UB on average; however, as λ2 increases, UB outperforms LB
on average. Likewise, λ2, the LW policy outperforms the SC policy on average, meaning that
if the clinic can implement only capacity control or overbooking, it prefers capacity control. As
λ2 increases, the SC policy outperforms the LW policy on average and the clinic would prefer
single class overbooking to capacity control with no overbooking. Since POA does not allow any
Class 2 patients to book, its performance clearly deteriorates as λ2 increases, because it incurs
a higher opportunity cost by not allowing Class 2 patients.
Table 4.10 provides results regarding how mean performance changes with respect to the
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Table 4.10: Avg. Percent Diﬀerence from Optimal by p/h, (p = 100)
% STOP MR LB UB ROA SC LW FCFS POA
p/h = 0.25 0.057 0.181 1.450 2.706 5.950 5.680 3.030 12.415 22.025
p/h = 0.5 0.175 0.322 2.284 1.467 3.720 3.858 4.425 13.671 23.026
p/h = 0.75 0.034 0.363 2.972 0.574 1.917 2.322 5.671 14.789 23.957
ratio of revenue and cost parameters. As the overtime cost, h, increases, the lower bound
policies, LB and LW, perform better, where the opposite is true for the upper bound policies,
UB and SC. This result is expected because the upper bound policies are exposing the clinic to
more overtime risk and perform better when the overtime cost parameter is lower. This result
provides insight into the sensitivity analyses in earlier sections and Figure 4.5. The performance
of MR policy improves as h decreases. Likewise, the performance of POA increases slightly as
h increases. POA does not overbook, so changes in expected proﬁts are not due to changes in
h, given the same values for other parameters. The improvement in performance is more an
indication of how the optimal policy is changing and the decrease in the opportunity cost for
POA of not booking Class 2. Alternatively, the performance of ROA decreases as h increases
because ROA is a joint overbooking and capacity control policy which allows some overbooking
unless POA is optimal. Both policies are similar in that they oﬀer all Class 1 patients an
appointment (up to capacity), so we might expect similar behavior with regard to the changes
h. It is also interesting because the result agrees with Robinson and Chen (2010) that open
access performs better when there are small overtime surcharges.
4.5 Conclusion
We analyze joint overbooking and capacity control decisions in the presence of class-dependent
no-shows. Assuming immediate appointment requests attend with certainty, we derive a simple
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expression for the optimal booking limit for immediate requests as a function of previously
booked appointments which may no-show. Due to no-show heterogeneity, the proﬁt function
may not be unimodal in the number of advance appointments accepted, making it necessary
to use computationally intensive search methods to derive the optimal advance booking limit.
We develop upper and lower bounds which greatly reduce the size of the search space. We
perform sensitivity analysis to investigate how model parameters aﬀect the optimal expected
proﬁt and policy. We compare ten policies developed from this paper, previous models from the
literature, and popular outpatient appointment scheduling methods. The policies we develop
perform extremely well compared to the optimal.
Our results show that expected proﬁts are improved by allocating total capacity and over-
booking to distinct demand classes with diﬀerent no-show rates, even with constant revenue
per patient. Compared to a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve (FCFS) allocation, expected proﬁts increase
12.3% on average, across a numerical study of 198 scenarios, when incorporating capacity con-
trol with no overbooking. Expected proﬁts increase 12.6% using a single overbooking limit and
maintaining a FCFS allocation. When jointly incorporating capacity control and overbooking,
the optimal policy improves expected proﬁts 17.8% over FCFS. On average, expected proﬁts
for the lower and upper bounds perform within 2.24% and 1.58% of optimal, respectively. We
also develop a Marginal Revenue (MR) policy which quickly and accurately approximates the
optimal solution with mean and median percent errors less than 0.3%.
The implications of our results demonstrate how appointment allocation and overbooking
decisions should consider diﬀerences in patient attendance rates, forecasts of immediate appoint-
ment requests, and revenues relative to overbooking costs. On average, across our numerical
study the optimal policy protects 58.3% of its appointment capacity for immediate requests with
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a range of 12.5% to 100%. In 147 of 198 scenarios, the optimal policy allows future appoint-
ments to overbook. On average, the optimal policy sets its advance booking limit at 56.19%
of capacity with an average overbooking pad of 14.6% of capacity. On average, 25.8 total ap-
pointments (107.5% of capacity) are booked (11.1 advance and 14.7 immediate). When the
advanced booking limit is not reached, the clinic increases the number of immediate requests
it is willing to accept, but at less than a one-to-one ratio because attendance rates are higher
for immediate requests. The optimal policy generally books more advance appointments as
revenues increase relative to costs and fewer advance appointments as advance attendance rate
or demand for immediate appointments increases. Given the variability of optimal policy values
between scenarios, we show the value of using bounds and approximations provided in this work
to determine the best allocation for the setting, instead of naive FCFS allocations or crude
guidelines from practice - e.g. 25-35% future appointments and 75% immediate appointments
(Qu et al. (2007), Green et al. (2007)).
A pure open access policy (POA), which reserves 100% of appointment capacity for immedi-
ate requests, does not perform well on average with expected proﬁts 23.0% below optimal. POA
can be optimal if the advance appointment attendance rate is small relative to the immediate
demand distribution and the marginal overtime cost is not too far below the marginal revenue.
We develop policies, such as MR policy, which generalize pure open access and outperform it
under more general assumptions.
Our sensitivity analysis shows that clinics can achieve higher expected proﬁts by making
eﬀorts to impact important model parameters. Optimal expected proﬁts increase with the
appointment attendance rate, the mean demand for immediate requests, and the p/h ratio.
Clinics might attempt to increase proﬁts, for instance, by lowering no-show rates via appoint-
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ment reminders, or by increasing demand for immediate appointments by encouraging patients
to schedule closer to the desired appointment date.
Extensions to this work could incorporate features such as cancellations, rejection costs,
multiple booking attempts, and dynamic models. Cancellations have been incorporated in pre-
vious revenue management models assuming static no-show rates and memory-less distribution
of time until cancellation. If heterogeneity in attendance rates is partly due to cancellations, in-
tuition from our model suggests clinics would increase booking limits, since recourse is available
for some appointment waste. Often no explicit rejection costs are incurred in reality, but these
parameters could model the eﬀects of competition or increased appointment delay for patients.
Future work could also assume rejected requests make additional booking attempts at a later
stage or appointment date. Our model can also be extended into a dynamic model to allow
for simultaneous booking of diﬀerent patient classes, such as new or return patients. Empirical
studies have investigated patient attributes that determine probability of a no-show, but clinics
may ﬁnd it ethically inappropriate to use personal attributes for appointment allocation. Addi-
tionally, future research could extend our model to more than two booking stages, but no-show
heterogeneity requires tracking reservations from each class; leading to exponential growth in
the state space.
As clinic management technology develops, more clinics gain the ability to implement com-
plex appointment allocation policies. While recent work in operations sciences has developed
eﬀective policies, there is still opportunity for improvement translating research into practice.
Managers and researchers should continue to collaborate on developing eﬀective policies and
methods for using real-time data to drive decisions.
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Appendix A
Competition
A.1 Proofs of Key Results
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. We write the monopolist's optimization problem as
max
x≥0,µ≥0
pi = rλ− qx− cµ (A.1)
βx− h
µ− δx− λ − z = 0 (A.2)
λ ≤ Λ (A.3)
λ ≥ 0 (A.4)
λ < µ (A.5)
Solving the ﬁrst constraint, λ = µ − δx − hβx−z . Substituting back into the proﬁt function,
we write the KKT Lagrangian as follows
L = r
(
µ− δx− h
βx− z
)
− qx− cµ
− η1
(
µ− δx− h
βx− z − Λ
)
+ η2
(
µ− δx− h
βx− z
)
(A.6)
We write the stability conditions as
∂L
∂x
= (r − η1 + η2)
(
hβ
(βx− z)2 − δ
)
− q = 0 (A.7)
∂L
∂µ
= r − c− (η1 − η2) = 0 (A.8)
And the complimentary slackness condition
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η1
(
µ− δx− h
βx− z − Λ
)
= 0 (A.9)
−η2
(
µ− δx− h
βx− z
)
= 0 (A.10)
From Equation (A.8) and non-negativity conditions, ηi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, we see that the proﬁt
function is linear in the capacity decision, µ, for ﬁxed quality eﬀort decision, x. Therefore, if
r < c, then η2 > 0 which implies that λ = 0, i.e the provider does not enter the market. If
r > c, then η1 > 0 which implies λ = Λ. Assuming r > c implies λ > 0. Therefore, for any x,
µ− hβx−z = Λ. Solving Equation (A.7) for x, we obtain
x =
z
β
+
√
ch
β (q + cδ)
(A.11)
And the closed-form expression for capacity is obtained by substituting back into µ− δx−
h
z+βx = Λ to get
µ = Λ +
δz
β
+ (2cδ + q)
√
h
cβ (q + cδ)
(A.12)
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof. The proof for the ﬁrst case is trivial. If the market potential is not high enough for either
provider to make proﬁt capturing the full market potential then neither provider will enter.
Similarly, in the second case, if the market potential is not high enough for Provider 2 to
enter, then Provider 1 acts as monopolist.
In the third case, Provider 2 can enter as a monopolist, but there is not enough market
potential for both ﬁrms to break-even so both ﬁrms cannot operate in the market.
In the fourth case, there is enough market potential for both ﬁrms to enter the market. In
this case, if Provider j = 1, 2 sets quality and capacity such that it captures λj ≥ Λj then the
best response for Provider i 6= j is to capture the remaining market potential as if it were a
monopolist. The result follows from Proposition 2.1.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. We write the Lagrangian as follows
L =rλ− cµ− qx− k + η1
(
βx− hλ
µ− δx − z
)
− η2 (λ− Λ) (A.13)
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The stability conditions are given by
−q + η1
(
β − hλδ
(µ− δx)2
)
= 0 (A.14)
r − η1h
µ− δx − η2 = 0 (A.15)
−c+ η1hλ
(µ− δx)2 = 0 (A.16)
The complimentary slackness conditions are given by
η1
(
βx− hλ
µ− δx − z
)
= 0 (A.17)
η2 (λ− Λ) = 0 (A.18)
Solving, we eliminate the cases of [η1 = 0, η2 = 0] and [η1 = 0, η2 > 0] as infeasible, i.e. con-
sumers will be utility neutral with the outside option as shown in previous literature. The
interior solution, [η1 > 0, η2 > 0], provides a critical point solution which leads to negative prof-
its; therefore the ﬁrm can do strictly better by not entering the market. The only non-trivial
solution is for the ﬁrm to capture the full market with consumers utility neutral to the outside
option, [η1 > 0, η2 = 0]. Solving that case provides the result.
A.1.4 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.2 and structure of Theorem 2.1.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. We write the Lagrangian as follows
L =rλ− cµ− qx− k + η1 (βx−−z)− η2 (λ− Λ) (A.19)
The stability conditions are given by
−q + η1
β + hλ(
µ− λγx
)2
γx2
 = 0 (A.20)
r − η1h(
µ− λγx
)2
γx
− η2 = 0 (A.21)
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−c+ η1h(
µ− λγx
)2 = 0 (A.22)
The complimentary slackness conditions are given by
η1
(
βx− h
µ− λγx
− z
)
= 0 (A.23)
η2 (λ− Λ) = 0 (A.24)
Solving, we eliminate the cases of [η1 = 0, η2 = 0] and [η1 = 0, η2 > 0] as infeasible. The
interior solution, [η1 > 0, η2 > 0], provides a critical point solution which leads to negative prof-
its; therefore the ﬁrm can do strictly better by not entering the market. The only non-trivial
solution is for the ﬁrm to capture the full market with consumers utility neutral to the outside
option, [η1 > 0, η2 = 0]. Solving that case provides the result.
A.1.6 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.3 and structure of Theorem 2.1.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. We write the Lagrangian as follows
L = (r − qx)λ− cµ− k + η1
(
βx− h
µ− δx− λ − z
)
− η2 (λ− Λ) (A.25)
The stability conditions are given by
−λq + η1
(
β − hδ
(µ− δx− λ)2
)
= 0 (A.26)
r − qx− η1h
(µ− δx− λ)2 − η2 = 0 (A.27)
−c+ η1h
(µ− δx− λ)2 = 0 (A.28)
The complimentary slackness conditions are given by
η1
(
βx− h
µ− δx− λ − z
)
= 0 (A.29)
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η2 (λ− Λ) = 0 (A.30)
Solving, we eliminate the cases of [η1 = 0, η2 = 0] and [η1 = 0, η2 > 0] as infeasible. The
interior solution, [η1 > 0, η2 > 0], provides a critical point solution which leads to negative prof-
its; therefore the ﬁrm can do strictly better by not entering the market. The only non-trivial
solution is for the ﬁrm to capture the full market with consumers utility neutral to the outside
option, [η1 > 0, η2 = 0]. Solving that case provides the result.
A.1.8 Proof of Theorem 2.4
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.4 and structure of Theorem 2.1.
A.1.9 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. We write the Lagrangian as follows
L =rλ− cµ− qµx− k + η1
(
βx− h
µ− δx− λ − z
)
− η2 (λ− Λ) (A.31)
The stability conditions are given by
−qµ+ η1
(
β − hδ
(µ− δx− λ)2
)
= 0 (A.32)
r − η1h
(µ− δx− λ)2 − η2 = 0 (A.33)
−qx− c+ η1h
(µ− δx− λ)2 = 0 (A.34)
The complimentary slackness conditions are given by
η1
(
βx− h
µ− δx− λ − z
)
= 0 (A.35)
η2 (λ− Λ) = 0 (A.36)
Solving, we eliminate the cases of [η1 = 0, η2 = 0] and [η1 = 0, η2 > 0] as infeasible. The
interior solution, [η1 > 0, η2 > 0], provides a critical point solution which leads to negative prof-
its; therefore the ﬁrm can do strictly better by not entering the market. The only non-trivial
solution is for the ﬁrm to capture the full market with consumers utility neutral to the outside
option, [η1 > 0, η2 = 0]. Solving that case provides the result.
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A.1.10 Proof of Theorem 2.5
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.5 and structure of Theorem 2.1.
A.1.11 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof of Proposition 2.6
We write the monopolist's optimization problem as
max
x≥0
pi = rλ− qx (A.37)
βx− h
µ− δx− λ − z = 0 (A.38)
λ ≤ Λ (A.39)
λ ≥ 0 (A.40)
λ < µ (A.41)
Solving the ﬁrst constraint, λ = µ − δx − hβx−z . Substituting back into the proﬁt function,
we write the proﬁt function as follows:
pi (x) = r
(
µ− δx− h
βx− z
)
− qx (A.42)
Using the second-order condition, we can show that the unbounded proﬁt function is concave
in x because βx− z > 0 for any consumers to join with no expected waiting time.
∂2pi (x)
∂x2
= − 2rhβ
2
(βx− z)3
Taking the ﬁrst-order condition, we can solve for the interior solution as follows
∂pi (x)
∂x
= r
(
hβ
(βx− z)2 − δ
)
− q
Again, noting the condition βx− z > 0, we obtain the single positive root:
x =
z
β
+
√
rh
β (q + rδ)
The equilibrium arrival rate follows from substitution.
λ = µ− δz
β
− (2rδ + q)
√
h
rβ (q + rδ)
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For the full-market boundary solution, λ = Λ
Λ = µ− δx− h
βx− z
This equation will have two roots.
A.1.12 Proof of Theorem 2.6
The proof follows from Proposition 2.6.
A.2 Extensions
A.2.1 G/G/1 Queue
An alternative method for checking the robustness of the wait-time assumptions is to extend
our results to general arrival and service time distributions.
Now the expected wait time at Provider i = 1, 2 is approximated by Kingman's formula,
Wi (λi, µi) =
1
µi
+ 12µi
(
λi
µi−λi
)(
CV 2a,i + CV
2
s,i
)
where CVa,i denotes the coeﬃcient of variation
of the arrival time distribution which has variance σ2a,iwhere CVs,i denotes the coeﬃcient of
variation of the service time distribution which has variance σ2s,i. The formula is exact when
arrivals are Poisson, and is known to be very accurate when ρi =
λi
µi
is close to 1. The Nash
equilibrium for the symmetric duopoly game solves the following optimization problem.
max
xi≥0,µi≥0
pi = rλi − qxi − cµi − ki (A.43)
βxi − hWi (λi, µi)− zi = 0 (A.44)
λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ (A.45)
λi ≥ 0 (A.46)
λi ≤ µ (A.47)
From the above, we can again see that given the non-negativity assumptions, it is impossible
for a provider to make a positive proﬁt with homogenous consumers if r < c and k ≥ 0. The
optimal solution for the monopolist is given by the following proposition which generalizes the
earlier result for M/M/1.
Proposition A.1. If CV 2a + CV
2
s − 2 ≥ 0, then λ∗ = Λ
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Appendix B
Cancer Screening
B.1 Proofs of Key Results
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. We will derive the probability of each event by summing up the probabilities of all
sequences of the four random variables which correspond to that event. We drop the subscripts
on the random variables as all variables will regenerate between screens and follow the same
distribution independent of cycle number, time, and patient.
Three of the events are explained rather intuitively. First, we derive the probability of
detection via other methods at home.
P (SH) = P (X = min {X,L,H})P (Y = min {Y,L−X,H −X} | X = min {X,L,H})
Due to the memoryless property
P (Y = min {Y, L−X,H −X} | X = min {X,L,H}) = P (Y = min {Y,L,H}) = θ
τ + α+ θ
Substituting we obtain
P (SH) =
(
β
τ + α+ β
)(
θ
τ + α+ θ
)
Second, we derive the probability of a screen for cancer which detects cancer (developed at
home).
P (CH) = P (X = min {X,L,H})P (H −X = min {Y,L−X,H −X} | X = min {X,L,H})
Due to the memoryless property
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P (H −X = min {Y,L−X,H −X} | X = min {X,L,H}) = P (H = min {Y, L,H})
=
τ
τ + α+ θ
Substituting we obtain
P (CH) =
(
β
τ + α+ β
)(
τ
τ + α+ θ
)
Third, we derive the probability of a screen for cancer which detects no cancer.
P (NC) = P (H = min {X,L,H}) = τ
τ + α+ β
Now, we examine the probability of a dying at home which can happen in two ways: 1) the
patient dies before getting cancer, 2) the patient gets cancer but dies from other causes before
it's detected (via screening or other method). We assume that since the cancer is relatively
asymptomatic, there is no cost for living with the disease undetected.
P (DH) = P (L = min {X,L,H})
+ P (X = min {X,L,H})P (L−X = min {Y, L−X,H −X} | X = min {X,L,H})
Due to the memoryless property
P (L−X = min {Y,L−X,H −X} | X = min {X,L,H}) = P (L = min {Y,L,H})
=
α
τ + α+ θ
Substituting we obtain
P (DH) =
(
α
τ + α+ β
)
+
(
β
α+ β + τ
)(
α
α+ τ + θ
)
=
(
α
τ + α+ β
)(
τ + β + α+ θ
τ + α+ θ
)
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. From Equations (3.2) and (3.3) we have
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a1 = λ+ a2P (NC | Screen) (B.1)
a2 = a1P (Screen) (B.2)
The probability of having a screen within a cycle is given by
P (Screen) = 1− P (DH)− P (SH) = τ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(τ + α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
(B.3)
The conditional probability of a negative screen given that a screen occurs is given by
P (NC | Screen) = τ + α+ θ
τ + β + α+ θ
(B.4)
Therefore, we rewrite the balance equations as
a1 = λ+ a2
(
τ + α+ θ
τ + β + α+ θ
)
(B.5)
a2 = a1
(
τ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(τ + α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
)
(B.6)
Solving the balance equations we obtain the following expressions for the steady-state input
rates of the queueing network:
a1 =
λ (τ + α+ β)
α+ β
a2 =
λτ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. We show the convexity of the objective function in Equation (3.6) straightforwardly using
the second order condition.
∂2TC
∂µ2
=
2βτλb1
(α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
(
µ− λτ(τ+β+α+θ)(α+β)(τ+α+θ)
)3 ≥ 0
The denominator must be positive due to fact that the input rate into the screening node is
given by a2 =
λτ(τ+β+α+θ)
(α+β)(τ+α+θ) and the stability condition µ > a2.
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B.1.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We write the ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem given in Equation (3.6)
as follows.
c− λβτb1
(α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
(
µ− λτ(τ+β+α+θ)(α+β)(τ+α+θ)
)2 = 0
Solving for µ within the feasible region µ > a2 provides the solution
µ =
λτ (τ + β + α+ θ)
(α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
+
√
b1βλτ
c (α+ β) (τ + α+ θ)
The other results are derived straightforwardly by substituting the optimal capacity into the
input rates, the wait time function, and the cost function
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. We show the convexity of the objective function in Equation (3.16) straightforwardly
using the second order condition.
∂2TC
∂h2
= b1λ
2
 2λ(
µ− λ− λβh
)3
β2h4
+
2(
µ− λ− λβh
)2
βh3
 ≥ 0
Both terms must be positive since µ− λ− λβh = µ− a2 (h) > 0.
B.1.6 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. We write the ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem given in Equation (3.16)
as follows.
b1λ
1− λ(
µ− λ− λβh
)2
βh2
 = 0
Solving for h within the feasible region µ > a2 (h) and h ≥ 0, provides the solution.
h =
λ+
√
λβ
(µ− λ)β
The other results are derived straightforwardly by substituting the optimal average time at
home into the input rates, the wait time function, and the cost function.
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B.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. We show the joint convexity of the cost function in Equation (3.18) using the second
order conditions.
We write the Hessian of the cost function as follows.
H =

2λb1(
µ−λ− λ
βh
)3 − 2λ2b1(
µ−λ− λ
βh
)3
βh2
− 2λ2b1(
µ−λ− λ
βh
)3
βh2
b1λ
2
(
2λ(
µ−λ− λ
βh
)3
β2h4
+ 2(
µ−λ− λ
βh
)2
βh3
)

The (joint) convexity with respect to µ and τ holds due to the second order conditions as
given in the following three inequalities
H1,1 =
2λb1(
µ− λ− λβh
)3 ≥ 0
H2,2 = b1λ
2
 2λ(
µ− λ− λβh
)3
β2h4
+
2(
µ− λ− λβh
)2
βh3
 ≥ 0
det (H) =
4b21λ
3
βh3
(
µ− λ− λβh
)5 ≥ 0
Which all hold due to the stability condition µ > a2 (τ) = λ+
λ
βh .
B.1.8 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. We write the ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem given in Equation (3.18)
as follows.
∂TC
∂h
= b1λ
1− λ(
µ− λ− λβh
)2
βh2
 = 0
∂TC
∂µ
= c− b1λ(
µ− λ− λβh
)2 = 0
Solving within the feasible region µ > λ− λβh provides the solution
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h =
√
c
βb1
µ = λ+ λ
√
b1
βc
+
√
λb1
c
The other results are derived straightforwardly by substituting the optimal capacity and
average time at home into the input rates, the wait time function, and the cost function.
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Appendix C
Revenue Management
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. Assume x2 Class 2 patients patients have already been booked. Assume D1 ≥ x1 and
the clinic is considering whether or not to accept the xth1 patient. The marginal expected proﬁt,
∆x1V0 (x2, x1) , of accepting an additional patient can be written as:
∆x1V0 (x2, x1) = V0 (x2, x1)− V0 (x2, x1 − 1) = p− hP (Z2 (x2) > k − b1) (C.1)
Since the marginal expected proﬁt proﬁt is decreasing in x1, the clinic accepts Class 1
patients so long as ∆x1V0 (x2, x1) ≥ 0, i.e. P (Z2 (x2) > k − x1) ≤ ph , or until all requests have
been booked.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. Let b1 (x2) = b1 for all values of x2. We can write the expected overbooking cost as
L = hE [Z2 (x2) +min (D1, b1 (x2))− k]+. Note that h (z +min (D1, b1)− k)+ is an increasing,
convex function of z. From Example 8.B.3 on page 368 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)
we know {Z2 (x2) , x2 = 0, 1, 2...} is stochastically increasing convex. Therefore, Eφ [Z2 (x2)] is
increasing and convex in x2 for any convex function including hE [Z2 (x2) +min (D1, b1)− k]+.
Therefore, V0 (x2, b1 (x2)) is concave in x2 since the sum of concave functions is concave. This
implies V1 (x2, 0) must be concave in x2 since the component-wise maximum of concave functions
is concave.
C.3 Proposition 4.3
Proof. By deﬁnition, for any two random variables, R1 and R2, and increasing function φ
R1 ≤st R2 ⇐⇒ P (R1 > t) ≤ P (R2 > t) ∀t⇐⇒ Eφ (R1) ≤ Eφ (R2)
Since h [x− k]+ is an increasing, convex function of x, we can use stochastic ordering between
Z2 (x2) + min (D1, s− x2) and Z2 (x2 − 1) + min (D1, s− x2 + 1) to determine whether the
expected overbooking cost is increasing or decreasing.
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Z2 (x) +min (D1, s− x2) ≥st Z2 (x2 − 1) +min (D1, s− x2 + 1)
Z2 (x2)− Z2 (x2 − 1) ≥st min (D1, s− x2 + 1)−min (D1, s− x2) (C.2)
If P (Z2 (x2)− Z2 (x2 − 1) > t) ≥ P (min (D1s− x2 + 1)−min (D1, s− x2) > t) ∀t then Z2 (x2)
is stochastically increasing in x2. If the reverse is true, then Z2 (x2) is stochastically decreasing
in x2. (Note: each diﬀerence is either 0 or 1.)
For t ≥ 1
P (Z2 (x2)− Z2 (x2 − 1) > t) = 0 = P (min (D1, s− x2 + 1)−min (D1, s− x2) > t)
For t = 0
P (Z2 (x2)− Z2 (x2 − 1) > t) = α2
P (min (D1, s− x2 + 1)−min (D1, s− x2) > t) = P (D1 ≥ s− x2 + 1)
For t < 0
P (Z2 (x2)− Z2 (x2 − 1) > t) = 1 = P (min (D1, s− x2 + 1)−min (D1, s− x2) > t)
For any increasing function φ, Z2 (x2) is stochastically increasing in x2 and Eφ (Z2 (x2)) is
increasing in x2 if α2 ≥ P (D1 ≥ s− x2 + 1).
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. Let superscripts A and B denote the two cases, respectively, where the Class 1 booking
limit stays constant or decreases by one.
Case A: b1 (x2) = b1 (x2 − 1)
4V A1 (x2, 0) = pα2 − h4LA (x2, b1 (x2))
If the xth2 customer does not attend,
4LA (x2, b1 (x2)) = 0
= E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + min (b1 (x2 − 1) , D1)− k]+
−E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + min (b1 (x2 − 1) , D1)− k]+
If the xth2 customer attends and Class 1 demand is at least b1 (x2 − 1),
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4LA (x2, b1 (x2)) = E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + 1 + b1 (x2 − 1)− k]+
−E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + b1 (x2 − 1)− k]+
=
∞∑
z=k−y(x2−1)−1
P (Z2 (x2) > z)
−
∞∑
z=k−y(x2−1)
P (Z2 (x2) > z)
= P (Z2 (x2) > k − b1 (x2 − 1)− 1)
If the xth2 customer attends and Class 1 demand is equal to d < b1 (x2 − 1),
4LA (x2, b1 (x2)) = E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + 1 + d− k]+ − E [Z2 (x2 − 1) + d− k]+
= P (Z2 (x2) > k − d− 1)
Conditioning upon these sub-cases we write the marginal expected proﬁt as
4V A1 (x2, 0) = pα2 − hα2S (x2, b1 (x2)) (C.3)
−hα2P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − b1 (x2 − 1)− 1)P (D1 ≥ b1 (x2 − 1))
where
S (x2, b1 (x2)) =
b1(x2−1)−1∑
d=k−x2+1
P (D1 = d)P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − d− 1) (C.4)
Case B: b1 (x) = b1 (x2 − 1)− 1
4V B1 (x2, 0) = pα2 − pP (D1 ≥ b1 (x2 − 1))− h4LB (x2, b1 (x2))
Conditioning on sub-cases as in Case A, we derive the marginal change in expected overbooks
as follows and write the marginal expected proﬁt for Case B as
4V B1 (x2, 0) = pα2 − hα2S (x2, b1 (x2)) (C.5)
−P (D1 ≥ b1 (x2 − 1)) (p− h (1− α2)P (Z2 (x2 − 1) > k − b1 (x2 − 1)))
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